890D.20 Mission/12–2145
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)
Dear Loy: I have read your memorandum of November 13, together with the statement prepared by NE on the subject of the request of the Syrian Government for an American military mission, and fully appreciate the arguments which you have put forward in favor of our acceding to the Syrian request.
I am frankly of the opinion, however, that this is not a propitious time to reply to the Syrian invitation, wholly apart from the fundamental question of whether or not the invitation should be accepted.
In the first place, I understand that the proposed enabling legislation, without which this Government lacks the authority to send a military mission to Syria, is not yet before Congress and it seems likely that it will be a matter of weeks, if not months, before we could hope to have the legislation enacted, even assuming that Congress reacts favorably. I seriously doubt the wisdom of committing ourselves to the Syrian Government, even informally, to the sending of a military mission before Congress has passed on the general question.
Secondly, I think it would be unwise to inject ourselves into the situation at a time when to do so might be a disruptive factor in the discussions which have been going on for many weeks between the French and British Governments looking to the joint withdrawal of French and British troops. It can be argued that these discussions have dragged on interminably and that nothing concrete may come of them. I am more hopeful, however, inasmuch as the Levant problem is one which has stood in the way of a Franco-British alliance which I believe both Governments are now anxious to conclude.
Finally, as indicated in NE’s memorandum, the attitude which this Government takes towards the Zionist program in Palestine would have a vital bearing on the chances of success for an American military mission in Syria. I quite agree that this Government should not hold back from any desirable course of action merely because that action confronts us with the risk of failure. I also agree, as you know, with the general principle that this Government should take a clear position with regard to important questions of foreign policy and should not be content, as was so often the case prior to the war, to adopt a passive attitude and to avoid embarrassing decisions in distant parts of the world where our interests were not at that time considered to be directly concerned. But, as in any specific undertaking, the possible disadvantages have to be weighed against the possible advantages and [Page 1215] at the moment it seems to me that in this case the former considerably outweigh the latter.44
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- Aside from discussion among Department officers, no further action was taken on this matter in 1945.↩