For several years we have taken the position that the United States is
sympathetic to the maintenance by the countries of the Near East of
their independence33 and that the
United States is prepared to take steps to aid them in maintaining this
independence. If we refuse the Syrian request for a military mission,
the impression is sure to be created in the Near East that although we
are willing to talk glibly regarding our interest in the welfare of the
peoples of the Near East, we are unwilling to implement the principle to
which we say we adhere by refusing to take any measures which might meet
the fierce opposition of any great power. They will feel that when the
principles of the United Nations come to close grips with imperialistic
ambitions, the proponents of those principles do not have the courage or
assurance which characterizes the advocates of Western imperialism.
Therefore, it seems to me extremely important that we do not permit
French opposition to the sending of this mission to be a factor which
will influence the decision which we may make.
The attached memorandum, prepared in the Division of Near Eastern
Affairs, represents the views of that Division with regard to the
mission. I would appreciate it if you would have this memorandum
examined by the appropriate members of EUR and let me know when they
will be prepared to confer with members of NEA. I hope that the
conference can take place this week, since Mr. Wadsworth will be leaving
in the not distant future and since a decision should be made before his
departure.
[Annex]
Memorandum by Mr. Adrian B. Colquitt of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs36
[Washington,] November 6,
1945.
Subject: Request for American Military Mission for
Syria
The Syrian Government on August 3, 1945 made a formal request that an
American military mission be sent to Syria for the purpose of
assisting the Syrian Government with the organizaton and training of
its national defense and security forces. These levies consist of
gendarmerie, police and local militia
totaling approximately 20,000. The militia, which roughly accounts
for rather more than half of the total, were transferred formally
from French to Syrian control (after some 7,000 had deserted from
French to Syrian command) following the Franco-Syrian dispute which
culminated in the French bombardment of Damascus last May.
These Syrian troops are in a disorganized condition and are badly in
need of reorganization, technical training and modern equipment if
they are to be effective in maintaining public order and security
throughout Syria. With the approach of winter the morale of the
[Page 1210]
troops is low, as they
lack warm clothing. The Syrian Government has expressed its desire
to purchase woolen uniforms from surplus American Army stocks, and
the War Department has agreed to supply them. The French have been
informed of the matter and have no objection provided payment is not
made in scarce dollars. The question of whether or not payment in
dollars will be required is not yet settled.
In the past two months the Syrian Government has on several occasions
reiterated its request for a military mission and has urged prompt
consideration. For example, on the occasion of Senator Pepper’s37 recent visit to
Damascus President Quwatly told him that the military mission was
Syria’s greatest need and that only America could meet it. Senator
Pepper is said to have given assurances of his support.
A strong argument in favor of our acceding to the Syrian request is
the fact that a cardinal point in the foreign policy of the United
States is to lend assistance to small states in their efforts to
achieve and maintain their independence and in order to enable them
to avoid outside interference as much as possible. We have declared
this policy with especial reference to Syria several times during
the past two years. We have done little to implement this policy up
to the present time. The present request is a small one, easily
granted, but of the greatest importance to Syria. If the Syrians do
not develop some kind of army they cannot hope even to maintain
order within the country. A refusal of the request would make us
subject to entirely justifiable accusations that our foreign policy
consists merely of statements which are not implemented. An American
military mission of the kind desired would make an important
contribution to the implementation of Syrian independence by paving
the way for complete withdrawal of British and French forces.
Moreover, from the point of view of American national interests, it
is hardly necessary to point out that the war has emphasized the
strategic importance of the Near East, a region whose component
countries are in a state of intense political, social and economic
readjustment. There is need for a stronger role for this Government
in the economic and political destinies of the countries of the Near
and Middle East, especially in view of the strategic importance of
its oil reserves. The effect of our entering upon the comparatively
small task under discussion would, if successfully performed, serve
to strengthen greatly our influence and prestige well beyond the
borders of Syria. Consequently, we feel that the question of sending
a military
[Page 1211]
mission to
Syria should be given the most careful consideration and that the
advantages and disadvantages of complying with the request should be
carefully weighed in arriving at a policy decision which will affect
our position in the Near East.
One factor against meeting the Syrian request is that our action
would be objected to by France. The French Government commented as
follows in reply38 to our request of September 19, 1945 for
their views on the subject of the proposed military mission:
“… in the event that the Government of the United States
should agree to send American counselors to the Levant, the
decision would run the risk of being interpreted, in the
circumstances resulting from the recent crisis, as
participation in an action designed to evict France from the
position formerly occupied . . . .
“… In the circumstances, a favorable reply of the American
Government to the request just addressed to it by the
Government of Damascus would necessarily appear as a gesture
unfriendly to the French Government.”
A desire to avoid giving offense to France has been the basis on
which there has been some hesitation in the Department to the
granting of the Syrian request. This factor as regards France, whose
return to a strong international position may be in our national
interest, must be given due weight.
