811.24591/10–1845: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:57 a.m.]
851. Africa-Middle East Theater and Persian Gulf Service command have received telegram from War saying Dept has expressed concern over political implications of despatch of 2,200 troops to Persian Gulf Service Command as replacement for high point men to be released. They are instructed report when the replacements can be dispensed with and plan send reply in teletype conference with War from Cairo Oct 19.
Embassy does not feel political repercussions in Iran of arrival replacements need be serious especially in view Iran Govt’s request that American troops stay as long as British and Russians. Iranians have hitherto shown little interest in specific movements American troops and could hardly object officially to moves designed solely to expedite liquidation of American interests here.
Whether arrival replacements or exact time departure our troops from Iran would have any bearing on Soviet or British policy seems questionable. According to press, Molotov has clearly indicated Russians have no intention of leaving before March 2. Unless Dept plans forceful approach to Moscow to effect earlier withdrawal I doubt that anything we may do will matter in this respect so long as our forces do not overstay March deadline.
Therefore unless Dept has information unknown to me or unless policy decisions have been taken of which I am ignorant, I would not recommend any move which would handicap withdrawal American movable property or prematurely cause abandonment of fixed installations here. I assume Dept does not contemplate abandonment [Page 428] here of any substantial quantity movable equipment bulk of which is railroad rolling stock and Persian Gulf Service Command states it is physically impossible complete shipment of this before February 1. So long as any sizable force must remain to handle this shipment I think it will make little difference if other small units are left to guard major fixed installations. Past experience has shown use of civilians as guards is impracticable and delivery of all camps into gendarme custody would give Iran Govt whiphand in further sales negotiations.
I should make clear however I fully agree with policy of withdrawing our forces entirely from Iran as soon as that can be done without serious financial loss of US Govt and in any case by March 2, 1946.37
- The Department replied to this telegram in telegram 598, October 24, 1945, 8 p.m., which stated in part: “In view of concerted judgment Emb, OANLC, and War that troop replacements are desirable and necessary (urtel 851, Oct. 18), Army is prepared to send appropriate number in near future. Army system of release for high-point men does not permit suspension of withdrawals from Iran pending arrival replacements from US (urtel 818, Oct. 9 [not printed]). Number American troops in Iran should be progressively reduced to lowest level consistent with efficient disposal operation and, in any event, all must be withdrawn by March 2.” (811.24591/10–845).↩