882.796/46
The First Secretary of the British Embassy
(Wright) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)
441/30/43
Washington, July 7,
1943.
Dear Mr. Berle: You may recall that towards
the end of April you discussed with Sir Ronald Campbell a request
previously put forward by this Embassy on behalf of His Majesty’s
Government for landing rights for flying boats on the British Overseas
Airways Corporation at Fisherman’s Lake in Liberia, and that you
referred in this connection to the views of the United States military
authorities on certain aspects of the services performed by British
Overseas Airways
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Corporation
in West Africa, and on the advantages, in terms of increased pay load,
which could be expected if the facilities in question were granted.
I now write to inform you that, in view of the possibility of using
Abidjan for the purpose in view, His Majesty’s Government do not wish
for the present to press their request for facilities at Fisherman’s
Lake.
At the same time, in view of the fact that some of the statements which
you conveyed to Sir Ronald Campbell during the interview seem to be
based on a misunderstanding of the status of British Overseas Airways
Corporation, and on the nature and purpose of its operations in Africa,
I take this opportunity of transmitting herewith two memoranda, the
first63 of which is
a statement by the Permanent Under Secretary of State for Air on the
relations, financial and other, of British Overseas Airways Corporation
with His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, and the second64 deals
in detail with the specific points raised in regard to the Corporation’s
activities in Africa.
Yours sincerely
[Enclosure]
The following is a list of statements by United States military
authorities regarding the operations of British Overseas Airways
Corporation in Africa as reported by Mr. Berle of the State
Department in conversation with Sir Ronald Campbell, together with
the observations of His Majesty’s Government thereon.
First Statement—“It does not appear that
the B.O.A.C. land planes are primarily carrying military cargo
or personnel but that they are largely interested in commercial
passengers and freight.”
With rare exceptions (see observations on statement No. 3), traffic
in the United Kingdom–West Africa and trans-African services of
B.O.A.C. is allocated by the Air Transport Priorities Boards in
London or in Cairo, who give space only to official passengers travelling on business connected with
the war effort, and to official freight. Such official passengers or
freight are not, of course, necessarily military, and a civilian passenger may well be much more
important than a given military passenger from the point of view of
the war effort.
Second Statement—“At Kano in Nigeria
there are said to be 150 tons of spare parts for British
aircraft awaiting transport, which are never picked up by
B.O.A.C. planes.”
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His Majesty’s Government are, of course, aware of the large
accumulation of dead load awaiting onward conveyance at Kano.
Recently the accumulation has been considerably reduced by the
intensification of Ensign operations between Khartoum and Kano and
by R.A.F. Dakota shuttles. But the presence of an accumulation of
cargo at Kano should not prevent B.O.A.C. from endeavouring to clear
heavy loads on the through route from Lagos to the Middle East.
Third Statement—“The passengers carried
are reported to include Syrian traders.”
As stated in the observations on Statement No. 1, exceptions are
occasionally made to the rule that only official passengers are
carried on B.O.A.C. aircraft. It is sometimes possible to take on a
non-priority passenger either on a lightly loaded intermediate
section of the route or in the event of a priority passage being
suddenly thrown up at very short notice. The Syrian traders referred
to in this statement are cases in point; such traders have been
carried from Khartoum to Lagos and on to Accra, as the B.O.A.C.
services are lightly loaded in the westbound direction and there is
occasionally capacity to spare on this stage, after official demands
have been met.
Fourth Statement—“At [Maiduguri]65 on several occasions members of the R.A.F.
have applied to the Air Transport Command for transportation to
the next stop on the B.O.A.C. line, this taking place on the
same day that the B.O.A.C. was running a plane carrying an
almost total load of civilian passengers”.
The fact that there has been no capacity available for military
personnel whose journeys originate at Maiduguri is not surprising.
There is no excess capacity out of Maiduguri and therefore sectional
traffic originating there can only be carried at the expense of
through load. As regards transportation of civilian passengers, see
the observations on Statement No. 1.
Fifth Statement—Doubt is thrown on the
statement made in a letter from Mr. Hayter to Mr. Alling of the
State Department dated March 23rd to the effect that “the
ability to use Fisherman’s Lake would improve the pay load of
both Sunderland and Boeing type flying boat by over 2000 lbs. in
each case …” and it is suggested that the saving would in fact
amount to only a little more than 1000 lbs.
An analysis of the loading table for Boeing type flying boats on the
West African route shows that the pay load for the Bathurst–Lagos
section would be increased by no less than 2,722 lbs. if the flight
were interrupted at Fisherman’s Lake for refuelling. See attached
table.66
