The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Cuba ( Norweb )
The Secretary of State encloses a copy of a letter of November 15, 1945,25 with its enclosure, from the Secretary of Commerce26 regarding the delay on the part of the Cuban authorities in taking over and operating the weather station at Camagüey, Cuba. Observations on a twenty-four hour basis are urgently needed from Camagüey for the protection of commercial and military aircraft operations in that area. This station was operated by the Army Air Forces until their scheduled withdrawal on July 15, 1945. The Army Air Forces requested the Weather Bureau to make arrangements for the continued operation of the station. As pointed out in the letter, the Cuban authorities [Page 913] indicated that they would be willing to operate the station. The Cuban meteorological service has not yet taken over the station and at present no official weather observations are being made at Camagüey. Approximately one hundred commercial passenger flights now operate into and out of Camagüey daily without adequate meteorological information.
The Embassy is requested, in its discretion, to take this matter up urgently with the proper Cuban authorities, emphasizing the need for weather observations from Camagüey, as a measure of protection for the safe and efficient operation of aircraft in that area.
It is requested that the Embassy advise the Department by telegraph of the action taken in the matter.27
- Not printed.↩
- Henry A. Wallace.↩
- Ambassador Norweb informed the Department in telegram 785 of December 6, 1945, despatch 664 of December 8, 1945, and airgram A–385 of March 13, 1946, that after receiving nothing more than formal acknowledgement of his Embassy note No. 863 to the Cuban Ministry of State dated December 5, 1945, an officer of the Embassy discussed the matter on March 17, 1946, with the Cuban Minister of Communications, Sergio Clark y Diaz, and the President of Cuba’s Civil Aviation Committee, and was assured that immediate investigation would be made and the earliest possible action taken to correct the situation (837.9243/12–645, 12–845, and 3–1346).↩