Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference at Quebec, 1944

Roosevelt Papers

Memorandum by the Assistant to the Presidents Naval Aide (Elsey)¹

[Undated.]

Zones of Occupation in Europe

At the Quebec Conference of the President and Prime Minister Churchill with their Chiefs of Staff in August 1943, an outline plan was presented by Lieutenant General Morgan for an emergency return to Europe by Allied troops should German resistance in the West suddenly weaken or collapse before the Invasion of France was launched in the Spring of 1944.² General Morgan had been appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in May 1943 as Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (abbreviated to COSSAC) to begin planning for the invasion, and, as a corollary, to prepare plans for the emergency return should that become possible. The purpose of COSSAC’s plan, named Rankin, was to introduce as many Allied troops into western Europe as possible to prevent chaos and ruin resulting from disintegration of the German war machine. Rankin proposed that France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Rhine Valley to Düsseldorf be regarded as a sphere under U.S. control while Holland, Denmark, and northwestern Germany from the Ruhr Valley to Lübeck be controlled by British forces.^*

Rankin was approved “in principle” by the Combined Chiefs on August 23, 1943.^† On the same day, at the second and final meeting of the President and the Prime Minister with the Chiefs of Staff at the Citadel, the President inquired if plans were being made for an emergency return to the continent and added that he desired United Nations troops to reach Berlin as soon as did the Russians.^‡ The President was informed of the COSSAC plan and in the final report of the conference submitted to him the next day a statement on Rankin was included. “We have examined,” the Chiefs of Staff said, “the plans that have been proposed [prepared] by General Morgan’s staff for an emergency operation to enter the Continent. We have taken note of these plans and have directed that they be kept under continuous review.”^§

By concurring with the British Chiefs in approving “in principle” the recommendations of COSSAC, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were accepting without thorough examination and without guidance or direction from the President the proposal that in any emergency entrance into the Continent U.S. forces would occupy France and Belgium and southwestern Germany. This decision was to have far-reaching consequences and was to become, in short order, a bone of contention between Great Britain and the United States which has not yet been buried.

After the Quebec Conference the U.S. Joint Chiefs shelved the question of Rankin but the British Chiefs and COSSAC continued active study and planning.

In early November, on the eve of departure of the President and the Chiefs of Staff for the Sextant Conference at Cairo,³ General Morgan submitted in person to General Marshall a proposed revision of the Rankin plan approved “in principle” at Quebec.^║ The major change was in the delineation of spheres to be controlled by Great Britain and the United States. In discussing the problem, COSSAC stated: “In making our original recommendation …⁴ we were handicapped by the fact that at that time (August 1943) no consideration had been given by the Allied Governments as to their policy for the disarmament and control of Germany.” He had assumed, however, that Anglo-American forces would be required at least to control the Rhine and Ruhr Valleys and northwest Germany and to assist in the restoration of France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark and had made his original recommendation for the two spheres on that assumption. After Quadrant, the British Chiefs of Staff had examined Rankin carefully and had asked COSSAC to reexamine the plan with a view to establishing mobile land and air forces in the best strategic positions from which control of German industry could be ensured. COSSAC’s staff had consulted the Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee of the War Cabinet and documents prepared by the British Planning Staff and the Foreign Office. As a result of this additional study, COSSAC now wished to withdraw his original recommendation on zones and substitute a new one along the lines of the Post-Hostilities Committee’s zoning. Accordingly, he now proposed that the U.S. sphere should comprise southern Germany, Austria and France and the English sphere should consist of northwest Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark. The Russians should occupy territory to the eastward. This zoning, COSSAC remarked in his recommendation to General Marshall, provides a more equitable sharing in the task of restoring liberated countries than the original scheme and leaves the U.S. forces free to devote full attention to the “sufficiently formidable task of France.” General Morgan added that planning was in progress on this basis.^¶

The changes proposed by COSSAC did not involve large areas. Belgium and Luxembourg were transferred from the American to the British zone and Austria was added as an American responsibility whereas it had not been included in the original COSSAC plan. France, with the largest population and area of the “liberated countries”, remained American. The significance of the new COSSAC proposal was that it focused American attention on Rankin as it had not been before. The allocation of spheres had been tentatively set down as “strategic recommendations” in August but now the Joint Chiefs of Staff learned that full-scale planning and preparations were proceeding in London along British lines.

