Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The American Republics, Volume IX

711.35/10–645: Telegram

The Chargé in Argentina (Cabot) to the Secretary of State

Buenos Aires, October 6, 1945—2 p.m.
[Received 5:23 p.m.]

2449. In considering my 2434, October 5, 11 a.m.,⁵⁷ I believe Dept. should bear following in mind:

1. Cooke to my mind is undoubtedly doing his best to clean out Nazis and may be expected, if he remains in office, to accomplish quite a bit in this field even though his cooperation from other Argentine officials is far from perfect.

2. Although Cooke has some political standing basically speaking Perón is his master.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8. Our ease against this Government depends primarily on Nazi sympathies and aggressive Fascist tendencies of Perón and clique not upon what it is doing to Argentine people, outrageous though that may be. At moment Cooke is building up case for compliance foreshadowed in Embassy’s telegram 2066, September 4, 10 p.m.⁵⁸ Embassy is handicapped by lack of instructions re ACC vesting and repatriation programs and by fears that urging compliance in minor matters will play into Perón’s hands. Embassy experts tell me that economic case against Argentina is already becoming from a purely legalistic standpoint poor. Nevertheless Nazi machine is by no means wrecked.

9. I must therefore emphasize that continuance of strong policy toward Argentina requires building up our case by showing extent of Nazi activities in Argentina and making demands which would really end them. Open references on our part internal political matters may well be resented in Argentina and other Republics as interference in internal affairs and are therefore unsatisfactory as justification for action.

10. News despatches from Washington re congressional reaction to Argentine situation are having most unfortunate effect locally. If assumptions in my 2368, September 30, 11 a.m.⁵⁹ are not correct and if [in?] congressional or public opinion the internal situation or any other reason renders unlikely the carrying through of strong policy, then let us take advantage of Cooke’s attitude to climb off limb while there is yet time. Our policy at begining must be based on how far we are prepared and able to go at end. Under no circumstances should we appease but we could shift our major attack to Nazi activities, remembering that any success achieved will of itself hearten local democratic forces. But I must emphasize to Dept. that only by replacement of this basically Nazi government by a democratic government can we hope effectively to destroy Nazi machine in Argentina.

Cabot

57. Not printed.
58. Ante, p. 406.
59. The statements indicated, in summary, that the Argentine replacement program had eliminated 5 firms, was in the process of liquidating 8, and had brought 59 under control of the Government.