125.0090F/9
The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 12.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegram no. 59 dated September 3, 9:00 p.m., and to confirm to the Department that at the time when the initial request was made for permission to open a Consulate at Dhahran, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shaikh Yusuf Yassin, was in Jidda, and the King was in Riyadh.
So far as is known, neither the British Legation nor any person beside Saudi Foreign Ministry officials has any knowledge of the Department’s desire to open a Consulate; and the eventual intention to include Bahrein in the Dhahran district has not been divulged to anyone.
When in Riyadh between September 29, 1943 and October 5, 1943,15 I took advantage of several interviews with Saudi officials and interviews with King Ibn Saud, to renew the request, with the negative results recounted below.
On September 30, 1943, the earlier request for permission to open an American Consulate in Dhahran was mentioned to the King who said that he would discuss the matter himself in a subsequent audience.
That same day, however, Khalid Bey Al-Gargani and Beshir Bey Al-Sadawi, two of the King’s Counselors, called on me, and stated, among other things, that the King had authorized them to conduct preliminary conversations on the subject of the desired Consulate at Dhahran.
I then recalled to Khalid Bey and Beshir Bey that on August 23, 1943 a request for the requisite permission was made verbally to Shaikh Yusuf Yassin, and that the Saudi Arabian Government’s reply had been that the establishment of such a Consulate might cause an embarrassing precedent; and permission was not granted.
It was pointed out that a Consulate in Dhahran would be a great convenience both to the California Arabian Standard Oil Company and to the individual Americans there, in the issuance and validation of passports, notarial services, services to shipping and seamen, documentation [Page 836] of merchandise in normal times, et cetera, et cetera, and that with the anticipated growth in the company’s exports and in the size of its staff, the lack of a Consulate would become progressively more inconvenient.
It was added that Dhahran is unique in Saudi Arabia, and the chances that some other nation will have the same need for a Consulate there, or elsewhere in Saudi Arabia, is so remote as to be negligible. Consequently, there would appear to be little danger that a troublesome precedent would be established—and in any event, no new Consulates could be opened in Saudi Arabia without the permission of the Saudi Government.
Khalid Bey replied that “political law” (or “diplomatic law”) would oblige Saudi Arabia to grant to Iraq, for example, all rights with respect to Consulates which might be granted to the United States. And, in fact, Iraq had already applied for permission to open Consulates at Qatif and Riyadh and had been refused.
When a question was raised about which “political law” established the rule in this case, Khalid Bey said that the treaties establishing relations between Saudi Arabia and other countries made it impossible for Saudi Arabia to refuse to any friendly country permission to establish a Consulate at any place where the Consulate of a third country was located. Khalid Bey added that this provision is also found in the treaty establishing relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States. On request, Khalid Bey said he would show these treaty provisions.
Khalid Bey protested that he was really trying to help out in the matter, and that he was merely indicating, in friendly fashion, the difficulties lying in the way of the request.
The following day, I saw Khalid Bey and Beshir Bey at the Royal Palace. They produced copies of the Arabic text of the United States-Saudi Arabia Treaty of November 7, 1933,16 and cited the first article in support of their contention of the previous day. The English text was not available. A translation of the first article from the Arabic follows:
“The diplomatic representatives of either of the two states, when in the territory of the other state, shall enjoy the privileges and immunities derived from generally accepted international law. Consular representatives of either of the two states, after the issuance of their exequaturs, shall be permitted to reside in the territories of the other state in places where consular representatives are permitted to reside, in accordance with local laws; and they shall enjoy the privileges and immunities granted to similar officials in accordance with general international usage, and shall not be treated with less attention than similar officials of any other foreign state”.
Instead of the interpretation put upon it by the King’s counselors, the foregoing extract, in Arabic text, may be taken to provide that American consular officials may not establish themselves in any place without having the prior permission of the Saudi Arabian Government, and that the United States shall enjoy most favored nation treatment with respect to its consular representatives.
Neither of these provisions appeared to confirm the contentions of the King’s counselors.
They then produced the Arabic text of the Treaty of Friendship signed in Jidda on February 10, 1932 between Italy and the Kingdom of the Hejaz, and of the Nejd and Dependencies,17 and cited Article 2 as further proof, saying that any rights granted to Italy would automatically accrue to Iraq.
Article 2, in translation from the Arabic, reads as follows:
“Second Article.
“In accomplishment of the preceding article, the two high contracting parties have agreed to establish diplomatic and consular relations with each other, and for that purpose, the diplomatic and consular representatives of either of the two contracting parties shall enjoy, so long as they are in the territory of the other party, the treatment established in the principles of general international law, as well as enjoying, on condition of reciprocity, the treatment accorded to the most favored nation”.
When it was questioned that these treaty provisions would oblige the Saudi Government to grant to a third nation permission to establish a Consulate in Dhahran if such permission were accorded to the United States, Khalid Bey said that the Saudi Arabian Government so construed them.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Khalid Bey continued by saying that the development of the oil company’s concession would be advantageous to both Saudi Arabia and to the United States; and he felt sure that some method could be found whereby the desired services could be performed without the formal opening of a Consulate in Dhahran.
As a purely personal suggestion, Khalid Bey said that when the matter was discussed by the King, and when the King had said that he did not wish to grant permission for an American Consulate to be opened in Dhahran, the King might profitably be asked if he had any alternate plan to offer.
