Office of the Historian

891.00/10–1645

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

Tehran, October 16, 1945.

Dear Loy: I have your letter of September 27th with its enclosed memorandum35 to the Under Secretary. (Just in passing, I am very grateful to NEA and ME for sending us copies of memoranda affecting Iran.)

In general, I am wholly in agreement with the thoughts set forth in your letter and in the memorandum. It is certainly most desirable that foreign troops of all sorts be withdrawn from Iran at the earliest possible moment, and I concur that some monetary sacrifices on our part would be worth while if they contribute toward this end. Judging by the information we receive from Colonel Anderson, commanding the Persian Gulf Service Command,36 the Army is in accord so far as withdrawal of American troops is concerned, although probably for different reasons. Just a few days ago we learned that the necessity [Page 426] of shipping high-point men home for discharge is forcing PGSC to pull out its security detachments at 12 of the small road camps between Kazvin and Andimeshk, and the big camps at Hamadan and Khorramabad will likewise have to be abandoned in another two months, if they are not sold first. (We are arranging for Iranian Gendarme guards for the abandoned camps, but that is another story.)

My only qualification on the point of view you express is that we should not hasten our withdrawal to such an extent that it results in the loss of large quantities of movable property which could profitably be shipped out of Iran if not disposed of to local purchasers. Specifically, there are some thousands of railroad cars and a number of locomotives which the Iranians do not need and could not pay for in any case. PGSC is in process of preparing these for shipment, but I understand it will take some time and require perhaps 25 vessels. To leave this material behind would mean a heavy loss to our government, and only PGSC could conceivably handle its packing and loading.

To my mind, therefore, our policy should be as follows:

1.
To sell off our surplus property here as rapidly as possible, if necessary at less than maximum potential prices;
2.
To proceed as fast as possible with the shipment elsewhere, of all movable equipment for which there is no ready market in Iran;
3.
To withdraw PGSC troops as fast as they are no longer needed in connection with shipment of American property or other winding-up tasks.
4.
To retain American security detachments in our major installations (such as Amirabad, Hamadan, Khorramabad, Andimeshk, Ahwaz, and Khorramshahr) until they are sold or until all major shipments of movable property out of Iran have been completed. As the port of embarkation, Khorramshahr will necessarily be the last post to be evacuated, and so long as we have any sizable force there, it will make little difference politically whether or not small detachments are stationed at the other main camps.
5.
To do everything possible to sell the fixed installations prior to the complete withdrawal of the moveable property but not to abandon them prematurely. Only in the event that they are unsold by the March 2 deadline should be given serious consideration to abandonment.
6.
To withdraw completely from Abadan just as soon as the Army can possibly dispense with it as a base for repatriation of troops in India and Iran.

I am hopeful that the fixed installations will have been disposed of by the time PGSC can move out the unsold moveable items plus its own impedimenta and personnel and from present indications I believe the chances for accomplishing this are not at all bad. While I would be most reluctant to see American troops left in Iran after the departure of the bulk of the Command solely for the purpose of [Page 427] guarding the camps, I cannot but view premature abandonment with considerable concern.

From the international point of view, I realize it might be well to advocate immediate withdrawal of all American troops, regardless of what property might have to be sacrificed. If the Department is prepared to make a real fight with the Russians to get them out of Iran quickly, this would be the ideal policy. I do not advocate it because, first, I have had no indication that the Department intends to go to the mat with the Soviets on this issue, and second, because I am afraid it would result in substantial financial loss, arouse strong Congressional criticism, and might prove, in the end, to have little effect on Soviet actions.

Sincerely yours,

Wallace Murray
  1. Memorandum of September 17, p. 410.↩
  2. On August 3, 1945, the War Department ordered consolidation of the Persian Gulf Command under the Africa-Middle East Theater, effective October 1. The Africa-Middle East Theater issued a general order on September 21 establishing a Persian Gulf Service Command as an AMET subcommand.↩