Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files: US/A/M (Chr)/134

Minutes of Briefing Session of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Washington, Department of State, September 7, 1950, 3:00 p. m.

Washington, September 7, 1950, 3:00 p.m.

secret

[Here follows list of representatives and alternate representatives present (8).]

1. Chinese Representation

Under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Austin, the Delegation continued its briefing meeting in the afternoon.¹ The first subject considered was that of Chinese Representation. Mr. Popper explained that Chinese representation had been one problem before June 25 and was a different problem at this time. Our position previously had been that we recognized the Chinese Nationalist Government as the Government of China and would vote for its continued seating, but at the same time we had made it clear that we would accept the decision taken by any United Nations body in this regard and would not attempt to influence other Members in behalf of our own position. With monotonous regularity since January 13, on which date the Soviets had walked out of the Security Council, the question had come up, in various bodies as a Soviet demand to exclude the Chinese Nationalist representatives, and except in one obscure case, the Soviets had been voted down. Mr. Popper observed that only sixteen UN members could be said to have recognized the Chinese Communist Government.

After Korea, Mr. Popper explained that the emphasis of the American position had shifted. Taking account of domestic and other factors, we had taken the line we did not wish to have the Security Council diverted from its fundamental task of stopping aggression. We had indicated that, when the Korean crisis was settled, we would be willing to consider the Chinese representation issue on its merits.

As the General Assembly approached, this was the situation: at the very outset the Soviet Delegation might seek to propose exclusion of the Chinese Nationalists. It was the position of the Department that any such proposal, which would have the effect of changing the representation of Nationalist China and seating the Communists should be opposed by the United States. We felt that at this juncture, we should use our influence to prevent such a step, but we believed that the question should be considered on its merits after the Korean conflict was brought to its conclusion. Moreover, we considered that when this matter came up in the Assembly, it should be dealt with as soon as it was raised in order to prevent its use as propaganda. At the most, we would accept the seating of the Chinese Nationalists on a provisional basis, subject to the conclusion of a proposed General Assembly study on credentials and recognition, submitted for the Assembly’s agenda by Cuba. Mr. Popper thought it possible that neither faction would be seated. It was difficult to see, however, how such a step would settle the problem, and it would raise particular difficulties with regard to continued Chinese Nationalist participation in the Security Council. Finally, Mr. Popper explained that the Department did not think this question required action by two-thirds majority, but rather by simple majority.

Ambassador Austin elaborated upon the change in our position. In the beginning we had said we would not support either removal of the Nationalists or seating of the Communists, and, while we would vote against seating the Communists, we would not permit this vote to be regarded as a veto. If the rest of the world saw fit to vote for the seating of the Chinese Communists, as a loyal member of the United Nations, we would accede to their wishes. Now we are ready to fight for the continued seating of the Nationalists. Senator Lodge inquired as to the basis of the change in substance of our position.

Ambassador Austin explained that, as a matter of principle, we did not believe that a country actively fighting the United Nations should be admitted. Yesterday, for example, in the Security Council, Dr. Tsiang, the Chinese Representative, had named divisions of the Communist Chinese armies which were now fighting divisions with different numbers and names under the North Korean army. These soldiers were nationals of North Korea, but there were two divisions with such Korean personnel which had previously been part of the Chinese Communist armies. In other words, the Chinese Communists were actively supporting Soviet aims in Korea. In his opinion, that was reason enough to oppose seating the Chinese Communists in the Security Council at this time.

Mrs. Roosevelt saw his point that, under these circumstances, there was no reason for voting to seat the Chinese Communists. At the same time the difficult thing to explain was why we were voting to retain the Chinese Nationalist representatives. She thought the public would appreciate why we did not want a Communist-controlled representative to be seated, but on the other hand it was impossible to mention that China was represented by the Nationalists, knowing what the Nationalists were and had been doing. Mrs. Roosevelt asked how we could put our position across to the public. After all, the Nationalists simply did not represent China. We could explain why we did not seat the other regime (she assumed that it was because we wanted the Nationalist vote in the Security Council that we wished to maintain the Nationalist representative there), perhaps the public should be told that fact frankly.