General Morgan’s recommendations were reviewed by the U.S. Joint Staff Planners who reported that action on them by the Joint Chiefs should be deferred pending information on our post-war political and economic policies. It was at once apparent to the Planners that COSSAC’s plan reflected deep and careful study; he had coordinated his efforts with the Foreign Office and the War Cabinet; and his plan reflected British political and economic as well as military policy. Similar guidance and direction was needed, they felt, by the U.S. Chiefs before commitments on the COSSAC plan were made.^**

The U.S. Joint Chiefs acted on their Planning Committee’s advice at once. At a meeting held aboard the USS Iowa on 17 November, en route Cairo, the Chiefs prepared a paper for the British Chiefs stating that they had not approved the revision of Rankin which appeared to have far-reaching political and economic implications extending beyond their cognizance and on which the Department of State and the President had not expressed themselves.^††

On the same day, the Joint Chiefs addressed a letter to the President. Explaining the new COSSAC proposals which divided Europe into three spheres of responsibility, the Chiefs stated that exact boundaries between U.S., British and Soviet zones could not be defined until agreement on the subject had been reached by the three governments. Due to a rapidly developing military situation it was necessary to come to this agreement as soon as possible but before it could be done, they needed guidance so that an occupation plan would be in accord with American political and economic policies and with international agreements.^‡‡

The President replied immediately to the request of the Joint Chiefs for advice and for information on U.S. policy. He informed Admiral Leahy that he could not agree to the areas of occupation which General Morgan had proposed and that he wished American forces to occupy northern Europe, that is, Scandinavia, Denmark, and northern Germany and not the area which COSSAC had recommended.^§§

On November 19, while still embarked in the Iowa, the President met with the Joint Chiefs for a full discussion of the problem. He again defined the area which he wished American forces to occupy, and stated that the British should be responsible for France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and southern Germany and that the U.S.S.R. should occupy eastern Germany.

The President also discussed other implications of Rankin. Tie told the Joint Chiefs that British political considerations were very evident in the COSSAC plan and he again emphasized that we should get U.S. troops into Berlin as soon as possible after German collapse or surrender.^║║

After the President had expressed his views to the Chiefs, it was possible for planning groups to initiate definite studies. The Joint Staff Planners examined the feasibility of American occupation of the northern area proposed by the President and concluded that it was more advantageous from a military as well as a political point of view. The people in the northern area are more stable racially and politically, ports and lines of communications are better and less liable to sabotage, and they concluded that we should have to remain there less time. The defeat of Japan is a primary concern, taking priority over restoration and rehabilitation of Europe; supplies and shipping must not be tied up in Europe when they can be used in the Pacific war. Hence the area committing least forces for the shortest time is most desirable for American occupation. The Joint Staff Planners also considered the problem of “cross-over”. Plans for the invasion of France called for American forces on the right or west flank of the Norman coast and British on the east. Should Germany not weaken suddenly or collapse and should we have a prolonged engagement in France, the line of battle would swing to a north-south axis with Americans still on the right and hence southern flank. Thus, if the U.S. should occupy north western Germany after her defeat or collapse as the President proposed, U.S. troops would have to transfer through British forces moving into southern Germany. This would be difficult with railroads, bridges and highways damaged by air bombardment but by careful coordination with the British our Staff Planners considered it feasible.^¶¶

By Presidential direction and with this military study supporting their position, the U.S. Joint Chiefs on December 4 at Cairo replied to the British proposal on division of occupied territories. Rather than permit COSSAC to continue planning on American occupation of southern Germany and British occupation of the northwest, the U.S. Chiefs proposed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct him to revise his planning at once on the basis of the U.S. in the general area of the Netherlands, Northern Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, with the British west and south of the American position.^*

To this reallocation of zones which was a complete reversal, the British Chiefs refused to consent. At the end of the Conference the British and U.S. Chiefs were still in disagreement and after lengthy discussion they could agree only that COSSAC should be directed to “examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres.”^†

