Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The Near East and Africa, Volume IV

891.51A/865: Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

Tehran, October 13, 1943—noon.
[Received October 14—5:08 a.m.]

993. My 989, October 11. Millspaugh and his American staff will today present to Prime Minister their formal resignations, which will take effect on November 2. In the interim period they offer Iranian Government full cooperation in effecting an orderly turnover of their functions.

It will be well to point out and bear in mind some possible consequences which may attend or follow the withdrawal of the American Financial Mission. In an economic sense there will naturally be a temporary increase in the already existing confusion in matters such as road transport, grain collection, finance, price stabilization, et cetera, which Millspaugh has had under his direct control.

In the political sphere, which is closely related to the economic, the consequences may prove to be more profound and far reaching. The British, responsible for Allied security in Iran, may find it necessary to reconsider their position and perhaps intervene even more fully and directly in Iranian affairs, to prevent further deterioration in Iranian economy. The Russians always suspicious of British motives and action in Iran would perhaps seize the opportunity to tighten their grip on the northern zone and lay plans for further penetration. The result might well be to intensify or precipitate the already existing but somewhat quiescent struggle of the British and Russians for Iranian hegemony. It should be emphasized that, entirely apart from the Millspaugh question, Russian-British relations in Iran have been so unsatisfactory and mutually suspicious that there is always danger of a renewal of their pre-1907 struggle for ascendency.⁴⁸ (See for example my telegram no. 976 October 2⁴⁹ re Tabatabai.) While American interest in Iran is [in] the form of advisers probably serves as a restraining influence on the British and Russians it is unlikely that it could prevent an eventual clash if the issues become sufficiently clear and the time propitious. It is understood that the British propose to discuss at Moscow ways and means of effecting better Allied cooperation in Iran and of improving Iran’s economy.⁵⁰ It might be possible to bring within the scope of the conversations a general discussion of the position of the American advisers in Iran and the means by which they could be given greater Allied support and be made a more effective instrument in bringing about Iran’s regimentation. Any instruction or guidance the Department may be able to give for use in the conversations will be appreciated.

As noted in my 989 Millspaugh has left the way open for the Iranians to suggest continuance of the Financial Mission on a new basis. However such a course would not be advisable unless the American Government is able and willing to give the American missions in Iran more active and substantial support as a matter of determined policy. While certain Divisions of the State Department have rendered valuable assistance other agencies of the Government have not given the support without which the missions cannot hope to succeed. It would appear to me that a remedy for this situation must be sought in the highest policy making levels if the United States is to continue to play an active [role?] in Iranian affairs. Specifically it would be necessary, if Millspaugh is to continue, that American personnel requested be selected and arrive in Iran within a reasonable period of time, say a maximum of 2 months. Since it is well realized that the State Department does not have facilities for selecting a large number of men it would be necessary for Millspaugh to make his own arrangements for employment, in close collaboration with the Department.

Dreyfus

48. For the Anglo-Russian Convention of August 31, 1907, see Foreign Relations, 1907, pt. 1, p. 550.
49. Ante, p. 389.
50. For correspondence relating to the question of Iran at the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers, October 18–November 1, see vol. i, index entries on Iran under Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers.