800.24591/6–1845
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Minor)
| Participants: | The Iranian Minister |
| Mr. Loy Henderson51 | |
| Mr. Harold Minor |
The Iranian Minister called today at his request to discuss the question of the withdrawal of allied forces from Iran. The Minister began by giving a résumé of a telegram he had just received from his foreign office instructing him to take this matter up again with the Department of State. The Foreign Minister described the unfortunate situation of Iran, a condition of confusion and disruption in which there was no tenure of Government and in which he, himself, did not know how long he would remain Foreign Minister. He was therefore speaking as an Iranian citizen and expressing the viewpoint of Iranians. The Foreign Minister attributed this unfortunate condition of Iran to the presence of foreign troops on Iranian soil and stated that Iran’s situation cannot improve until these forces are withdrawn.
The Iranian Minister elaborated on this theme and urged that the Department do everything possible to bring about the withdrawal of these forces. He further stated that the Iranians are not worried about the presence of American troops on Iranian soil but are very much concerned about the presence of the British and Russians. He believed that the first step must be a declaration, on the part of the British, that they are now ready to depart and suggesting that the Russians take the same course. His view was that as long as there is one British soldier left on Iranian soil, the Russians will not withdraw. In reply to the Minister’s question, Mr. Henderson said that the British have not approached us formally on the subject of withdrawal so that we have no official knowledge of their viewpoint. Mr. Henderson, however, conjectured that the British might desire to remain in Southwestern Iran for the protection of the oil fields and the refinery at Abadan which are essential to the allied war effort. The Minister replied that keeping these troops there is not necessary because the British need have no fear of the Iranians and because the British have troops very near by in Iraq and have their battleships in the Persian Gulf. Mr. Henderson remarked that the American Army continues to operate the air field at Abadan, a vital link in communications to the Far East, and inquired what view the Iranians might take of this operation.52 The Minister replied that there would be no difficulty [Page 381] on this score and that “one way or another” this matter can be arranged.
The Minister inquired pointedly in closing as to what attitude the Department would take in this matter which, he understood, will be brought up at the next Big Three meeting. Mr. Henderson replied that we are not yet in a position to speak for the Department or for the United States Government in this matter. However, we can state that we view the Iranian request with the greatest of sympathy and wish to do whatever we can to alleviate the situation in Iran.53
- Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.↩
- For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. v, pp. 486 ff.↩
- The Iranian Minister reiterated his request for the support of the United States at the forthcoming Big Three meeting, in a conversation with the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs and the Acting Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs on July 5. He was assured that “we have this situation prominently in mind and that the Iranians may depend upon a sympathetic attitude on the part of the Department”. (891.24/7–545) The Big Three meeting refers to the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, participated in by President Truman, British Prime Ministers Churchill and Attlee, and Generalissimo Stalin, which met at Potsdam from July 17 to August 2, 1945.↩