Here the matter rested for a month, during which the COSSAC staff continued planning on the basis of Americans in southern Germany and British in the north. On January 7 the British Chiefs re plied to the American proposal made at Cairo. “The difficulties in implementing it are such,” they stated, “that it should not be proceeded further with.” In a very lengthy report they elaborated the difficulties. If the occupation of Germany were not to occur until the invasion of France was well under way, transport difficulties of a “cross-over” would be insurmountable, as U.S. Army staffs operating in the southern sector would have to occupy later the northern area. COSSAC also believed that working up intelligence on the whole area from Denmark to the Swiss frontier which would be necessary for each Army Group would be too great a burden for the staffs. The greatest objection which COSSAC had to the change, however, was that diversion of his own staff to the replanning of Rankin would be so serious a detriment to preparations for Overlord that the invasion target date would have to be postponed.^‡

The U.S. Joint Staff Planners studied this rebuttal of their earlier recommendations and prepared a counter-claim. They informed the Joint Chiefs that they agreed that logistic difficulties of a “cross-over” would be great, but they strongly disagreed that they were insurmountable. As for replanning causing postponement of the invasion, they presented a letter from Lieutenant General Devers, Commanding General of the European Theatre of Operations, which stated changes could be made on the part of U.S. Forces without any prejudice to Overlord. The Civil Affairs Division of the War Department added that the proposed revision would not create additional burdens nor present additional difficulties; it was possible and desirable. The Staff Planners’ paper concluded with the comment that “the most important point is that time is working against us. If the U.S. proposal is to be put into effect, the decision should be announced without delay.”^§

The Joint Chiefs on January 25 made formal reply to the British refusal to accept their proposals. Denying that a change in zones would so absorb planning staffs that Overlord would be postponed as a result, and suggesting ways to avoid “cross-over” difficulties by supplying British troops for the southern area from the Mediterranean theatre, the Americans again recommended that Rankin be replanned on the U.S. basis.^║

On February 2 the British replied and added new objections to the change which they had not previously presented. Now they spoke about the desirability of British control of German naval bases in the Baltic and their close working relationship with the air forces and navies of Belgium and Norway during the war, and added the usual comments about the difficulties of “cross-over.” Pointedly, they noted that the U.S. had failed to advance reasons for the proposed change but had simply demanded it and denied the difficulties of its execution.^¶

There was now a deadlock. The COSSAC Staff, becoming General Eisenhower’s staff when he assumed command of the Allied Expeditionary Force in January, had been directed to make plans for an emergency return to the continent in the case of the complete collapse or sudden surrender of Germany. These tentative plans had been approved “in principle” only by the Combined Chiefs at Quebec in August. The deadlock resulted because, without direction and without approval by the Combined Chiefs, General Morgan proceeded to make specific plans for the occupation by British and U.S. forces on the basis of zones proposed by the British War Cabinet and Foreign Office. When the U.S. Chiefs had been informed what the boundaries of these areas were, they ascertained the views of the President and protested, recommending that the zones be changed. The British Chiefs had refused the change. A series of papers had been exchanged without result. Now, on February 4 the Combined Chiefs agreed that they could not reach a decision, that the matter was beyond their cognizance, and that it would have to be referred to the President and the Prime Minister for decision.^**

The President acted at once. On February 7 he sent a dispatch to the Prime Minister outlining the impasse confronting the Combined Chiefs. A decision by them was necessary, he said, before the invasion. He put the problems squarely to the Prime Minister: “I am absolutely unwilling to police France and possibly Italy and the Balkans as well. After all, France is your baby and will take a lot of nursing in order to bring it to the point of walking alone. It would be very difficult for me to keep in France my military force or management for any length of time.”^††

The Prime Minister’s reply on February 23 echoed the old cries of the British Staff. He complained that the U.S. Chiefs had never given reasons for the reallocation of spheres. He ran through the standard objections: “crossing” of lines of communication, British need to control German naval ports on the Baltic, and the relationship between the RAF and Norwegian and Netherlands air forces. The Prime Minister failed to understand, he said, the President’s aversion to police work in France. Communications through France did not in his estimate involve policing and in any case, the French provisional government would be in effective control. The Prime Minister rejected the President’s appeal. “All our thoughts and energies must be given to making a success of Overlord,” he concluded. “I consider that only reasons of over-riding importance could justify such a fundamental change of plan as that proposed.^‡‡

The President provided such reasons in a letter to the Prime Minister on February 29. “‘Do please don’t’ ask me to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce and protest the paternity of Belgium, France and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children. In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for their schooling now.”^§§

To this letter Prime Minister Churchill made no reply.

