811.24591/6–1545: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)
296. Dept is considering possibility of requesting War to accelerate withdrawal of American forces from Iran and would appreciate [Page 379] receiving your views and recommendations in light of following factors. While we have informed Iranian, British and Soviet Govts that we have been and are continuing to withdraw our forces, it appears that this process will be slow and in stages. War’s program on withdrawal is as follows: (1) redeployment of major part of remaining 11,000 troops will take several months (2) some 3,000 troops will be left indefinitely to care for installations until disposed of and (3) about 1,500 ATC men will be left at Abadan until end of war to operate and service military airfield. Brit have informally signified firm intention of retaining garrison in southwestern Iran until end of war. Thus with both American and Brit forces in southern Iran it seems unlikely that Russians will consent to any large scale withdrawal of their forces.
While continued presence of almost 5,000 American troops in Iran may expose us to future criticism and contribute to situation wherein Brit and Russians refuse Iranian request to withdraw, it is difficult to devise formula consistent with war effort which will avoid this. Evacuation of caretaking troops might be accelerated by speeding up surplus property disposal or by some alternative scheme of guarding installations. However airport at Abadan is essential to war effort and cannot be abandoned until a suitable replacement field is available. Even should War consent to proposal to construct military field at Dhahran50 this would not be ready for better part of year and thus would contribute little to solution of withdrawal problem.
Consideration should also be given to whether we should seek formal Iranian consent to plan to leave these forces in Iran or whether it would at present be advisable not to precipitate issue but rather rest on informal Iranian assurances that they do not desire withdrawal of our forces until departure of Brit and Russians. Your views on this subject will be helpful.
The Dept has some doubt as to the correctness of leaving armed forces at various points in Iran merely for the purpose of safeguarding American installations pending their sale or export, particularly if the Iranian authorities insist that they are in a position to give them adequate protection. The airfield at Abadan of course presents a different problem in view of strategic factors.