890D.01/5–1945

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State of a Conversation With the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Bidault)15

I said that we were considerably disturbed over reports which were coming to us from Syria and Lebanon, and that a rather explosive situation seemed to be developing as a result of French troops which were being sent to the Levant States. We realized that some of these troops were merely replacements, but our reports indicated that in addition to replacements the forces were being augmented. I then read to the Minister a paraphrase of the instructions which I had sent to Ambassador Caffery on April 30th16 for presentation to the French Government. This message expressed the various reasons for the interest and concern of this Government:

a)
That it would be extremely unfortunate for disorders to occur in the Levant States when a supreme effort is being made by the Allied forces, or in the near future, when redeployment to the Far Eastern theater of war will make the Near East a highly important avenue;
b)
That an effect out of proportion to its intrinsic importance might be created at this time by an even minor act of a great power which might be regarded as provocative, and this in turn might be an issue of first importance at San Francisco;
c)
That the application or even threat of force by France would give rise to doubts throughout the world in regard to the intention of the major United Nations to support their enunciated principles by force.

[Page 1082]

The message concluded with the statement that we consider that any increase in French forces in the Levant States could not in the absence of military necessity be more ill-timed. Mr. Bidault listened attentively, and the Ambassador summarized the entire despatch in French in a remarkable piece of interpretation. The Minister did not answer specifically the points raised. He spoke of the responsibility of the French to maintain order. He referred to the presence of nearby British troops and that if any foreign troops were to be withdrawn they should all be withdrawn simultaneously. I interrupted by assuring him that I was not referring to a withdrawal of French troops but merely the dangers involved by augmenting their present forces.

  1. This memorandum is an extract from a longer memorandum of conversation on several subjects. The longer memorandum indicates that Messrs. Henri Bonnet, William Phillips, and H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs, were also present (711.51/5–2145).
  2. Telegram 1776, p. 1060.