Time was short before Overlord, and inasmuch as planning and preparations continued along the lines of British desire, every delay strengthened the British position and made it more difficult to advance our own views. When no reply had come from the Prime Minister after two months, the President in Georgetown, South Carolina, directed General Marshall, senior member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, to prepare a directive to General Eisenhower. The directive should order Eisenhower to plan to send U.S. troops to the Nether lands and northwest Germany as occupation forces when the armistice should be signed.^║║ On April 25 General Marshall sent such a directive to the President.^¶¶ The President approved it but took no action for one more month. He then reconsidered it and inasmuch as there was still no reply from the Prime Minister to his letter of February 29, and on General Marshall’s suggestion, the President sent the proposed directive to Mr. Churchill for his concurrence on May 27.^*

The directive stated:

“You are hereby directed to make such plans as are practicable to send American troops to the Netherlands and northwest Germany as forces of occupation when hostilities with Germany cease. For planning purposes, the area in Germany to be occupied by U.S. Forces will comprise the states of Schleswig, Hanover, Brunswick, Westphalia, Hesse–Nassau and the Rhine Province.

“It will be assumed in this plan that France, Austria and the Balkans will not be included in an American zone of responsibility and that Berlin will be occupied jointly by the U.S., British and Soviet Forces.”

The Prime Minister’s reaction was immediate. He said that he had not heard of the matter since he had rejected the President’s first approach on February 23 and he had assumed that the subject was settled. This of course was ignoring the President’s letter of February 29 which was the strongest statement of the American case. “A change of policy such as you now propose would have grave consequences” was the Prime Minister’s manner of disapproving the proposed directive.^†

The next round was the President’s. By dispatch on June 2 he repeated his letter of February 29 and remarked that he had been awaiting the Prime Minister’s reply to it. He had expected, he said, as a result of that letter that at least tentative plans would have been made for the occupation of northwestern Germany by American forces. “In view of my clearly stated inability to police the south and southwestern areas … I really think it is necessary that General Eisenhower should [shall] even now make such plans as are practical to use American forces of occupation in northwestern Europe during the occupation period. … There is ample time for this,” the President continued, “unless Germany suddenly collapses. … Under my plan all of your needs can and will be taken care of in the northwest area, but I hope you will realize that I am in such a position that I cannot go along with the British General Staff plan. The reasons are political, as you well know, though, as a result, they enter necessarily into the military.”^‡

The Prime Minister never replied to this dispatch.

The Chiefs of Staff had been unable to solve the problems of post war occupation because complex political factors beyond their scope confronted them. They had referred the problem to “highest quarters”; here the complexity of political factors was such that the Prime Minister chose to reject the American proposals when first presented to him and to fail to answer them when re-presented. The deadlock confronting the Combined Chiefs now extended to the President and Mr. Churchill.

While the President had been pressing the Prime Minister for a decision, preparations for occupation along British lines had been continued by General Eisenhower’s staff. And, as the invasion date drew near, the European Advisory Commission in London intensified its work on surrender terms for Germany and control machinery for the post-surrender period.⁵ The Commission was a product of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of October–November 1943.⁶ Members were appointed at the Cairo–Teheran Staff Conferences and their first meeting was held in London in December. On January 15, the British proposals for surrender terms were presented to the Commission for consideration.⁷ The terms were based on the assumption that Germany would be divided into three zones for control purposes. The zones were those proposed by the Foreign Office and War Cabinet and were the same which the British Chiefs had introduced into Combined Chiefs of Staff discussions in November.^§

British and Soviet foreign secretaries had agreed to this delineation of areas even before the Commission had been organized,^║ hence the Soviet draft of surrender terms presented on February 16 proposed the same zones.⁸ In addition, the Soviets recommended that Austria and Berlin be occupied jointly by British, American and Red forces.^¶ The American representative, Ambassador Winant, lacked specific instructions on the American point of view and was unable to present the American case to the Commission until instructed. Hence on February 19 the Acting Secretary of State wrote to the President asking for information. “We do not know what your thinking on this subject has been,” wrote Mr. Stettinius, “and we have been unable to give instructions to Ambassador Winant relative to the American position.”^**