Ambassador Austin believed that there were arguments on both sides, and on balance it seemed to him that we were justified in taking the course in the United Nations which was recommended. Considering the effect of any other position on the Security Council, he recalled that often we were able to get only seven votes in the Security Council. Dr. Tsiang was very helpful by his vote and by his speeches in the Council. He had made a record on principle. If he were removed, our position would be difficult. Obviously, he could not be removed.

Mr. Dulles remarked that when the question of whether a certain government represented a country was raised, a rather illusive subject was being considered. What was meant by “represent” in such a case? If it was meant whether a certain group represented real aspirations for the welfare of the Chinese people, he would suppose that some of the Nationalist Chinese whom the Delegation knew could be relied upon to seek the real interests of the Chinese people just as much as other Chinese, who after training in Moscow, have now seized control of China. He recalled that during World War II there were various governments in exile which the United States continued to recognize because we felt that they were more truly representative of the hopes of their people. He would not indefinitely approve that kind of practice; for example, in 1921 and after we had made a mistake in continuing our recognition of the Russian Government in exile long after it had any chance of returning to power. In his view there was a limit to the time in which a government in exile could properly be recognized, but the Chinese situation was not yet fully crystallized in this regard. The Nationalists could not be completely written off. The present choice was better than no Chinese representation at all.

Mr. Cohen began by stating that he knew he was in a minority. He realized the United States must follow a consistent line of policy, but he wished to give the Delegation his reasons for doubting the wisdom of our present policy in regard to Chinese representation. While he did not like the Red Chinese any more than anyone else, and neither did he like Franco or Peron, experience had shown that failure to recognize a government was not the controlling factor in its success unless there was reason to believe such a government could be supplanted quickly; such a policy often did more harm than good. When there was a war, it was expected that the situation would be changed, but to continue such a policy in the long run was unpalatable since the loss was likely to be more than the possible gain.

He could appreciate the position recommended in view of the recent accession to power of Red China and our natural resentment at the aid which it was giving North Korea. At the same time he believed the Delegation felt that the Soviets were equally culprits in the Korean situation. We did not like the Yugoslav action in Greece, but we did not question their right to representation in the United Nations. If we opposed the Chinese Communists because of their recent accession to power, that was one thing, but in his view, no matter how much we liked the Chinese Nationalist representatives in the United Nations, it should be remembered that that group no longer had effective control of any part of its country. Indeed, since the recent statements on Formosa, the Nationalists, in his opinion, had lost the very little stake in China to which we might have held. Obviously, the Security Council would be pleasanter with the Nationalists represented. However, we should remember that the Soviets would probably veto our resolutions any way, so that Chinese representation really made no difference. Mr. Cohen did not believe that seating the Chinese Communists would prejudice the vital interests of the United States if we took the position we were not prepared to recognize them but that we realized that the Nationalist Government no longer had effective control of China. He felt on the whole this position was morally sounder—our needed votes in the Security Council should be bought by hard work. He believed the difficulty of allowing the Chinese seat to become vacant until the situation became clarified had been grossly exaggerated. The inconvenience of such a vacancy was, in his view, much less than that of continued Nationalist representation. Even the United States could not say that the Nationalists constituted the Government of China today. Our aims in Asia should be put on stronger ground.