In reply, Khalid Bey was assured that the United States Government had no desire to raise any question which is embarrassing to the Saudi Arabian Government, but that the need for a Consulate in Dhahran is real and is certain to be more pressing as time goes on. [Page 838] Then Khalid Bey was given a brief description of the nature of the services performed by a Consulate, a subject on which he seemed to have very hazy notions.
On October 2, 1943, the request was mentioned to the King. He said that Khalid Bey and Beshir Bey had already explained the circumstances which had caused him to withhold the desired permission. He repeated … his belief that the establishment of an American Consulate at Dhahran would cause a renewal of requests from other countries, and that such requests would be embarrassing to Saudi Arabia. He added that requests to establish Consulates had been made by the British, Iraqis and Iranians, and had in each case been refused. The King stated that the Americans are his friends, and he wishes to help them, but not by permitting a Consulate to open at Dhahran. He repeated several times over that this was not a refusal, and said that perhaps the United States Government could suggest another way of performing the desired and desirable services.
In reply, I stated that no other way in which to perform the services occurred to me, and asked if the King had anything specific in mind. He said no, adding that he would be starting for the Hejaz toward the end of the month and that he would then discuss the subject again.
The Department will note that the position of the Saudi Arabian Government with respect to the request for a Consulate in Dhahran has two principal points:
- (1)
- The fear that an American Consulate in Dhahran would cause embarrassing demands for consulates of other nations in Saudi Arabia. This fear has been buttressed at various times by citation of international law, Moslem religious law, and treaty provisions; and all such citations seem to be inconclusive. Perhaps the fear of embarrassing demands from Iraq, Iran or Great Britain is genuine. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that the fear of foreign Consulates is a hold-over from the capitulatory regime of the Ottoman Empire. There has been little evidence to show that the King and his advisers have any clear conception of the services which a Consulate performs. These services were explained verbally to Shaikh Yusuf Yassin, to Khalid Bey and Beshir Bey, and briefly to the King. It is by no means certain that the explanations made any impression, though there was no tendency to question the desirability or advantages to be derived from the proposed Consulate.
- (2)
- Although withholding permission to open a Consulate, the Saudi officials, including the King, intimate that the same end can be obtained in a different way. It has not yet been possible to learn what they have in mind.
In despatch no. 24 dated August 26, 1943,18 the Department was informed how the Netherlands Government maintains a Vice Consul in Mecca who functions without hindrance from the Saudi Arabian Government as a member of the staff of the Dutch Legation in Jidda.
[Page 839]In this connection it may be of interest to note that a Saudi Arabian Consulate has recently been opened in Basra.
The local Government also wished to open a Consulate in Bahrein where a Saudi representative is needed to look after supplies for Saudi Arabia trans-shipped and landed at Bahrein. The British authorities refused to permit a Saudi Consulate in Bahrein, so eventually Shaikh Abdullah Al-Fadhl, the Saudi Arabian Government representative in Dammam, was made “Saudi Arabian Trade Representative”, and operates in Bahrein without official status but without interference from the British.
The prospect of opening a Consulate in Dhahran at present is not encouraging. The Department would appear to have three principal choices of the course to pursue: (1) to drop the matter; (2) to ignore the references to a “way to render the services without the establishment of a consulate” and to press periodically for the desired permission; or, (3) to investigate the “way to render the services without the establishment of a consulate” and to expect the situation to be regularized later.
When in Dhahran on October 7, 1943, the General Manager of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company remarked that the American personnel found it inconvenient to refer to the American Consulate at Basra for consular services, particularly passports and notarials, and stated that much time was lost by company personnel going to Bahrein, there to execute notarials at the British Political Agency. He suggested that an American Consulate might be opened at Dhahran, particularly in view of the expected increase in the number of Americans there. No indication was given him that an American Consulate in Dhahran was contemplated, though it is possible that Mr. Ohliger had heard it from Saudi sources.
In my opinion, it would be advantageous to follow up the hints of the King and others, and learn what kind of arrangement they would approve for the performance of consular services. It might be possible to arrange some plan such as this: A secretary from this Legation would take up his residence in Dhahran, with the knowledge and at least tacit assent of the Saudi Arabian Government, and would perform the usual consular services, acting as a member of the Legation and using a Legation seal. (As a member of the Legation, he would have official standing in the eyes of the local officials, and it is believed that he would be almost as useful as if a Consulate were established.)
Should such an arrangement be made, the secretary stationed in Dhahran could exchange places from time to time with a secretary in Jidda, both breaking the monotony for the officers concerned, and confirming the fact that the person in Dhahran was in reality a secretary of the Legation.
[Page 840]This slightly irregular proceeding may seem to the Department to be less of an innovation if the situation in Jidda is taken into account. Since the establishment of Legations in Jidda, no consular officials are known to have been recognized by the Saudi Arabian Government. Members of the Legation staffs serve in consular capacity without presenting commissions or receiving exequaturs, and without any objection on the part of the local Government. That is the position of the American and British Legations at present, and it is believed to apply to all other Legations here.
Thus far no one has wished to bring up the subject of exequaturs because of the danger that it would do more harm than good. If the local authorities once realize that consular officials normally hold exequaturs, they might raise difficulties in the issuance of the documents and in the performance of consular services. They might also refuse to recognize the same person in dual diplomatic and consular capacity.
The Department’s views on the foregoing suggestion of an informal consular office in Dhahran are respectfully requested by airgram.
Respectfully yours,