The President outlined American policy with respect to post-war occupation of Europe very thoroughly in his reply to the Department of State. At the outset he denounced the British proposal that the United States should occupy southern Germany and France or have any responsibility for Italy and the Balkans. The burden of reconstruction of those areas is “not our natural task at a distance of 3500 miles or more.” The President defined the principal object of the United States as “not to take part in internal problems in southern Europe but … rather to take part in eliminating Germany as a possible and even probable cause of a third world war.” This we could best do from the northwest. British objections to American occupation of this area were dismissed by the President. “Cross-over” of military forces is entirely feasible, the British desire to control naval bases on the Baltic is a question of long-range security, not of first occupation, and there will be, thought the President, ample time to work that out. “Americans by that time will be only too glad to retire all their military forces from Europe.” Supply and shipping problems for our war with Japan will provide enough problems at a distance of 3500 sea-miles without our becoming involved in land transport to the center of the continent of Europe. The President nailed down tightly his arguments in conclusion, “If anything further is needed to justify this agreement [disagreement] with the British line of demarcation, I can only add that political considerations in the United States make my decision conclusive.”^††

This statement of American policy was sent to Ambassador Winant on February 25 [26] together with a copy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposals which had been submitted to the British Chiefs at Cairo in December.^‡‡ Ambassador Winant replied, in response to these instructions, that he was unable to present the Chiefs of Staff proposals to the European Advisory Commission. It was now out-dated by late developments. The area boundaries defined by the United States would cut the Soviet area into half of that already agreed upon by the British and the Soviets. Such a counter-claim without adequate reasons to substantiate it, and these had not been furnished, would only jeopardize relations with the Soviet Union. Furthermore the Ambassador felt that the Joint Chiefs’ proposals were faulty in that the zone lines did not follow German administrative boundaries. Mr. Winant therefore asked for a restatement of the American position which he could present to the Commission and he recommended that we accept the occupation boundaries as agreed upon by the British and the Soviets withholding, of course, approval of the allocation of southern Germany to the United States.^§§

The President approved the Ambassador’s recommendation and the Working Security Committee, representing the State, War and Navy Departments, prepared a new statement of policy. Their re statement., in brief, concurred in the British-Soviet boundary lines, re-emphasized the original instructions of February that the north western area should be American and the southern British, and recommended that Austria be occupied by British forces alone.^║║

This restatement received the imprimatur of the Joint Chiefs and the President and on May 1 was forwarded by the Secretary of State to Mr. Winant.^¶¶ The Ambassador presented the “restatement” to the European Advisory Commission and in short order the Commission agreed upon the area of Russian jurisdiction which Mr. Winant had defined as “the objective of importance.” The dividing line between northern and southern German occupation zones was also settled but inasmuch as Mr. Winant stoutly supported the President’s views, within and without the Commission, that the British allocation of the two zones should be reversed, deadlock resulted again.^* Here as with the Chiefs of Staff and in the discussion between President and the Prime Minister it was still an open question which should be British and which American.

The problem became acute in early August. The Soviet member of the European Advisory Commission declared that unless a decision were reached at once on assignment of occupation zones between England and the United States, the Soviets would refuse to continue discussions on surrender terms and machinery for post-war control. In forwarding this information to the President, who was at sea in the Pacific, on August 2, Mr. Stettinius suggested a compromise to end the long drawn-out controversy. The British should agree to occupy France, Italy and the Balkans should that become necessary; the United States and Great Britain should have joint use or control of northwest German ports thus avoiding any American dependence on French routes; and American forces should occupy southwestern Germany. To encourage acceptance of the compromise, Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the northern area would be more difficult than the southern to control (contrary to estimates of the Joint Chiefs) and that whoever accepted responsibility for it would have to remain “in residence” longer. This State Department compromise of course put American occupation forces in the area against which we had been protesting for nine months but other provisions were designed to eliminate many of our objections to that area. The Undersecretary of State urged the President to approve because there was danger of a bad situation developing between Great Britain and the United States of which the Russians would be well aware. Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal concurred in this proposal.^†

The President replied the next day. “It is essential,” he said in rejecting the compromise, “that American troops of occupation will have no responsibility in southern Europe and will be withdrawn from there [Europe]⁹ at earliest practicable date.” He foresaw no difficulty with England in regard to her naval problems in northwest Germany and he re-asserted the need for our use of Hamburg and Bremen in view of 3000 miles of transport. The President awaited, he informed Mr. Stettinius, an agreement from the Prime Minister that we would police only Northwestern Germany and he could see no reason why the Soviets should express concern at this time since their area was agreed upon.^‡

The Soviets did not make good their threat to walk out of the European Advisory Commission discussions, but their ultimatum had served to call attention again to the deadlock on the allocation of zones at a time when Allied armies in France were advancing at so fast a pace that optimists were predicting the end of the war in two months.

