Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The Near East and Africa, Volume IV

740.0011 Moscow/212

Mr. George V. Allen, Member of the American Delegation to the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers, to the Secretary of State

[Tehran,] November 4, 1943.
[Received November 16.]

Subject: Discussions regarding Iran at Moscow Conference.

Sir: I have the honor to submit, for the Department’s information, a summary of the discussions regarding Iran held during the tripartite meeting of foreign secretaries at Moscow, October 18 to 30,1943.

The subject “Common Policy towards Iran” had been proposed by the British Government for discussion at the conference and was incorporated in the final agenda as point No. 10. In accordance with the agreed procedure regarding presentation of subjects, the British delegation prepared a memorandum, (the substance of which was communicated orally to the American delegation in advance) which was circulated by hand to the American and Soviet representatives on October 23. This memorandum⁴² (enclosure No. 1) reviewed the situation in Iran and contained a suggested tripartite declaration of policy which might be agreed upon at the Conference.

On October 24, Mr. Eden called on the Secretary of State at Spaso House. Mr. Hull took the occasion to suggest (1) that the proposed declaration be expanded to include a promise of support for the foreign advisers (Dr. Millspaugh et cetera) and domestic agencies working to improve conditions in Iran and (2) that separate declarations be made regarding the intentions of the three powers to withdraw their armed forces from Iran after the cessation of hostilities. Mr. Eden concurred in these suggestions.

Item 10 on the agreed agenda came before the general meeting of the foreign secretaries for the first time at the session of October 24. Mr. Eden referred to the British memorandum and asked that the conference also consider various practical questions relating to the operations of the three powers in Iran, such as transport, finance, coordination of trade activities, etc. He proposed the appointment of a sub-committee to study the whole question of policy in Iran.

Mr. Molotov⁴³ said that a few days before the opening of the conference the Iranian Ambassador at Moscow, Mr. Ahy, had called at the Soviet Foreign Office to express the opinion that Iran was entitled, by the terms of the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Alliance, to be represented at any discussions concerning Iran, and that the Ambassador had been informed that the Soviet authorities did not expect that decisions regarding Iran would be made by the conference. Mr. Molotov asked the opinion of the meeting as to whether this reply had been correct.

Mr. Eden replied that it was not suggested that any major decisions be taken nor anything done which might affect the terms of the tripartite treaty of alliance. His thought was merely to discuss certain measures which, if the conversations were successful, could only redound to the benefit of Iran.

Mr. Molotov did not dissent from this statement, and Mr. Hull concurred in the suggested appointment of a sub-committee on Iran. Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull then named the following members of their respective delegations to be members of the Iranian sub-committee:

For the Soviet delegation:

• Mr. S. I. Kavtaradze, People’s Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs;
• Mr. Andrei Smirnov, former Soviet Ambassador to Iran.

For the British delegation:

• Mr. Adrian Holman, Counselor of the British Legation at Tehran;
• Mr. William Iliff, Financial Counselor of the British Legation at Tehran.

For the American delegation:

• Mr. George V. Allen, Assistant Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State;
• Mr. John D. Jernegan, Third Secretary of the American Legation, Tehran.

On October 25, the British members of the sub-committee circulated to the other two delegations copies of two proposed declarations⁴⁴ (enclosure No. 2), based upon the original British memorandum of October 23 and upon the suggestions made by the Secretary of State to Mr. Eden during their conversation on October 24.

The sub-committee met for the first time on October 26. The British members proposed consideration of their draft declarations, and the American members put forward a memorandum⁴⁵ (enclosure No. 3) containing a proposed amendment to the British draft of a tripartite declaration together with a draft of a declaration to be made by the United States regarding withdrawal of its troops from Iran. It was proposed that this latter declaration be made simultaneously with the similar Anglo-Soviet declaration suggested by the British members. The British members at once accepted the American amendment to the draft tripartite declaration.

Owing to delay in delivery, the Soviet members had not received advance copies of either the British draft declarations or the American memorandum. They felt that they could not discuss those documents without written Russian translations, and it was agreed, therefore, to defer their consideration until the following day.

The British members put forward, for later discussion, the following specific points on which they thought it desirable to reach agreement, at least in principle:

(1) That all three powers should do what they could to relieve the food situation in Iran.

(2) That all three powers should do what they could to relieve the Iranian road transport situation.

(3) That all three powers should coordinate as far as possible their policy with regard to local purchases in Iran.

(4) That during the war period all three governments should coordinate their programs of imports into Iran.

(5) That an understanding should be reached regarding matters of finance involved in the operation of the Trans-Iranian railroad. (In this connection, the British members presented a memorandum containing the principal points which they considered should be incorporated in a four-party Anglo-American-Soviet-Iranian agreement (enclosure No. 4⁴⁶).

(6) That the three powers should conclude an agreement regarding payment of Iranian taxes.

(7) That there should be regular consultation in Tehran between the three chiefs of mission on all economic and financial questions.

The sub-committee held its second meeting on October 27, Mr. Kavtaradze being elected chairman, and proceeded at once to the consideration of the draft declarations submitted the previous day by the British and American members. The Soviet members said that the declarations were substantially a repetition of assurances and undertakings which were already contained in the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty or which were incorporated in the draft agreement being negotiated between the United States and Iran. They asserted that they saw no necessity or reason for the publication of new assurances of this character, maintaining that the Iranian government and people were entirely satisfied as to the intentions of the three powers. They expressed the fear that the issuance of further declarations, when there had been no change in conditions, would alarm rather than reassure the Iranians. The Soviet members also questioned the propriety of taking action of this kind without consultation with the Iranian Government.