Mr. Rusk respected Mr. Cohen’s viewpoint, which he had shared before the Korean crisis. However, one factor of great importance should be taken into account—we might be in a position in the Far East today more closely analogous to war than to peace. In his view, it was important to find some way to put Peiping on notice that its conduct would be observed by the international community. The Peiping regime was heavily involved in Korea and in Indochina, where it was training divisions to help Ho Chi Minh. There were difficulties caused in the Philippines through support given to the Huks’ operations through the Chinese community guided by Peiping. There was also subversive Chinese influence in Malaya. Moreover, it was possible that the Chinese Communist regime was presiding over the partition of China contrary to our traditional Objective of preserving the territorial integrity of China. We knew, besides, that we were not as isolated in our position as some would have us believe. The whole world was divided on this issue. There was no solid grouping of opinion on what China was and how it should be treated. Moreover, if the United Kingdom and India should change their positions, and that might possibly occur almost overnight dependent upon territorial-political developments, the balance would shift completely to our position. Mr. Rusk believed it possible that the British attitude might change, subject to developments in Hongkong. There the conduct of the Peiping regime would be the decisive factor. The present situation might simply be a prelude to an attack on peaceful members of the international community.

Mr. Cohen considered that we would achieve the greater part of this position by permitting the Chinese seat to become vacant. That was another thing from recognizing the Chinese Nationalists as the government of China. He would concede that Mr. Rusk’s arguments were cogent, but it still seemed to him that the United States would be on sounder ground by recognizing the doubt respecting the Chinese Communist regime and letting the seat remain vacant. Mr. Hickerson pointed out that the Chinese Communists’ battle would be half won if the seat were allowed to become vacant.

Mr. Hickerson pointed out that only sixteen of the fifty-nine members of the United Nations had actually recognized the Peiping regime. Thus, over two-thirds of the Members still recognized the Nationalists as the government of China; for him that was enough reason to continue to deal with the Nationalists.

Mr. Rusk believed another factor was relevant. We could not say as a matter of intelligence what the decision of the Kremlin was as to the role of China in the world situation. It was true that the Nationalist government on Formosa was in disrepute. But there were other things on Formosa. Among them were 400,000–500,000 troops. There was also Chinese, with different views than the Nationalists, who could be important to us. It seemed to him that we should preserve that potential strength on Formosa in the event that we should get into a general conflict in which case these troops would be needed.

Ambassador Austin considered that any other position than that recommended would damage our position in Korea. We had to maintain our strength; we could not make halfway concessions.

Mrs. Roosevelt agreed that any concessions at the present time would be undesirable. However, on the other hand, the fact had to be faced that in Asia there were people who felt that the United States had backed reactionary forces, and she could not agree that we should continue to be for Nationalist China simply because we liked Tsiang. She agreed that we could not make concessions to the USSR, but our position would be weak if we did something in which we did not believe. She was terribly afraid that she would have to agree that backing the Nationalists, regardless of how good they were individually, was continuing to back Chiang who was discredited. Neither would she back the Communist regime. She simply could not happily accept our keeping the Nationalist regime in a position of power. She had not realized that the status of Formosa was subject to any question, and believed that situation further justified a change in our position. She asked about the changed Formosan situation.

Mr. Rusk replied that on June 25 and 27 when the President did not know whether the Korean action would lead to a general war, an effort had been made to neutralize Formosa from a political point of view, putting off the political question of its status for later decision. In that case, Mrs. Roosevelt thought that our position of fighting to continue the Nationalists in the United Nations was weaker. Perhaps we should indicate that our position was temporary.

Mr. Hickerson thought there was not a great difference in the Delegation; it was a question of timing. The Department did not think the issue should be raised at this time with the present Korean situation. After that, all favored full consideration of the problem on the merits.

Senator Cooper indicated that he shared some of the doubts expressed by Mrs. Roosevelt and Mr. Cohen. He saw the great difficulty of maintaining the Nationalists since they opposed the right of the United Nations to determine who represents China. As regards the Peiping regime, the very facts that no one could get into China to see what was going on so that it was impossible to judge what the situation was and whether the Communist regime represents the real sentiment of the people, were disturbing to him.

Further discussion of the matter was deferred until the Delegation meetings in New York.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

1. The first briefing meeting, held on the morning of September 7, was chaired by the Secretary of State.