The Representatives of United States and British military services in
conjunction with appropriate shipping authorities submit the
attached report of the examination of troop shipping requirements
suggested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 172d Meeting of
12 September.1
[Enclosure]
top
secret
Combined Memorandum on Troop
Movements Covering the Period October 1944 to March
1945
a. assumptions
- 1.
- The state of war in Europe is such that the Combined
Chiefs of Staff agree:
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- a.
- That it is feasible to release British troops from
Europe for Operation Dracula.
- b.
- No further U.S. troops need be transported to
European theaters.
- 2.
- If the decision with regard to the two conditions in 1
above is not made by 1 October the necessary transfer of
British forces to India cannot be accomplished in time to
execute the operation before the monsoon.
b. statement of the
problem
1. The problem therefore is to determine the effect of employment
of troop shipping for Dracula on U.S. and
British deployments subsequent to the defeat of Germany.
c. facts bearing on the
problem
- 1.
- The build-up of a British task force in India for Dracula involves the movement of six
British divisions or 370,000 personnel from Europe to India
prior to 1 March 1945.
- 2.
- It is estimated that this movement will during its peak
period involve virtually the entire British trooping
lift.
- 3.
- This requirement will limit British assistance to the
United States in the Atlantic to a trooplift of about 25,000
per month from November 1944 to April 1945 by leaving only
the two Queens2 on this run. However in the event
of any unforeseen difficulties in meeting the Dracula program it might prove necessary
to withdraw one or both of the Queens
from the Atlantic service.
- 4.
- A further effect will be the withdrawal of all British
ocean-going troopships now employed in cross-Channel
movements. This amounts to a capacity of 25-30,000 troop
spaces for combined cross-Channel troop movements. It is
estimated that British cross-Channel troop movements can be
accomplished in other type vessels. The scale of U.S.
cross-Channel troop movements cannot be determined but
should be relatively light in proportion to total U.S.
withdrawals from the Continent. To the extent required such
movement must be accomplished in U.S. shipping.
- 5.
- The Dracula movement of British troops
absorbs the full capacity of Indian ports with the exception
of such U.S. troops as can be received through the port of
Calcutta. India has stated that they can disembark two
“General” class ships off Calcutta simultaneously by the use
of Indian Ocean shipping.
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d. discussion
1. Effect on British movement up to
approximately mid-March
- a.
- After 30 September it will not be possible to carry out
any normal trooping from the United Kingdom to theaters
abroad other than any replacements included in the Dracula program. Allowance has been made
for 4,500 a month between Canada and the United
Kingdom.
- b.
- No non-operational movement can take place except those
which might be capable of being effected in ships returning
empty from operational voyages.
- c.
- No troop ships could be spared for conversion to other
tasks, viz: fleet train, hospital ships, etc.
- d.
- It will only be possible to carry out movement already
planned between theaters abroad, mainly reinforcements from
West and East Africa to India and New Zealanders to Italy
which are small in relation to the total fleet and for which
shipping is being positioned. Internal movement in the
Mediterranean will be reduced to a local lift of some
15,000.
2. Effect on U.S. movements up to approximately
end of March
a. U.S. shipping schedules for
redeployment have included the movement of 70,000 U.S. troops
per month from Europe to the United States in British ships.
Under this assumption the strength of U.S. forces in Europe will
be:
| 1 Oct 44 |
2,760,000 |
| 1 Apr 45 |
1,535,000 |
| 6 months withdrawals from Europe |
1,225,000 |
b. The reduction of British assistance in the Atlantic to 25,000
troops monthly would result in the following European position:
| 1 Oct 44 |
2,760,000 |
| 1 Apr 45 |
1,805,000 |
| 6 months withdrawals from Europe |
955,000 |
In other words a reduction in the rate of return of U.S. troops
from the European Theater will be required amounting to 270,000
in six months.
c. Troop movements to Pacific theaters in
accordance with redeployment plans tentatively set up, but now
under review, would be possible.
e. conclusion
1. Until the strategic requirements for the furtherance of the
war against Japan subsequent to the defeat of Germany have been
determined and until shipping priorities have been established
as between operational and non-operational moves, it is not
possible to present
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more detailed shipping implications during and after the period
1 October 1944 to 1 April 1945.
