710 Conference W and PW/2–1045: Telegram

The Ambassador in Bolivia (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

166. The Foreign Minister called me to the Foreign Office this morning for the purpose he stated of amplifying orally the outline of the Bolivian plan of action at Mexico City contained in the memorandum delivered to me last evening (Embassy’s telegrams 161 February 9, 6 p.m. and 162 February 9, 7 p.m.).62

Chacón stated that as a general proposition the efforts of the Bolivian delegation will be directed toward the establishment of a system of continental solidarity and collective security. From statements made later on in the conversation I gained the impression that the [Page 29] underlying reason for Bolivia’s attitude with respect to these points is the conviction that Argentina and Brazil must clash within the next few years and that in that event geographical factors would compel them to wage war on Bolivian territory. I also inferred that Bolivia hopes that the Atlantic Charter may afford a means of preventing such a development and that the Bolivian delegation will stress the significance of that pronouncement at the conference.

With respect to Argentina, Chacón stated that he wished to have us know that Bolivia feels that the present situation is most unfortunate and that it is highly desirable that Argentina be brought back into the concert of American Nations. I asked him if he did not also feel that considerable responsibility rests upon Argentina for the existence of the present situation and that it has some contribution to make toward its return to the American community. He stated that of course this is the fact and that Bolivia’s attitude at the conference will be governed by a spirit of cooperation with the majority of the American States.

As to the port question, Chacón stated emphatically that it is a matter of vital importance to Bolivia which feels that it must have an outlet to the Pacific and that historic wrongs connected with that problem must be rectified. He stated, however, that on this point the attitude of his delegation will be prudent but he left no doubt in my mind that the subject will come up in one way or another at the conference.

Chacón mentioned Dumbarton Oaks and stated that after careful study the Bolivian Government strongly favors the Padilla proposals over those emanating from the Dumbarton Oaks meeting.

The Minister stated that Bolivia is disposed to establish relations with the Soviet Union63 but that it intends to do so in its own manner and at a time of its own choosing. He added that he has reason to believe that Chile, Ecuador, Colombia and perhaps other countries contemplate proposals at the Mexico City conference whereunder all Latin American states which have not done so would simultaneously establish relations with the Soviet Union. In this connection he endeavored to obtain my views as to the possible threat to security which the Soviet Union may constitute in world affairs after the war.

He stated that he understands that an effort may also be made at the conference to bring about the breaking of relations with the Franco Government64 [by] all American States and commented that he thought this would be unwise and undesirable. He added that he [Page 30] considered the explanation made in Sumner Welles’ Time for Decision of the considerations which induced the United States to maintain relations with Franco very sound and still applicable and that the action to which he referred would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.

He repeated that if any move were made at the conference offensive to Bolivian dignity he would withdraw instantly.

Chacón stated that he is very anxious to have an early interview with the Secretary and Nelson Rockefeller and in this connection he spoke most highly of Avra Warren65 and expressed the hope that he also would be present at the conference. When I asked him if there were any specific subjects which he wished to discuss with the American delegation Chacón replied that he wishes to take up plans affecting Bolivian tin and other minerals, rubber and petroleum and also further American collaboration especially in the reorganization of the Bolivian banking system by means of financial support which would make possible the separation from the Central Bank of its present commercial functions leaving it solely as a bank of issue.

Thurston
  1. Neither printed.
  2. For documentation on the concern of the United States regarding relations between the American Republics and the Soviet Union, see pp. 223 ff.
  3. For documentation on the attitude of the United States with respect to the Franco régime in Spain following World War II, see vol. v, pp. 667 ff.
  4. Director, Office of American Republic Affairs.