It was this lightning advance in fact which caused discussion to open upon a “fourth front.” The Combined Chiefs of Staff, the President and the Prime Minister, and the European Advisory Commission had been unable to agree; now the Allied Military Commander in the field raised the question. General Eisenhower reported to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on August 17 that he might be faced with the occupation of Germany sooner than had been expected. The only possible planning which he could attempt was on a “purely military basis,” the rapid follow-up of his armies by direct pressure on the enemy. His armies, as deployed in France, were placed with the British on the left or northern flank and the Americans on the right or southern flank. Hence Eisenhower found himself, due to the exigencies of war and the absence of basic decision on zones of occupation, making plans for the occupation of southern Germany by his American troops and northwestern Germany by the English.^§ Quite naturally this solution pleased the British Chiefs of Staff, since it was in perfect accord with their views, and on August 19 they reported to the U.S. Joint Chiefs that they were in complete agreement with General Eisenhower’s solution.^║

On August 23 General Eisenhower elaborated his estimate of the situation. Surrender terms as proposed by the European Advisory Commission and tentative control machinery were apparently based, reported the General, on the expectation that the German Army at some time would surrender en bloc. That now seemed very improbable and he believed it entirely possible that the German Army as a whole would never actually surrender, that Allied forces might enter the country finding no central German authority in control, “with the situation chaotic, probably guerilla fighting and possibly even civil war in certain districts. In these conditions the occupation of Germany will be a continuation of active operations. There can be no question of establishing central tripartite control … until Germany is occupied and order established.”^¶

That is how the question now stands. On the eve of another conference between the President and the Prime Minister, basic decisions on Allied zones of occupation in Europe still have to be made. The Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander made plans in the Fall of 1943 for an emergency return to Europe by British and U.S. forces should Germany weaken or collapse before the invasion of France was launched. Allocation of territory to be occupied by the two nations was on the basis of recommendations of various British agencies. This allocation was not to the liking of the President nor of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, but all efforts by the Chiefs to change it were fruitless, the President’s appeals to the Prime Minister were unanswered, and the European Advisory Commission was deadlocked. COSSAC was superseded by the Supreme Allied Commander in January 1944 but planning along British lines continued as before. As the target date for the invasion drew near, and it was obvious that Germany would not collapse beforehand, the Rankin plan was transformed from occupation of Europe after an “emergency return” to occupation after defeat in the field but areas to be occupied by Great Britain and the United States remained the same. The American reason for demanding a change in the allocation of occupation zones has remained the same throughout nine months of discussion—the political and military desire to be committed as little as possible in Europe after the defeat of Germany in order that our full attention can be devoted to the war with Japan. How effectively we can realize that desire will be determined by the second Quebec Conference.¹⁰

