891.00/2095
The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 14, 1944.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s instruction No. 293 of December 2, 1943 transmitting two memoranda of conversations regarding the desire of the Iranian Government to have foreign troops withdrawn from Iran at an early date.71 It is noted that the Iranian Minister has put forward the view of his Government [Page 427] that conditions have radically changed since the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of January 29, 1943 [1942] and that the evacuation of the Allied troops should not be postponed until after the end of the war, for the following reasons:
- (a)
- All Axis agents have been eliminated from Iran.
- (b)
- There is no longer any threat of an enemy invasion of Iran.
- (c)
- Iran has joined the United Nations.
I assume that the Iranian Government really has in mind only the withdrawal of British and Soviet combat troops, since there are no American combat forces in Iran and the presence of American, British or Soviet technical units for operating purposes will obviously be necessary so long as this country continues to be used as a major route for the transport of supplies to the U. S. S. R.
The Legation has informally and confidentially consulted on this subject General Ridley, Colonel Schwarzkopf and General Scott (chief of staff to General Connolly, who is away). Their views, which they do not wish attributed to them in any way, and those of Colonel Baker, the Legation’s Military Attaché, are, in composite summary:
- (1)
- It is highly improbable that all dangerous Axis agents have been eliminated from Iran.
- (2)
- The tribes continue to constitute a threat to the security of the supply line, and the presence of foreign troops undoubtedly exercises a deterrent effect upon them.
- (3)
- The Iranian Army and Gendarmerie are not yet in a position to cope with the tribes unassisted and probably will not be able to do so for some time to come.
- (4)
- The Persian Gulf Command and the American advisers to the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie prefer to have the existing arrangement maintained, whereby the British Army is responsible for security in the south and the Soviet Army in the north.
I do not think that one need be a military expert to agree with the foregoing. It is quite clear that the Iranian military forces are for the time being incapable of dealing with restive tribes, such as the Qashqai and the Kurds, and I think the same may be said of the police forces vis-à-vis individual Axis agents. One cannot, of course, say definitely that hostile activities of the tribes and agents would increase if foreign troops were not on hand, but it seems probable. In any case, the danger exists. There is a further, more remote, possibility that the withdrawal of Allied forces would open the way to general disturbances in the nature of revolution, expressing the widespread dissatisfaction of the Iranian people with the present government and social system.
Respectfully yours,