In reply I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum prepared by an
officer of the Embassy, in which the four points of interest
[Page 899]
to the Department are
separately discussed. It may be remarked that the Cuban Government’s
eventual request for the establishment of United States army (ground
force and air force) missions to its army would, in ordinary procedure,
most probably be directed to the Department of State through the Cuban
Embassy at Washington, and that therefore the fact that this Embassy has
as yet received no word regarding the preparation of such a request need
not for the time being be regarded as an unpropitious circumstance.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by Mr. H. Bartlett Wells, Second
Secretary of Embassy in Cuba
I.
The conclusions embodied in General Brett’s report on the staff
conversations held between representatives of the American and Cuban
Armies in Habana may be summarized, in their essential parts, as
follows:
The Government of Cuba indicated, through its military
representatives, its willingness to standardize on United States
tables of organization and equipment; to standardize on United
States armament, and to continue to depend on the United States for
the supply of arms, matériel, and equipment; to lend assistance to
maintain hemispheric defense within the capabilities of the army;
and to take advantage of a long-range program for training Cuban
army students in the continental United States and Panama Canal
Department Service Schools. The above undertakings are within the
capabilities of the proposed Cuban army and can be accomplished.
The appropriations allocated in the 1945–46 budget for the Cuban
Armed Forces is adequate to maintain the armed forces desired.
Requested Tables of Organization and Equipment made by the Cuban
representatives are well suited to the topography of the country,
its available manpower, and its fiscal capacity.
The Cuban Army representatives expressed the desire to receive Ground
and Air Force Missions, which the author of the report feels they
should be encouraged to request as soon as practicable.
The Cuban Air Force as currently organized and equipped is capable of
conducting primary, basic, and advanced flight training, but is not
at present capable of engaging in effective combat operations.
Progress has been sufficient to justify the receipt of a limited
number of
[Page 900]
United States
combat aircraft. The present number of trained enlisted technicians
is inadequate.
The Cuban Air Force desires to maintain a minimum supply of spare
parts in Cuba, and to receive major items of Air Corps supply from
the Panama Air Depot. It desires to expand its aviation overhaul
facilities to provide for complete overhaul of all aircraft; this
will require additional shop facilities and new construction.
The Cuban Air Force desires to conduct primary flight training and
the corresponding ground schooling in Cuba, with advanced and
transitional flight training to be conducted in schools of the
continental United States. There is an immediate need for additional
United States training aids and devices.
II.
The recommendations embodied in the report may be summarized briefly
as follows:
The staff conversations had resulted in an agreement that the Cuban
Army eventually be supplied with matériel for the following units,
and it was recommended that this agreement be accepted as a basis
for establishing the size, organization and composition of the Cuban
Armed Forces:
- One light division, war strength, with certain
modifications;
- (One regimental combat team to be supplied with arms and
equipment with minimum delay)
- One squadron cavalry, horse, training strength, with
certain additions;
- One battery 155 mm guns, with certain
modifications;
- The following matériel: 7,000 carbines cal. 30; 4,000
horses, 86 ¼ ton trucks, and 60 2½ ton trucks, to re-equip
the Rural Guard.
- The following aircraft: One C–47 (transport); two AT–11
(trainers); four B–25 (bombers); one CA–9
(amphibian).
It was recommended that Cuba be encouraged to accept a Ground Force
and Air Force Mission at the earliest practicable date. The Ground
Force Mission should include the following:
- 1—Infantry Officer
- 1—Field Artillery Officer (pack trained)
- 1—Engineer Officer
- 1—Signal Corps Officer (radio and wire trained)
- 1—Medical Officer (Bn and/or Regt surgeon trained)
- 1—Cavalry Officer (advanced horseman, pack trained)
- 1—Ordnance or Quartermaster Officer (Division and pack
trained)
- 1—Veterinary Officer (field trained with pack or horse
unit) (Plus the necessary non-commissioned assistants and
clerks. The necessity of reasonable fluency in Spanish and
the desirability of battle experience, as well as of combat
decorations, were stressed.)
With regard to the Air Force Mission, the designation of the Chief
was recommended for the earliest possible date, and the designation
of “such additional air mission members as are required” as soon as
practicable. It was pointed out that one officer should have
extensive supply experience, and one additional officer extensive
experience in aircraft maintenance.
It was recommended that quotas be authorized for approximately 90
officers and 700 men annually at the various Panama Canal Department
and Continental United States Service Schools.
Coincident with the furnishing of the aircraft listed above, it was
recommended that refresher courses and transition training for Cuban
pilots and ground crews be conducted in the United States on B–25
aircraft.
It was further recommended that the Cuban Government be authorized to
requisition upon the Panama Air Depot for necessary training aids,
spare parts, accessories, engines, equipment, and general aviation
supplies; that student pilots of the Cuban Air Force be given
advanced and specialized flight training and associated ground
school instruction in Panama Canal Department or Continental United
States Service Schools; and that the United States Army Air Forces
translate and publish in Spanish six sets of specified technical
publications.
Finally, it was recommended that prior to the release of Air Force or
Ground Force equipment by the United States, the Cuban Government be
required to furnish positive assurance and make definite commitments
that it will meet the financial obligations incident to the proposed
reorganization of the Cuban Ground and Air Forces.
III.
Careful study of the report does not reveal any points of a salient
character which fail to be reviewed and emphasized in the
conclusions and recommendations summarized above.
IV.
The conclusions and recommendations which are summarized above are
succinctly set forth in Folder 02 (Covering Report, general), in
Folder 03 (Exhibit A, Annex I, Army Ground Force Plan), and in
Folder 15 (Exhibit B, Annex II, Army Air Force Plan). No features
[Page 902]
of them appear to be
objectionable or impracticable from the point of view of the
Embassy.
While it might appear that the recommendation transcribed in the last
paragraph of Section II above is superfluous (the report having
already indicated that the appropriations allocated in the 1945–46
budget for the Cuban Armed Forces was adequate to maintain the armed
forces desired, and the body of the report having shown that the
appropriations for the Cuban Armed Forces would almost certainly be
maintained no matter what financial crises might beset the country),
it is assumed that this recommendation calls merely for a formal
assertion of what is already acknowledged to be probable and
natural.
With regard to the recommendation that the Cuban Government be
encouraged to accept the missions referred to, it may be stated that
shortly after the receipt of the report the Acting Military
Attaché9 called on the Cuban Chief of Staff,10 who in his presence
dictated a letter to the Minister of National Defense11
recommending that the missions be formally requested of the American
Government. The Embassy has not yet, however, received any
intimation that such a formal request is being made through the
Ministry of State.
