Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The Near East and Africa, Volume IV

867N.00/627

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William L. Parker of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[ Washington ,] March 3, 1943.

Participants:	Dr. Chaim Weizmann21
	Mr. Moshe Shertok
	Dr. Nahum Goldmann22
	Mr. Louis Lipsky22
	Mr. Murray
	Mr. Alling23
	Mr. Merriam24
	Mr. Parker

Dr. Weizmann, accompanied by Mr. Shertok, Dr. Goldmann and Mr. Lipsky, called to discuss matters relating to the status of Palestine. Mr. Murray initiated the discussion by addressing a few courteous preliminary remarks to Dr. Weizmann, who replied that Mr. Shertok was present in order to express his views concerning the war effort in Palestine with which he, of course, was familiar as head of the political section of the Jewish Agency at Jerusalem. Before inviting Mr. Shertok to express his views Dr. Weizmann remarked that recently American officials, particularly army officers, returning to this country after brief visits to Palestine, have been indulging in clichés about Palestine unfavorable to the Jewish position there without knowing much about the situation and not having been there long enough to have gained a true understanding of the facts.

Mr. Shertok prefaced his remarks by stating that there have been many changes in Palestine since he met Mr. Murray in Jerusalem in 1938. Since that time the White Paper has been promulgated and war has descended upon the world. Mr. Shertok declared that the White Paper and the war effort are in conflict because the White Paper forbids immigration at a time when the war effort calls for the greatest mobilization of existing resources in Palestine. He continued along the following lines: The Jews are not in Palestine by accident; they are there as a result of an organized effort. If the power of the Jewish economic machine is to be harnessed to the war effort it is necessary to cooperate with the Jews in Palestine. In order to effect such cooperation, the Jewish authorities in Palestine are determined to alter the White Paper policy in order to derive the most from Palestine as a contribution to the prosecution of the war.

When the war first started, the Jews of Palestine did not expect the British Government to change the White Paper policy immediately but expected that it would be held in abeyance. This belief was held because Palestine 1) was actually threatened with invasion, 2) is against Hitler, 3) is a part of the progressive world.

Palestine has made great contributions to the war effort. There are 30,000 Palestinian Jews in the military services, 20,000 of them in the Army and others in such organizations as the police. There are, however, only about 8,000 Arabs in all of the British Empire forces. Of the Arabs in the armed forces, about 25 per cent desert and about 25 per cent more are dismissed. Desertions and dismissals among the Jews, however, are extremely rare.

In addition to its contributions to the armed forces, the Jewish community of Palestine is turning to industry and to employment of its scientific resources for the benefit of the war effort. There are Jews in war work all over the Near East. Recently the British Army needed some Jews to work in Iraq and took them over the frontier in uniform although they were not military personnel. (Dr. Weizmann remarked that this was “illegal immigration”.) Mr. Shertok stated that such action could be condoned as a desperate measure, but he pointed out that the Jews also are waging a desperate struggle for existence. The Jews of Palestine have wondered what it would have been like and what a contribution they could have made if there had been 1,000,000 or 2,000,000 Jews in Palestine instead of only half a million. If the Jews in Palestine had been two or even four or five times as numerous things would have been a lot different. This thought pertains not only to the present but should be projected into the future. What the Jews are doing in Palestine is not an accident; it is the result of a conscious effort. Jews went to Palestine to live there and to earn their living there. Their presence in Palestine has not been the result of the free play of economic forces; it has been the result of governmental decisions that the Jews should go to Palestine.

The economic absorptive capacity of Palestine is not finite; it is the human element which is of importance. The important question is whether the Jews need Palestine, not what the capacity of Palestine might be. Although there may be a limit eventually as to the number of Jews that Palestine may absorb, this limit is very far from being approached. What has been done in Palestine to date is merely of an experimental character. For example, there have been experiments in irrigation; however, these experiments have been only of a local character. Recently these experiments have begun to pass, in a few instances, from the local to the regional. However, no attempt has been made as yet to make irrigation projects country-wide. There are great undeveloped water resources in Palestine which need to be harnessed. If the great water power and irrigation projects which have been developed in the United States could have been accomplished, certainly it would be possible to develop similar projects on a much smaller scale in a little country like Palestine. Then there is the industrial development of Palestine. There has been a substantial industrial output, but this, so far, has been primarily for consumption within the country. There are, however, excellent prospects for exporting Palestinian-made goods to neighboring countries. Before the war these neighboring countries imported approximately £200,000,000 worth of goods from nations now our enemies. Probably after the war these enemy countries will not be in a position to resume manufacturing for export immediately. Presumably the United States and the United Kingdom will participate in this trade, but Palestine desires its share as well. There is no reason why Palestine cannot develop a sizeable industry. Technological developments are tending to make areas less dependent upon local raw materials. For example, there are now European diamond cutters in Palestine. There is no reason why diamonds should travel all the way from South Africa to Europe for cutting when there are expert diamond cutters today to work in Palestine. There are in the country as well other skilled artisans, such as watchmakers, radio crystal makers and pharmaceutical men.