1. Elsey informed the Historical Office of the Department of State on January 12, 1955, that he had prepared this memorandum “immediately prior to” the Second Quebec Conference at the request of the President’s Naval Aide (Brown). “Knowing that the subject of zones of occupation would have a prominent place on the agenda of that conference, Admiral Brown directed me to write a briefing paper on the issues between the United Kingdom and the United States on zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, the paper to be based on the Map Room files and the files of Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy and the President.” (Historical Office Files)
2. See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, p. 940.
3. C.C.S. 320, 20 August 1943. [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, p. 1010.]
4. C.C.S. 115th Meeting, 23 August 1943. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., p. 940.]
5. Second Citadel meeting, 23 August 1943 (Minutes printed in Quadrant Conference report.) [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., p. 942.]
6. C.C.S. 319/5, 24 August 1943. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., p. 1121.]
3. See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.
4. J.C.S. 577, 8 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text]
4. Marks of ellipsis throughout this document appear in the source text.
5. C.C.S. 320/2, 8 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text]
6. J.C.S. 577, 8 November 1943. J.C.S. 577/1, 16 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. C.C.S. 320/3, 18 November 1943. J.C.S. 124th Meeting, 17 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. J.C.S. 577/2, 17 November 1943. Memorandum for the President from Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text]
9. J.C.S. 125th Meeting, 18 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text]
10. Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President, 19 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 253–256, 261; Matloff, map facing p. 341.]
11. J.C.S. 577/3, Sextant, 2 December 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]
12. C.C.S. 320/4, Sextant, 4 December 1943. [Footnote in the source text. For the text of C.C.S. 320/4 (Revised), see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 786–787. Cf. ibid., p. 688, fn. 13.]
13. C.C.S. 134th Meeting, Sextant, 4 December 1943. C.C.S. 320/4 Revised, Sextant, 4 December 1943. C.C.S. 426/1, Sextant, 6 December 1943. (Final Report of Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister.) [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran. 1943, pp. 688, 786–787, 813.]
14. C.C.S. 320/8, 7 January 1944. [Footnote in the source text]
15. J.CS. 577/6, 23 January 1944. [Footnote in the source text]
16. C.C.S. 320/9, 25 January 1944. J.C.S. 143rd Meeting, 25 January 1944. [Foot note in the source text.]
17. C.C.S. 320/10, 2 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]
18. C.C.S. 144th Meeting, 4 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]
19. Message from the President for the Prime Minister, Number 457, 7 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 166.]
20. Message for the President from the Prime Minister, Number 589, 23 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 180–182.]
21. Letter from the President for the Prime Minister, 29 February 1944. [Foot note in the source text. See ibid., pp. 188–189.]
22. White House Map Room message from Admiral Leahy for General Marshall (Black 61), 23 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text]
23. White House Map Room message for Admiral Leahy from General Marshall (White 116), 25 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text]
24. Memorandum from the President for Admiral Leahy, 22 May 1944. Message from the President for the Prime Minister, Number 545, 27 May 1944. [Footnote in the source text See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 223.]
25. Message for the President from the Prime Minister, Number 686, 31 May 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 224.]
26. Message from the President for the Prime Minister, Number 549, 2 June 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., p. 232.]
5. With respect to the work of the European Advisory Commission on questions of terms of surrender, zones of occupation, and control machinery for Germany, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 100 ff.
6. See ibid., 1943, vol. i, pp. 751, 756–757.
7. See ibid., 1944, vol. i, pp. 112 ff.
8. Memorandum for the President from the Acting Secretary of State, 19 February 1944. J.C.S. 577/9, 12 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., pp. 179–180.]
9. Message for the Secretary of State from Ambassador Winant, 17 June 1944, quoted in J.C.S. 577/15, 3 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., pp. 436–437.]
8. See ibid., pp. 173–179.
9. J.C.S. 577/8, 27 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]
10. Memorandum for the President from the Acting Secretary of State, 19 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text. The passage in quotation marks is a paraphrase rather than an exact quotation from Stettinius’ memorandum. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 179–180.]
11. Memorandum from the President for the Acting Secretary of State, 21 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 184, fn. 12.]
12. J.C.S. 577/8, 27 February 1944. Memorandum for the President from General Marshall for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., p. 184.]
13. J.C.S. 577/9, 12 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., p. 209.]
14. J.C.S. 577/10, 24 April 1944. Memorandum for the President from Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text]
15. J.C.S. 577/11, 1 May 1944. White House Map Room message from the President for the Secretary of State (Black 85), 30 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text. Cf. Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 211.]
16. Message for the Secretary of State from Ambassador Winant, 17 June 1944, quoted in J.C.S. 577/15, 3 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., pp. 436–437.]
17. White House Map Room message for the President from [the] Acting Secretary of State (Red 225), 2 August 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 263, fn. 8.]
9. The word in brackets appears in the source text.
10. White House Map Room message from the President for the Acting Secretary of State (Blue 72), 3 August 1944. [Footnote in the source text. Cf. ibid., p. 264.]
11. Message for the Combined Chiefs of Staff from General Eisenhower (Scaf 65), 17 August 1944. [Footnote in the source text]
12. C.C.S. 320/23, 19 August 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]
13. Message for the Combined Chiefs of Staff from General Eisenhower (Scaf 68), 23 August 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]
10. For an appendix to this paper, entitled “Occupation of Austria and the Balkans”, see post, p. 216.