881.00/5–2245: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 24—1:45 a.m.]
1105. It is not clear from Tangier’s airgram A–148 and A–150 of May 109 that adequate provision has been made for the participation in the proposed restoration of international control in the Tangier Zone of all of those powers who have signed or adhered to the Tangier statute. Although it may be that considerations of policy make inadvisable merely a return to the status quo ante the Spanish occupation, the fact can hardly be overlooked that the statute is nevertheless still in effect and that any action involving a revision of [or?] termination of the international regime for which the statute provides in which the initiative is taken or shared by the United States which has [Page 607] never adhered to the statute and from which there are excluded any of the seven powers10 who were actively participating in the administration of that regime prior to Nov 1940 will be likely to expose the United States to serious criticism on the part of the excluded powers. I should, therefore, think it important that regardless of what form the actual reoccupation of Tangier may take and regardless also of the nature of the interim regime which it is proposed thereafter to install, the reoccupation should at least be given the appearance of being a joint action on the part of the participating statutory powers. With the possible addition of Sweden which has adhered to the statute but never actively participated in its administration and with the support, if desired, of the United States as a legitimately interested power designed to relieve Spain of the responsibility of preserving single-handedly the neutrality of the Zone, the emergency which prompted it to assume responsibility in 1940 having passed with the termination of hostilities in Europe. Within this formula the de facto participation of the United States could be invoked in whatever manner and to whatever degree might be deemed desirable and an interim regime could then be established in accordance with the requirements of the situation and in conformity with the best interests of those powers legitimately concerned.
Inasmuch as Spanish cooperation is indispensable in any enduring solution of the Tangier question it is essential as a matter of expediency that Spain be permitted to get out of Tangier without public humiliation or loss of face which as indicated in my 307 of Feb 10, 6 a.m. [p.m.]11 it appears willing to do and to that end it would appear to be eminently advisable to invite the Spanish Govt, to participate in the reoccupation of the zone as reference airgrams suggest.
Whether it is deemed desirable or undesirable for us to participate in a duly revised international administration in Tangier I am opposed to our embarking upon such a course in a manner which might detract from our future prestige and influence there and elsewhere. The entire world and particularly the smaller nations will be holding under close scrutiny the manner in which we are to wield the vast power which we have amassed in the course of the present war and for us to lay ourselves open to the charge of treating Tangier as a prize of war or of taking such action there as could be construed as being in disregard of existing treaty obligation or of the rights of smaller nations would be to jeopardize that great moral influence which is in itself one of the most precious assets of our foreign policy.
Rptd to Tangier as 59, to Paris as 243 to London as 327 and Lisbon as 115.