Mr. Shertok continued by saying that the Jews of Palestine are very well aware that they are confronted with a very serious political difficulty. If Palestine were an empty country, this difficulty would not exist, and the world probably would be content to let Jews settle in Palestine. However, the democratic world entertains doubts as to the expediency of letting Jews settle in Palestine in large numbers because of the presence there of Arabs who do not welcome this development. This political difficulty raises two questions: 1) A question of justice; 2) a question of practicability. The first question, the question of justice, presents a dilemma with the alternatives of being unjust either to the Jews or to the Arabs. There is less injustice to the Arabs involved in awarding Palestine to the Jews than there would be injustice to the Jews in not allowing them to have Palestine. This viewpoint is supported as follows: The Arabs are an undeveloped people. There is plenty of opportunity for them in a developed Palestine which would create employment. Their fears are not justified. If the Italians had invaded Palestine they would have moved all Palestinian Arabs into Syria. Turkey is territorially ambitious too. Iraq went to war principally because it feared that Turkey would demand rectification of the Turko-Iraqi border at the Peace Conference. The Jews in Palestine could help Iraq to develop in order that Iraq would not remain an empty shell. Palestinian Jews could be of assistance to Arabs and to neighboring countries by creating markets and by providing employment. Even now, Iraqis come to Palestine in order to gain scientific knowledge.

Palestine is an Arab country no longer. All Jews feel that the establishment of a large Jewish community in Palestine is essential for the preservation of the race. This is the attitude not only of the Jews of Palestine but of the Jews of all the world. It is necessary, therefore, to bring in as many Jews as possible into Palestine in as short a space of time as possible. The Arabs thus far, according to Mr. Shertok, have accepted the Jews already in Palestine but have objected only to proposals to settle more Jews in the country.

Mr. Murray remarked at this point that this statement did not appear to be quite accurate because each Arab revolt in Palestine may be attributed to an influx of Jews who had actually arrived.

Mr. Shertok admitted that bringing in more Jews would mean a very difficult period indeed. For this reason he contended it is necessary to get over this difficult period as soon as possible by bringing into Palestine large numbers of Jews as quickly as possible.

Mr. Shertok then discussed the possible relationship to each other of Arab countries adjacent to Palestine. Would it be by union, a federation, by treaties, or by what means? This question Mr. Shertok could not undertake to answer. Personally he does not sympathize with the federation idea because that would depend upon the attitude of neighboring countries. With respect to the Jews, the idea of federation does not involve federation with the Jews already in Palestine; the object is to bring more Jews into Palestine.

Mr. Shertok then proceeded to a discussion of King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. He stated that he regards Ibn Saud as the most important Arab alive. However, Ibn Saud does not regard himself as a candidate for an imperial Arab throne. Mr. Shertok stated that he does not consider an Arab empire to be a practical possibility or that Ibn Saud is the man to rule it.

At this point Mr. Alling stated that probably Ibn Saud does not want to rule an Arab empire. Mr. Shertok agreed, adding that Ibn Saud prefers merely to be a man of influence in the Arab world. He might serve as the head of a Pan-Arab union, but he would not make a ruler of an Arab empire.

Mr. Shertok then referred to a suggestion made upon a previous occasion by Dr. Weizmann that a Jewish delegation confer with Ibn Saud in an effort to effect a settlement of Jewish-Arab problems. Mr. Shertok stated that he could not conceive of Ibn Saud’s even receiving a Jewish delegation. Such an event would be explosive in character. The entire Arab world would wonder what was taking place. Arabs would come to him from all directions to warn him to desist. However, Mr. Shertok observed that a British or American representative could discuss matters with Ibn Saud without having such conversations advertised or known to others. If the Jewish-Arab question were discussed with him in this manner, Ibn Saud’s reaction would be negative, but doubtless his interviewer could interpret the degree of his negative reaction from his manner.

Mr. Murray recalled that, after the Palestine revolt of 1936,²⁵ a great many people endeavored to persuade Ibn Saud to express his views, but Ibn Saud had said nothing. Then later came Ibn Saud’s letter to the President in 1938²⁶ in which he took an out-and-out position after a period of two years of silence. Mr. Murray said he wondered why pressure brought upon Ibn Saud previously had proved to be unsuccessful but concluded that Ibn Saud’s letter was in anticipation of the Round Table Conference in London.

