Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference at Quebec, 1944

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces (Somervell) and the British Minister of War Transport (Leathers)¹

top secret
Enclosure to C.C.S. 675/2

[Quebec,] 15 September 1944.

Memorandum by the U.S. Transportation, British Movement, and Combined Shipping Authorities

1. The attached Appendix “A” indicates the magnitude of the combined personnel movements which may be required during the first year after the defeat of Germany (assumed at 1 Oct. 1944) on the basis of tentative redeployment plans.

2. The attached Appendix “B” indicates the probable combined resources estimated to be available during the period under consideration.

3. Owing to changes in plans under way and in prospect a precise analysis of this problem cannot be made until the entire matter has been studied by combined agencies based on decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on strategy and priorities.

4. It is therefore recommended that the Combined Administrative Committee, in collaboration with the Combined Staff Planners, the Combined Military Transportation Committee, and the combined shipping authorities, study and report on this problem in the light of decisions to be made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Appendix “A”

Analysis of the Combined Personnel Movement Problem

Subsequent to a 1 October Defeat of Germany and for 1 Year Thereafter

		British	U.S.
1.	Operational Requirements
	a. Replacements (reinforcements) for forces already engaged in the war against Japan on 1 October.	*	693,000
	b. Build-up from U.S. for war against Japan.	—	826,000
	c. Redeployment for war against Japan.	1,052,000	804,000
	d. Additional replacements (reinforcements) to support increased strength due to b and/or c.	385,000	213,000
	e. Replacements or readjustments in garrisons, of non-operational areas.	265,000	10,000
	f. Rotational programs for forces engaged in the war against Japan.	150,000	280,000
	g. Intra-Area movement accomplished by retained ships.	250,000	768,000
	Subtotal	2,102,000	3,594,000
2.	Demobilization and Repatriation Without Replacement
	a. British and U.S. Forces.	678,000	1,720,000†
	b. Dominion, Colonial and other personnel.	251,000	28,000
	Subtotal	929,000	1,748,000
3.	Prisoners of War
	a. Allied prisoners of war.	53,000	102,000
	b. Enemy prisoners of war.	466,000	243,000
	Subtotal	519,000	345,000
4.	Total Requirements for the Services‡	3,550,000	5,687,000

Appendix “B”

Total Availability of Personnel Shipping by Categories (as of 1 Oct 1944)

		British		U.S.
	Categories	No. of Ships	Capacity	No. of Ships	Capacity
1.	Ocean Going	84	302,000	220	492,000
2.	Limited Capability
	(a) Indian Ocean type	31	48,000	—	—
	(b) Miscellaneous	6	6,000	45	35,000
	Subtotal	37	54,000	45	35,000
	Total Troopship Lift	121	356,000	265	527,000

Notes:			British		U.S.
1. Estimated lift on 1 October 1945, after allowing for additions and losses based on current C.C.S. rates				376,000		708,000
2. Additional trooplift may be realized by use of cargo ships temporarily fitted to carry a few hundred troops each.
3. An indeterminable lift may be obtained from captured enemy vessels.
4. Lift of LSI’s and APA’s is not included in above inventories but advantage will be taken of their lift whenever operational schedules permit.
5. Lift in U.S. Navy vessels as estimated and included in the above table for normal troop movement is subject to wide variation dependent upon possible utilization of Navy troopships for operational requirements.
6. No British cross-Channel type of shipping is included nor has any allowance been made for possible conversions for the naval fleet train or hospital ships.

1. Circulated as the enclosure to the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 675/2, “Combined Personnel Movement Problem During the First Year After the Defeat of Germany”, September 15, 1944): “The enclosure has been presented by Lord Leathers and General Somervell.” This paper was noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 175th Meeting, September 15, 1944. See ante, p. 356.
2. This figure is included under other headings in item 1. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. To the extent that the defeat of Germany is delayed beyond 1 October 1944 this figure will be increased. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. To this requirement must be added an unknown number for essential civilian movements. [Footnote in the source text.]