835.00/10–1945: Telegram

The Chargé in Argentina (Cabot) to the Secretary of State

2598. Fascist nature of Perón regime again emphasized by yesterday’s events. Manifestations showed excellent organization of hoodlums on Fascist lines like Brown Shirts and Black Shirts. Events again indicate that Perón plans a proletarian, totalitarian dictatorship with army and police support.

Unless successful reaction quickly occurs, Perón’s comeback is likely to result in fairly long step forward toward social revolution in Argentina. With extremes of wealth and poverty, this in itself is perhaps proper; tragedy is that a Fascist dictator is leading it and using such methods.

[Page 423]

Conservative opposition by their miserable failure to face realities have permitted Perón’s return to power apparently stronger than ever. Until democratic elements gain prestige and achieve cohesive leadership and organization, it is evident that choice is probably Perón or chaos rather than Perón or democracy. Effect of Perón’s social measures will probably leave their mark on Argentine social thinking for years.

General strike yesterday is likely to give labor confidence in own power overlooking active support of police and leadership of Fascist hoodlums. Thereby a second effort to oust Perón should be more difficult. An attempt on Perón’s life would not surprise me. Also old rumors of lung cancer have been revived.

As I see it, three major lines of policy are open to U.S.:

(1)
We could appease. With Cooke40 again in, Perón embarking on social reforms and his popularity probably growing, some of our best arguments against conciliation are disappearing. It is even possible that he would be able to win if there were free elections although few people believe there will be. I consider this policy fundamentally unsound for four reasons:
(a)
Nazi machine is unbroken and will probably remain unbroken as long as Perón is in, regardless of any efforts by Cooke.
(b)
Basic peril of an aggressive leftist totalitarianism in this hemisphere would remain unsolved.
(c)
We have gone too far to reverse ourselves.
(d)
Public opinion both in U.S. and in other American Republics would presumably be opposed to any appeasement.
(2)
We could for the time being rightly say that internal Argentine situation is a mess. While making clear on all appropriate occasions our democratic ideas and our principles regarding social and labor matters, we could then pursue a crackdown against Nazis and maintain firm attitude vis-à-vis this Government in all international affairs. We could endeavor to convince other American Republics of fundamental insincerity of Argentine totalitarian regime and danger its continuance represents for entire continent including themselves. I believe that this course is preferable to No. 3 even though it does not promise immediate results:
(a)
Because it does not involve any international collaboration which we may not be able to secure;
(b)
Because it should not poison our relations with Argentina and other countries for years to come;
(c)
Because it should not reduce Argentina to chaos as I fear 3 would;
(d)
Because it should not stop food supplies to Europe.
Such a policy might follow the general lines outlined in my 2390, October 2, 6 p.m. and include publication of damaging documents [Page 424] mentioned in my 2582, October 18, 8 p.m.43 also negotiation of strongest inter-American resolutions which can be secured from other Republics not involving economic sanctions.
(3)
We could adopt policy of full crackdown on Argentina involving possibility of economic sanctions and even military action if this proved necessary. Granting this is the only means of destroying Fascist regime in its inception, I am inclined to doubt its wisdom for reasons mentioned above. I would in any case suggest that active steps be delayed, as suggested in my 2390.

Department should, of course, appreciate in making policy decisions that another startling reversal might make any decision obsolete at any given moment. I have discussed existing situation with many qualified observers and consensus overwhelmingly supports views regarding Perón’s situation and prospect set forth above, nevertheless recent events have proved that anything can happen here.

Foregoing was drafted before my 259743 of today. It emphasizes truth preceding sentence but I believe bears out my recommendations.

Cabot
  1. Minister for Foreign Affairs.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not printed.