Ankara Embassy Files: 1945: 720 Straits
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen)
The Turkish Ambassador52 called for the purpose of a general discussion of matters relating to Turkey. During the course of the conversation lasting more than two hours, the Ambassador made the following observations:
Several things have happened during recent months which, the Ambassador would like to say, speaking in all frankness and sincerity, seem to indicate a lessening American interest in Turkish affairs and even some letdown in American support for Turkey. The first of these was our refusal to participate with the British in making representations to the Russians, prior to the Berlin Conference, regarding Russian demands on Turkey. The American reference to the fact [Page 1240] that the Russian-Turkish conversations had been “friendly” was disappointing to Turkey, because no demand for two Turkish provinces could possibly be regarded as friendly. In the second place, the Ambassador understood that the American Government regarded Russian demands for Kars and Ardahan as a matter between Russia and Turkey. The Ambassador referred at length to the sad experience which the western powers had had in appeasing Hitler in his territorial demands prior to the world war, and expressed strongly the view that the great powers had an obligation to prevent any likelihood of aggression when it first arises. He felt confident, from his long experience in Moscow, that the Russians would regard any indication of disinterest on the part of the United States in Turkish territorial questions as a green light to Russia to do whatever she desired.
The Ambassador understood that at the Berlin Conference, the United States had taken the position that the Turkish Straits should be open to the unrestricted commerce of vessels of all kinds. He recalled that during the entire history of the Straits controversy, over the past many years, one of Turkey’s principal desires had been to limit the number of foreign warships which might be in transit through the Straits at any one time. If he understood the American proposal correctly, there would be nothing to prevent Russia from sailing its entire Black Sea fleet into the Sea of Marmora at any time, leveling its guns at Istanbul, and presenting Turkey with demands. Unless the United States was willing to undertake very specific guarantees of support to Turkey in the event of aggression, the American proposal regarding the Dardanelles would be most detrimental to Turkish interests.
A further small but significant cause of Turkish concern regarding the American attitude towards his country was the radio speech which President Truman made following his return from Potsdam.53 The President had referred to the “selfish” use of waterways in Europe, naming specifically in the same context the Kiel Canal, the Rhine, the Danube, and the Straits. The Ambassador went to great lengths to show that Turkey had never exercised a selfish control over the Dardanelles and said that the Turkish public had been bewildered by the President’s reference. He said that the Turks felt very keenly that the President had linked a Turkish waterway with three Axis waterways. [Page 1241] This seemed to indicate that the United States had forgotten that Turkey was one of the Allies and had rendered conspicuous service to the Allies in 1940 and 1941 by barring the way to Hitler’s armies which had reached the Turkish frontier and were anxious to drive through to the Caucasus and the Suez. Turkey’s full mobilization of its troops and clear determination to defend its territory against any aggression had saved the Middle East and possibly even the eastern front for the Allies.
The Ambassador hoped that the United States would consider Soviet demands concerning the Straits and concerning Kars and Ardahan as a part of the same problem. I said that I thought the two questions might be handled separately. The Ambassador construed my remarks as meaning that Kars and Ardahan presented a Turkish-Soviet problem in which the United States has no concern. I assured him that the United States takes its membership in the United Nations Organization with all seriousness and that through our membership in this Organization, we are concerned with any threat to the peace anywhere. We hoped that the Kars and Ardahan question would not give rise to any such threat.
As regards the Ambassador’s impression that the United States was not supporting the Turkish Government fully in its present difficulty, I endeavored to explain the various events which the Ambassador had adduced to support his thesis and assured him of my confidence that there had been no change in the American Government’s policy in any way. He expressed full appreciation for this assurance.
- Hüseyin Ragip Baydur.↩
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August 9, Department of State Bulletin, August 12, 1945, p. 208. President Truman had stated with respect to the Straits question: “One of the persistent causes for wars in Europe in the last two centuries has been the selfish control of the waterways of Europe. I mean the Danube, the Black Sea Straits, the Rhine, the Kiel Canal, and all the inland waterways of Europe which border on two or more states.
“The United States proposed at Berlin that there be free and unrestricted navigation of these inland waterways. We proposed that regulations for such navigation be provided by international authorities.”
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