835.00/9–2845: Telegram
The Chargé in Argentina (Cabot) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:30 p.m.]
2353. This afternoon I had a further long talk with the officer referred to in my telegrams 2316, September 27, 6 p.m., and 2320, September 27, 6 p.m.48 He rather obviously conveyed to me a message from Foreign Minister,49 as follows. He said that there were only two possible solutions to present situation:50 (1) Immediate and drastic action, and (2) a short period of calm for Cooke and the other Radical Ministers to get democratic procedure again functioning and [Page 479] make further progress in eliminating Nazi activities. He said that worst possible course would be to let matters drift and to keep stirring up emotions by further statements, in which connection he referred to Ambassador Braden’s statement that he was “shocked but not surprised” and, as being unfortunate. In this event there would be chaos in the country particularly as the opposition had no clear leadership. He said that the Foreign Minister was doing everything he could and pleaded for me to do everything I could to gain him a little more time. He asked me what the reaction to events had been in the U.S.
I said that news reports already showed that reaction had been bad; that even if I wished to do anything I was completely helpless; that I felt like a man trying to shoot Niagara Falls in a washbasin; and that in spite of Foreign Minister’s best efforts we were no further ahead in liquidation of German interests than when he took office 3 weeks ago. In this connection I cited latest Graf Spee developments, our failure to get into German banks in spite of a formal Foreign Office note (I have just heard that bank custodian is admitting us Monday), and failure of things to move ahead in liquidation of German firms. I said that we had been waiting for action for 4 years on basis of promises and that only some drastic action by Argentina might help matters. I spoke sympathetically of Foreign Minister’s position but said that he was now undoubtedly as helpless as I was.
My friend continued earnestly to urge me to prevent action for a short time further. He spoke of the special commission which has been set up in Foreign Office which now included representations [representatives?] of other Ministries, and said it would expedite action on our notes. I said that the best I could promise was to report his comments to the Department. British Counselor51 also spoke to same officer of deplorable effect of events on public opinion.