Another deterrent to sending the mission is the changed attitude of
the British Government regarding the proposed mission. Although the
British originally supported—in fact themselves proposed—an American
military mission to Syria, they informed us as follows in reply39 to our inquiry of September 19, 1945:
“… the Foreign Office state that, as is known to the State
Department, they have always favoured the despatch of such
an American mission.…
“… If it turns out that the French would greatly prefer a
training mission from Holland or Denmark or some other small
European country, it may be necessary to reconsider the
position in spite of the fact that such countries would
probably have no representatives in the Levant nor anyone
with experience of local conditions …
“For these … the State Department might wish to hold the
matter of the training mission in abeyance until Mr. Bevin’s
forthcoming talks with the French have clarified the
position.”
This modified attitude reflects a softening of British policy
vis-à-vis the French in the Levant. NEA is aware that lack of
British support might impair—or contribute to the impairment of—the
success of the mission. It seems highly probable, however, that the
British will support us if we show that we mean business.
[Page 1212]
While admitting the weight of these factors in opposition to sending
the suggested mission, NEA feels it is essential to emphasize the
consequences of a decision not to meet the Syrian request. The
United States and France follow basically different policies
regarding Syria; in a word, the United States recognizes the
complete independence of Syria and opposes a privileged position for
any country, whereas French policy is directed toward keeping Syria
weak and disorganized until France is in a position to reassert its
former privileged position. The French are playing for time, hence
their opposition to American assistance to Syria.
NEA is of the opinion that our failure to meet the Syrian request in
the face of France’s intransigeance would constitute an unfortunate
and perhaps disastrous admission of the lack of an effective
independent American policy in the Near East, and would undermine
the faith of small nations in the Atlantic Charter40 or the
United Nations Organization. It would be obvious that our refusal
was due to French opposition and that we were bowing to French
imperialistic designs. We must face the fact that there is a growing
suspicion in the Near East that the policy of the United States is a
negative one and that we simply follow British and French policy
except in small matters. It has been pointed out that the
outstanding weakness of American policy in the Near East is
vacillation, lack of continuity or follow through and, at times, its
inconsistency. Clearly, the United States has strategic interests in
the Near East that require a consistent, effective, long-term policy
if this country is to take a rightful place as a world power. NEA
does not consider that France or any other great power has valid
grounds for taking offense because we lend direct aid to independent
countries which are members of good standing in the United Nations.
The supplying of military missions is a common and acceptable
practice in international relations.
At the present moment the Syrian Government is passing through a
critical phase and our assistance in providing a military mission
would bolster the Government in the transition to stable conditions
and would inspire confidence in the Near East toward the United
States and toward the United Nations Organization.
Finally, we should consider what the prospects are for the success of
the mission. Obviously, failure would be undesirable and might lower
our prestige. Failure might result from French intrigue and from a
lack of full British support. It might result from local political
differences. (Minister Wadsworth considers that all of these
difficulties
[Page 1213]
will not
amount to much, and some of them may not arise, if the personnel of
the mission is strictly top-notch.) In particular, if the United
States should throw its full support to the Zionist program in
Palestine,41 the resulting
atmosphere in Syria would without doubt make the success of the
mission an impossibility.
On balance, after taking into account the various advantages and
disadvantages, the doubts and the uncertainties, as well as the
probable benefits, we feel that we should give a favorable answer to
Syria, In doing so, we would carry out our established foreign
policy and the effect of doing so would be, on the whole, helpful to
the situation in the Near East, It seems to us that we should be
lacking in courage and in the spirit of enterprise which has made
this country what it is if we refuse to accept this opportunity,
which is also a challenge, to implement our foreign policy merely
because we prefer inaction to running a risk of failure.
A technical impediment to meeting the Syrian request is our present
lack of enabling legislation. The detail of naval or military
missions to foreign countries is governed by Section 540 of Title 10
of the United States Code, which authorizes such missions only
during war or a declared national emergency. SWNCC has proposed to
the Secretary,42 however, that
necessary steps be taken to obtain appropriate modification of the
language of the statute to permit the detail of missions to any part
of the world whenever deemed to be in the national interest.
The purpose of this paper is to present the arguments pro and con
with a view to our reaching a decision in
principle whether or not we should accede to Syria’s
request, provided the necessary legislation is enacted.
We have already informed Lacoste that we will not send the mission
without first informing him of our decision. It might, consequently,
be appropriate at that time to add that in view of our long and firm
friendship with his country, we cannot consider such a decision
illogical or inappropriate in the circumstances of our relations
with Syria or the situation in that country and, consequently, that
our decision is not of a nature properly to give offense to his
Government. On the contrary, we would appreciate the cooperative
assistance of the local French military authorities so long as they
may remain in the Levant.