Both the American and British members stated that they believed declarations of the sort proposed would be well received and would have a beneficial effect not only in Iran but also in other small countries which might be in doubt regarding the motives of the Great Powers. They emphasized the importance of demonstrating the unity of the three governments with regard to Iran, where they came more closely in contact with each other than at any other point. Both delegations also asserted their willingness to have the declarations submitted to the Iranian Government and to accept its decision regarding their publication. They further expressed their willingness to consider any counter-drafts which the Soviet members might wish to present, or to discuss any desired changes in the draft texts as presented. (See enclosure No. 5 for a detailed account of the discussion.⁴⁷)

As the attitude of the Soviet members remained unvarying, and as they expressed a desire to have time to study certain new ideas which had been developed in the course of the conversation, it was agreed that further consideration of the declarations should be postponed until the next meeting.

There was brief discussion of certain of the seven points suggested by the British members at the first meeting, during which the Soviet members expressed strong doubts regarding the practicability of considering such complex questions without prolonged and careful study by experts of the elements involved. The American members made no comment on this general point but indicated that they were not prepared to go into details with respect to the proposed agreement on railway finance.

At no time during the second meeting of the sub-committee did the Soviet members advance any affirmative suggestion, their attitude throughout being negative. It was noticeable that they frequently made no response to the arguments and observations presented by the American and British members, whose views appeared to be substantially in accord.

On October 30, the sub-committee met for the third, and last, time. The Soviet members maintained their previously adopted position that no declarations with respect to Iran were necessary or desirable at the present time. Their remarks also clearly showed that they did not agree with some of the points included in the draft declarations, although it was not possible to determine the exact nature of their objections. There is transmitted herewith (as enclosure No. 6) a memorandum of the discussion,⁴⁸ from which it will be apparent that the Soviet members refused to admit that any difficulties existed in Iran, either political or economic, which were not being satisfactorily dealt with under existing agreements and arrangements.

After more than two hours of discussion, it seemed obvious that the Soviet members would not agree to the issuance of any declaration at the moment, regardless of its form. Their statements regarding the situation in Iran, and especially regarding the attitude of the Iranians toward the three powers, in some respects were so completely at variance with the views of the American and British members, that it did not even appear practicable to attempt to draw up a secret joint statement, which the American members had planned to propose as a basis for action by the three powers in Iran, in substitution for the proposed public declarations. In this connection, the American members also had in mind that the Conference was to close that same afternoon, which meant that there would be no time for careful discussion by the sub-committee of any new proposal, and still less for its consideration by the three secretaries of state.

Accordingly, the American members suggested that the sub-committee report to the Conference its failure to agree on the issuance of any declaration at the time and recommend that the question of issuing such a declaration or declarations be considered by the representatives of the three powers in Tehran, in appropriate consultation with the Iranian authorities. This suggestion was based upon a remark which Mr. Smirnov had made earlier that a more opportune moment for the study of declarations regarding Iran would be presented after the conclusion of the proposed Irano-American agreement regarding the status of American troops in Iran.

The British members concurred in the American suggestion and Mr. Iliff prepared the following draft report,⁴⁹ which was unanimously adopted by the sub-committee:

“The Committee reports to the Conference that

• “a) After an exchange of views they detect no fundamental difference in the policy towards Iran of any of the three Governments.
• “b) The Committee was unable to reach agreement on the expediency of making any immediate declaration or declarations with regard to Iran.
• “c) The issue of such a declaration or declarations might be further considered by the representatives of the three Governments in Tehran with a view to the three Governments coming to a decision about the expediency of issuing such a declaration or declarations after the signature of the proposed Irano-American Agreement, and after appropriate consultation with the Government of Iran.”

During this meeting, as during the previous session, the British and American members seemed to be substantially in agreement, while the Soviet members held to a negative attitude. The latter answered evasively or ignored questions designed to draw out any specific objections they might have to the policies set forth in the British and American draft texts. They showed no disposition to compromise or to put forward alternative proposals.

The report of the sub-committee was presented to the plenary session of the Conference on the afternoon of October 30. Mr. Eden suggested that the discussions between the representatives of the three powers might preferably be held at Moscow rather than at Tehran. Mr. Molotov, however, preferred Tehran as the locale. Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden did not insist on Moscow, and the report was adopted as submitted. It was annexed to the final protocol of the Conference.

The discussions of the sub-committee were conducted on a friendly basis throughout. At the close of the final meeting all members expressed the opinion that the conversations had been most useful in clarifying the views of the three governments.

Mr. Philip E. Mosely of the Department of State attended the first two meetings as interpreter for the American members. His understanding of the subject matter and his complete command of the Russian language proved extremely valuable to the British and Soviet members as well as to the Americans, as all three parties relied upon him to carry the greater part of the burden of translation.

Respectfully yours,

George V. Allen

42. Vol. i, p. 730.
43. V. M. Molotov, Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs.
44. Vol. i, pp. 732 and 733, respectively.
45. Vol. i, p. 735.
46. Ibid., p. 734.
47. Vol. i, p. 645.
48. Vol. i, p. 674.
49. Printed as Conference document No. 30, ibid., p. 736.