867N.01/9–2645

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)42

Subject: Present Status of Our Policy on Palestine, and Suggestions

Mr. Henderson: Recent developments with respect to Palestine have in our opinion rendered it all the more essential that the Department [Page 746] should do everything possible to bring about a more unified and positive Government policy on Palestine. The essentials of such a policy should, we believe, be made public and be adhered to by all branches of the Government in the future handling of the Palestine question.

Reports which have been received from newspaper and other sources in the past ten days have served once again to emphasize the necessity for a clarification of our policy on a question which has such far-reaching and explosive potentialities as does the Palestine problem. It would appear, although we have as yet no definite confirmation of this in NE, that under date of August 31 President Truman addressed a secret communication to Prime Minister Attlee enclosing a copy of the Harrison report on refugees, and urging that immediate steps be taken to admit 100,000 displaced Jews into Palestine from the internment camps in Germany. This letter was apparently taken by the Secretary to London and became the basis for certain discussions which he has had on the subject with Foreign Secretary Bevin and other British officials. The President evidently intended to make the Harrison report public, together with the proposal he had made to Mr. Attlee, but was dissuaded by an urgent appeal from Mr. Attlee, who considered that nothing could be more calculated to cause “grievous harm” to the relations between Great Britain and the United States. The existence of the President’s letter to Mr. Attlee was announced in the press by former Senator Gillette, who, however, a few days later issued a formal and complete denial of any statements attributed to him on this subject.

More recently the matter has been mentioned in newspaper accounts carried by Reuter’s from London and it is to be anticipated that these reports will also appear in the press in the Near East. When this occurs, the Department will undoubtedly be bombarded by protests from Arab sources, as well as requests from our representatives for confirmation of the reports and instructions as to our policy. One detail in the Reuter’s despatch which is of special interest is the claim that the President’s alleged communication to Mr. Attlee is particularly resented by certain British officials because the Truman administration [Page 747] had recently rejected a proposal by the British Cabinet to share responsibility for Palestine. This may be a reference to discussions which Mr. Truman told the press he had had with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Attlee at, Potsdam but regarding which we in NE have no information.

To summarize, the present handling of our Palestine policy at the highest levels has already seriously irritated the British and threatens to have even more far-reaching effects upon our relations with the Near Eastern countries. It is accordingly our recommendation that the Department undertake the necessary clearance with the President, the Secretary, and the British Government for the issuance by the Department of a public statement of policy on Palestine which would seek to clarify the present position.

Such a statement would have as its starting, point the Harrison report on refugees which undoubtedly prompted the President’s apparent intervention with the British Government. This report deals with the displaced persons in the camps in Germany and points out with considerable clarity not only that the present physical condition of these persons leaves much to be desired, but also that they have no hope for the future in their former places of residence. Mr. Harrison asserts that the vast majority of the Jews in the camps, who number less than 100,000, desire to go to Palestine and that immediate steps should be taken to facilitate this objective.

Our proposed statement, after stressing the deep sympathy which the American Government feels for the displaced Jews of Europe, in line with our established policy of affording aid to the victims of Nazi persecution, would say that the possibility of admitting these persons into Palestine in the immediate future had been discussed with the British Government. The British, however, had decided that in present circumstances it would be impossible to allow any large number to go to Palestine. In view of the responsibility which the British bear as the Mandatory Power, we were not in a position to take issue with their decision. The statement would then summarize concrete steps which might be taken to assist the displaced persons in question. Such steps would include the issuance by the President of a strongly-worded directive to the American military authorities, urging immediate action to improve conditions in the internment camps. Steps should next be taken toward separate handling for the displaced Jews, in recognition of their special plight as compared with the other displaced persons. Every effort should be made, in conjunction with UNRRA43 and other agencies, to get the Jews out of the camps as soon as possible. Those willing to return to their former homes should be assisted to do so, while the remainder, representing the [Page 748] hard core of the stateless and non-repatriable persons, should be the object of the urgent consideration of the Allied Governments. Those whom the British Government would be willing to admit to Palestine should be allowed to proceed there as promptly as possible. Efforts should be made to amend our present visa procedures and other restrictions so as to make it possible for some of these Jews to come to the United States under our immigration quotas. Some properly equipped and managed temporary place or places of refuge should be developed as a place where the ultimate remainder could go pending a final decision as to their disposition. Such a decision might well involve an appeal by our Government to each of the other United Nations to accept as immigrants a proportionate number of these people, in the same proportion as we ourselves were ready to accept them.

With regard to Palestine, our statement would add that while Palestine is primarily a British responsibility, the American Government naturally has a deep interest in reaching an equitable solution of the different problems involved, which will undoubtedly come up for settlement under the trusteeship provisions of the San Francisco Charter. The statement would conclude by pointing out that in any event it is the view of the Government of the United States that there should be no decision affecting the basic situation of Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

The foregoing will, of course, require considerable implementation with the military authorities in Germany (and with our own visa issuing authorities) but it is believed to present the only feasible means of getting our policy out of its present impasse and on to a workmanlike basis.

Gordon P. Merriam
  1. Attached to this memorandum was a hand-written comment addressed to Mr. Henderson by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) as follows: “It seems apparent to me that the President (and perhaps Mr. Byrnes as well) have decided to have a go at Palestine negotiations without bringing NBA into the picture for the time being. The question we must answer is: Should we nevertheless inject ourselves actively into the negotiation with further recommendations at this stage, or should we wait to be called?

    There are pros and cons, but on balance I’m inclined to recommend that we stand by for the moment. It is true that as officials of the Govt. we have a responsibility to recommend the course of action which in our judgment is best, whether we are asked to do so or not and regardless of whether our suggestions are adopted. In some cases I strongly favor this line. But in the present case, we have already given Mr. Byrnes our fully considered recommendations on Palestine. I see nothing further we can appropriately do for the moment except carry on our current work, answering letters and telegrams, receiving callers, etc. as best we can, pending the time (which will come soon) when the whole thing will be dumped back in our laps.” (867N.01/9–2645)

  2. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.