Colonel Hoskins has now returned after three and one-half months in which
he visited all of the Near East and North Africa.
During the course of his visit he saw and talked to British, French, and
American military and political officials, and to a large number of the
leading Arab and Jewish officials and prominent persons in that area. A
copy of his report is attached.57
I believe that at least the summary warrants your careful reading. I also
trust I may have your approval for further efforts along the lines
indicated and for the wording of the proposed United Nations’
declaration attached hereto, which, if you concur, we could first
discuss with the British and subsequently with other United Nations.
[Enclosure 1]
Summary of Lieutenant Colonel Harold B.
Hoskins’ Report on the Near East
Part I gives the outstanding facts developed in the course of his
three and one-half months’ trip through the Near East and North
Africa and may be summarized as follows:
(1) The most important and most serious fact is the danger that,
unless definite steps are taken to prevent it, there may be a
renewed outbreak of fighting between Arabs and Jews in Palestine
before the end of the war and perhaps even during the next few
months. Such fighting in Palestine is almost certain to lead to the
massacre of Jews living in the neighboring states of Iraq and Syria
as well as in other places in the Near East.
The tension is growing steadily and as a result the Arabs are likely
to be goaded as their only effective means of protest into breaking
the informal truce which has existed in Palestine since the outbreak
of the war in 1939. The Arabs feel that the Zionists, by continuing
a world-wide propaganda for a Jewish State in Palestine, have not
kept their part of the bargain. There is therefore in the minds of
the Arabs a growing fear that unless they do something, they will be
faced, when the war is over, with a decision already taken by the
Great Powers to turn Palestine over to the Jews. This fear is, of
course, one on which Axis propaganda to this area has constantly and
effectively harped.
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(2) The Jews feel that with their increased numbers and with their
increased stocks of arms they can more than hold their own in actual
fighting with Palestinian Arabs. However, from previous experience
the Jews realize that, whenever serious fighting with the Arabs
starts in Palestine, assistance from neighboring Arab states will
again pour in. It is this increased opposition that the Zionists
admit they probably do not have the power to overcome without
outside assistance from British or British and American military
forces.
(3) There is an ever-present Arab fear of American support for
political Zionism with its proposed Jewish State and Jewish Army in
Palestine. This is now extending to the further fear of American
support for the penetration of Jewish people into Syria and other
neighboring Arab areas, once Palestine has been fully populated.
(4) There is also a growing Syrian fear of American support for, or
at least acquiescence in, a continuation of French control in Syria
after this war is over. The Syrians remember that, after the last
war and despite an overwhelming preference for the United States and
specific objection to France, the mandates for Syria and Lebanon
were nevertheless given to France.
In fact, the fear that already haunts all of the Near East is that at
the end of the present World War the United States may again return
to isolationism. Even today this is the cause of such worry that
reference is made to it in almost every conversation held with
private or official individuals.
(5) Tension and difficulties with the Arabs in North Africa have
already been reported to the War Department by General
Eisenhower.58 The unenthusiastic, and in some
places uncooperative, attitude of the North African Arab populations
reflects hostile propaganda that has claimed that American successes
in North Africa would aid the Jewish cause in Palestine.
Obviously the security of American or United Nations troops in the
Arab or Moslem world has not yet reached a critical stage. But the
situation is definitely unhealthy. The experiences of British troops
during their retreat in Burma are a grave and recent warning of the
serious effects that a hostile, rather than friendly, native
population can have on our military operations.
(6) Since Zionist propaganda in the United States is much greater
than corresponding Arab pressure, it is important for the American
people to realize that, in the Moslem world, Arab feelings remain
uncompromisingly against the acceptance of a political Zionist State
in Palestine.
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It should be very clear to the American people, therefore, that only
by military force can a Zionist State in Palestine be imposed upon
the Arabs.
Part II notes some of the effects of the Arab-Jew conflict in
Palestine on the United States.
Our domestic disunity is aggravated by dissension among American
citizens of various foreign born groups and increasing conflicts
among various Jewish groups, as well as increasing
anti-Semitism.
An unfortunate effect for the Jews themselves has resulted from
mixing together two problems that should be kept quite separate.
Support for all-out aid to persecuted Jews in Europe, on which there
can be no difference of opinion, should not be diminished by tying
it up with the extremely controversial proposal to establish a
Jewish political state in Palestine.
Part III suggests a specific step toward winning wartime support for
our United Nations’ cause of the 60 million Arabs in North Africa
and the Near East.
(1) By the issuance now of a brief statement by the United Nations
(or at least by the four major powers) giving assurances regarding
the procedure that will be followed in arriving at a post-war
settlement of Palestine. Such a statement need only restate as
official policy of the United Nations, in regard to Palestine what
the United States, Great Britain, and their Allies have already
announced as their general policy in regard to territorial problems
everywhere. This assurance can be very brief and need only consist
of two points: (1) that no final decisions regarding Palestine will
be taken until after the war; (2) that any post-war decisions will
be taken only after full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.
A statement along these lines issued as soon as possible would go far
to relieve existing tension in the Near East and would, in the
opinion of officials in that area, be the military equivalent of at
least several extra divisions of troops.
Part IV outlines a post-war solution.
The existing population of one million Arabs and one-half million
Jews in Palestine is not to be moved and is to form a bi-national
state within a proposed Levant Federation. This independent Levant
Federation would be formed by the re-uniting of Lebanon, Syria,
Palestine and Trans-Jordan that, prior to their dismemberment after
the last war, had for years been one natural economic and political
unit. The Holy Places, including Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Bethlehem,
are to be an enclave under United Nations’ control. The cession of
some specific territory other than Palestine for a Jewish State is
proposed—possibly northern Cirenaica, which is now virtually
uninhabited.
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The Jewish refugee problem is met to the extent that, under the
proposed plan, the Jews could put another half million in Palestine
so as to reach parity with the Arabs and up to a half million Jews
in northern Cirenaica.