Mr. Shertok stated that an Arab federation is an unlikely development because Egypt would not join. However, he added, Egypt might participate in an Arab union if Egypt could be the head of such a union. He expressed agreement with Mr. Murray that Ibn Saud is a man of the desert rather than a potential leader of an Arab empire.

Mr. Weizmann remarked that he would like to say a word about Ibn Saud’s letter to the President, He said that he thought that Ibn Saud wrote this letter because “no Arab could afford to speak less loudly than the other” at that time regarding the establishment of a Jewish national home. Dr. Weizmann expressed agreement with Mr. Shertok that it would be premature for him to go to see Ibn Saud.

Returning to the subject of the status of Palestine Dr. Weizmann declared that we should “grasp the nettle”. It will be easier, he declared, if the United Nations set up a Jewish Palestine now than it would be if the process were dragged out indefinitely. In this connection he referred to the cession of Alexandretta from Syria to Turkey²⁷ stating that this created no great furor. He continued by saying that what the Jews have achieved in Palestine has been done in spite of British administration.

Dr. Weizmann declared “I affirm again before you that Palestine will never again be an Arab country.” The United States has a moral responsibility with regard to Palestine which it cannot disclaim. The Jews have taken American official attitudes seriously and have spent money on Palestine on this basis. He said, “We will not let you disclaim this responsibility. The Jews will bring moral pressure to bear in order to create a Jewish Palestine.” He continued, “As long as the Middle East will be an empty country it will always be coveted. It should be worked and populated.”

At this point Mr. Murray observed that the people who have to deal with the Palestine question are faced with practical problems. For example, American diplomatic representatives abroad recently have received a number of protests from various Near Eastern governments with regard to the increasing Jewish influence in Palestine. Invariably, periods of pressure of this kind from Arab governments follow statements made in the United States such as those made recently with regard to the formation of a Jewish army. Irrespective of whether such statements may be right or wrong, they do serve to arouse Arab peoples and to occasion protests. The Axis propaganda machine, of course, uses these statements to its own advantage in attempting to foment discontent and antipathy to the United Nations’ cause among the Arab people. As a result, of course, the military situation is affected, in as much as it is essential to have the goodwill and friendship of the populations of Near Eastern countries where United Nations’ troops are stationed. Mr. Murray inquired what the callers thought of this aspect of the situation.

Mr. Shertok replied that Zionist leaders are dealing with democracies, which depend upon public opinion to support national policies. There are many questions being raised at this time regarding the predicament of the Jews in Europe. If anything is to be done about this situation, the question must be presented before the forum of public opinion.

Mr. Murray then inquired if questions are not being raised inopportunely by the issuance of public statements. Dr. Weizmann replied that, in order to raise money, it is necessary to make speeches as a means of securing the support of public opinion. Naturally the Axis hears about some of these things but unfortunately that cannot be helped.

Mr. Murray asked whether American Jews feel strongly on the subject of Zionism. There are, he said, many American Jews who are not pro-Zionist. Dr. Weizmann replied that probably over 90 percent of Jews in the United States would like to see Palestine rebuilt by the Jews and are incensed by the White Paper policy. Those who disagree with this majority are a powerful but small minority. This minority which is opposed to a Jewish state is afraid of jeopardizing its own position in the United States. Mr. Murray remarked that that is the very point involved—that there are many Jews in this country who regard themselves as thoroughly American and who do not wish to have their status threatened in any way. Dr. Weizmann then said that the war may end at any time and that the Palestine question is coming to a head. If it were possible to hold a plebiscite in the United States 90 percent of American Jews would favor the establishment of a Jewish state. Mr. Lipsky remarked at this point that dissenters among American Jews are agreeable to immigration into Palestine but balk only at the use of the term “state” with respect to Palestine. Mr. Murray observed that this attitude toward immigration may be attributed largely to sympathy for the predicament of Jews in Europe. Mr. Weizmann then stated that when a man is frightened he is not logical; that it is foolish for American Jews to be afraid that the United States would consider ejecting American Jews and sending them off to Palestine.

At this point the discussion ended and Dr. Weizmann and his associates arose to take their departure. As they were leaving, Mr. Alling asked Mr. Shertok how long he expected to remain in this country. Mr. Shertok replied that he expected “to remain here for the kill”.

21. President of the World Zionist Organization.
22. Dr. Goldmann and Mr. Lipsky were Zionist leaders.
22. Dr. Goldmann and Mr. Lipsky were Zionist leaders.
23. Paul H. Alling, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.
24. Gordon P. Merriam, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.
25. For correspondence relating to this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. iii, pp. 434–459, passim.
26. Dated November 29, 1938, ibid., 1938, vol. ii, p. 994.
27. For correspondence regarding this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1938, vol. ii, pp. 1031–1043, passim.