890D.01/12–1345

The Department of State to the British Embassy 80

Substance op Oral Statement

The Department of State fully appreciates the urgent desire of the British Government to reach an early agreement with the French Government on the Levant problem. It also appreciates the courtesy of the British Government in requesting the Department to furnish the British Embassy with its informal and confidential views on the draft agreements, of which it was good enough to furnish copies.

With regard to the draft agreement “regarding similarity of British and French aims in the Middle East,” the fixed policy of the United States Government has been and continues to be, as the Embassy knows, that the granting of mandates over certain territories following the First World War conferred on the Mandatory Powers and their nationals no rights or privileges to which the United States and its nationals were not likewise entitled. So far as concerns the Class A Mandates conferred on Great Britain and France in the Near and Middle East, the position of the United States in this respect was recognized by those two countries in treaties on that specific subject. The Department feels, therefore, that it would be unfortunate if the British and French Governments were to enter into any agreement containing an understanding of the type outlined in the final two sentences of this agreement.

The penultimate sentence of the agreement appears to the Department to signify that the British and French Governments are agreeing to divide certain areas in the Near East between themselves as spheres of influence. The sentence would at least be open to that interpretation. It would no doubt be charged, moreover, that following the First World War the British and French Governments divided certain portions of the Near East between themselves without adequate consideration for the wishes of the population by resorting to the device of the mandates and that now, even with the termination of these mandates (with the exception of that over Palestine), they are dividing the area between themselves into spheres of influence.

The Department, on the other hand, feels that the conception of a preferred position in the independent countries of the Near East of any of the Great Powers is now outmoded. It is further believed that an agreement between Great Britain and France tending to perpetuate such a concept would bring discredit not only upon themselves but [Page 1179] also upon the other Great Powers, such as the US, which are cooperating with Great Britain and France in so many fields.

The Department further feels that the last sentence of the proposed agreement on British and French aims in the Middle East is even more unfortunate than the preceding one. The impression would be obtained from this sentence that Great Britain and France were entering into an agreement to present a common front in the United Nations Organization, the purpose of which would be to perpetuate Great Power spheres of influence in the Middle East. It is felt that if the Great Powers should resort to the practice of entering into private agreements to cooperate with each other in the United Nations Organization for the purpose of making sure that the various small powers would be brought into their respective spheres of influence, the aims of the United Nations Organization would not be achieved and that Organization would come to be regarded as an instrument for the extension or perpetuation of imperialism rather than as an instrument for the preservation of world peace on the basis of justice and non-discrimination with respect to all nations, large and small.

With regard to the draft agreement “regarding the withdrawal of troops” the Department has been disappointed to learn that notwithstanding all the previous discussions and negotiations on this subject the draft agreement does not provide for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Syria and Lebanon unless and until the United Nations Organization has decided on the organization of collective security in that zone, and that it is apparently intended, despite the expressed desire of the Government of Lebanon that foreign troops be withdrawn, that the French Government retain its forces in that country for the maintenance of “collective security.” The United States Government recently proposed that the Soviet and British Governments withdraw their forces from Iran and has given instructions that its own forces be withdrawn from that country by January 1, next.81 It was the Department’s understanding that the British Government also desired the withdrawal of these troops. It would seem that the Governments of Western countries should be just as concerned with regard to the principles of sovereignty in Syria and Lebanon as for those in Iran.

The Department therefore feels that if these two agreements as drafted should be signed, the conclusion would be drawn that the British Government had definitely decided that, in exchange for French support of British predominance in other parts of the Near East, the British would support French predominance in Syria and Lebanon, in spite of the fact that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments [Page 1180] have made it clear that they are determined that no Great Power shall have any special rights or privileges in their respective countries.

Moreover, since the handling of the thorny question of the departure of non-national forces from the Levant States is the immediate touchstone on which any such agreements would be judged, notably in those and other Arab countries, it is the view of the Department that such withdrawal should be begun in substantial measure at the earliest possible date and be wholly consummated with the least possible delay, preferably by direct accord reached between the British and French Governments in no wise conditioned on political agreements of the nature under discussion; and, if there be technical aspects of the question of withdrawal of non-national troops, seemingly requiring for most efficient solution the cooperation of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, then it is the opinion of the Department that provision for such solution should be made in full partnership with the Syrian and Lebanese Governments.

  1. Handed to the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Tandy).
  2. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 359 ff.