Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

767.68119/8–2145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)

[Washington,] August 21, 1945.

Mr. Tandy⁵⁰ called on me this morning in order to acquaint the Department with the following developments regarding the Straits question. He had with him a sheaf of telegrams on the basis of which he talked.

The first communication dealt with a conversation of the British Ambassador on July 28 with the Turkish Government. The gist of this message was:

(1) The Turks fully appreciate the importance of the cooperation of the Government of the United States in the internationalization of the Straits.

(2) The Turks would be prepared to accept internationalization of the Straits on “condition that neither Turkey’s sovereignty nor security were diminished”.

(3) Any such settlement must mean improved relations with USSR.

Another message, dated August 11, received from the British Ambassador in Ankara states that the Turks are most anxious to have some communication from the American Government.

Another message, dated August 18, also from Ankara, states that the Turks still have not received any communication from the American Government.

The telegram which occasioned Mr. Tandy’s visit was, however, a message dated August 19 from the Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington (repeated Istanbul), of which the following is a very close summary:

(1) Message begins that it was agreed at Potsdam that the American Government should “try to make the Turks see the advantages of international control of the Straits and that we (i.e. the British) should support their representations”.

(2) The American Government, so far as the Foreign Office is aware, has taken no action.

(3) The Foreign Office regards it as essential to know “exactly what the American Government has in mind in this respect”.

(4) In view of the Foreign Office “internationalization” might mean:

(A) Modification of the Montreux Convention so that while Turkey would remain responsible for the defense of the Straits, the USSR would be allowed to move ships of war through the Straits in war as well as in peace. This might be guaranteed by an International Commission at Istanbul or merely by an agreement without such a Commission.

(B) “Complete demilitarization of the Straits under the guarantee of the Great Powers.”

(C) “International control of the Straits by the establishment of bases by some or all of the Great Powers in that area.”

(5) British Embassy is requested to put the “ideas” in the immediately preceding paragraph to the American Government and to request the comments of the American Government regarding these “ideas”.

(6) Foreign Office states that it is “not clear” whether the American Government intends to approach the Turks in the near future or to leave it for discussion by the Foreign Secretaries⁵¹ as a part of the “international water ways scheme”. British Embassy is requested to ask the American Government about this.

I informed Mr. Tandy that we learned only this morning that the Turkish Government had handed a note and memorandum to our Chargé d’Affaires in Ankara. I told him that obviously the Turks’ communication, which was also being handed to the British Ambassador in Ankara, would require study before we could formulate the views requested in the August 19 telegram from the Foreign Office.

50. A. H. Tandy, First Secretary, British Embassy.
51. Turkey was not included on the agenda of the Council of Foreign Ministers which met at London from September 11 to October 2. For discussion between the Foreign Ministers at their first (procedural) meeting on September 11, in which the decision was made not to include the subject of the Black Sea Straits, see vol. ii, pp. 112 ff.