It will be noted that General Connolly expressed a desire to be kept
informed regarding American political policy toward Iran and that he
indicated a possible willingness to cooperate in furthering that policy.
I believe that this attitude should be encouraged, and I propose to do
so by every means available to the Legation, but I believe there are two
factors which should be kept in mind in analyzing his statements in this
connection:
With reference to this latter point, the Legation would be greatly
interested to know what action has been taken on the statement of policy
toward Iran12 which I understand the Department sent to the
President some weeks ago, with the request that it be transmitted to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration and the eventual issuance
of appropriate instructions to the military commander in the field.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Third Secretary
of Legation in Iran (Jernegan)
[Tehran,] September 21, 1943.
Subject: American Policy toward Iran; Attitude of
Persian Gulf Service Command.
I called on General Connolly to pay my respects and to present a
letter of introduction from Colonel Douglas V. Johnson, Chief,
Central African-Middle Eastern Theater, Theater Group, Operations
Division, War Department. The conversation, during which General
Connolly took the initiative and did most of the talking, lasted for
more than an hour and a half and covered a wide field. It may be
roughly summarized as follows:
(1) Relation of PGSC13
to American Foreign Policy: General Connolly
led off by saying that he thought there should be closer
coordination between American political and military activity
throughout the world. Both the War Department and the State
Department were “on the same team” and should each be fully aware of
what the other was doing and wanted to accomplish. In this
connection, he cited the teamwork of British diplomatic and military
officials, which was the result of centuries of British military and
political activity in all parts of the world. Prior to the present
war, the State Department had not needed to consider the American
military organization in carrying out its policies, because our Army
had been confined to the United States. Now, however, we had troops
[Page 387]
abroad in large
numbers and in many places, and it was essential that their
commanders be informed regarding the objectives of our foreign
policy. Otherwise, they might unintentionally handicap our
diplomatic operations or miss opportunities to further our policies.
American military forces were frequently in a position to take
concrete, positive, action, whereas the State Department and its
representatives abroad could only persuade.
With respect to his own position, General Connolly said that his
orders were solely to expedite the movement of goods to the Soviet
Union, under the direction of the War Department. He was not
informed regarding American political objectives in Iran and had not
been able to ascertain that the United States had any definite
policy toward this country. Consequently, he had felt that the only
course open to him was to avoid scrupulously any action of any kind
which might involve his command in political matters. As he put it,
he was “walking a tight rope” between the intricate maneuverings of
the Soviets, British and Iranians. However, if he were fully
informed regarding American policy, assuming that we had any real
interests in Iran, it might be possible for his command “to give the
ball a push in the right direction” from time to time.
I remarked that Colonel Stetson14
had called at the State Department during his recent visit to
Washington and had asked whether the Department did, in fact, have
any definite policy toward Iran. We had shown him a memorandum on
this subject.15 I said I was
somewhat surprised that General Connolly had not long-since received
a copy, or at least a summary, of that memorandum from the War
Department, because copies had been furnished General Handy, chief
of the Operations Division, and General Wedemeyer, chief of the
Strategy Group of that Division.
(2) American Interests in Iran: General
Connolly said that he was doubtful as to whether the United States
really had any justifiable interest in Iran. The only important,
concrete American interest in this part of the world seemed to lie
in our oil concessions, which were down around Bahrein Island and
not in Iran at all.
I said that in the opinion of the State Department we had two
interests, one practical and one which might be called idealistic.
The first General Connolly had already mentioned, the oil fields of
Arabia. In strict confidence, I could say that these were taking on
great importance in the eyes of the United States Government,
notably the War and Navy Departments. A large immediate development
of those fields was, I believed, being initiated, and they were also
regarded as most important from the standpoint of future reserves.
[Page 388]
Iran came into this
picture because a great power established on the Iranian side of the
Persian Gulf would be in a position to deny us the use of the
Arabian fields. In this respect, our position was becoming similar
to that of the British, whose oil fields in southern Iran would be
jeopardized if another great power controlled Iran.
Our other interest in Iran, I said, was less immediately practical
and selfish. The State Department felt that if Iran should lose its
independence, whether in name or in fact, as a result of the war, it
would be negation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, the
principles to which all the United Nations were pledged and for
which we had repeatedly announced we were fighting. Such a negation
would destroy the confidence of the world in the good faith of the
United Nations and would begin the disintegration of the peace
structure which we hoped to set up. The same thought would, of
course, apply to an encroachment upon the rights of a small nation
in any part of the world, but Iran was of particular interest in
this connection because circumstances seemed to single it out as
being in special danger.
I went on to say that Iran’s danger, in the view of the State
Department, might be lessened if it could be rehabilitated and
enabled to stand on its own feet. There would be less temptation for
an interested great power to step in and establish a protectorate,
or annex all or part of the country, if Iran were a going concern. A
state of chaos in the country would provide at one and the same time
an excuse and an opportunity for foreign intervention. The State
Department’s policy, therefore, was to lend such assistance as might
be practicable to improve conditions in Iran.
General Connolly appeared to feel that this statement of American
interests might be logical, but he doubted whether the policy it
envisaged could be or should be carried out. …
[Here follows discussion of certain conditions in Iran.]
At the conclusion of the conversation, which was friendly throughout,
General Connolly reiterated his interest in being kept informed
regarding American political objectives and expressed a desire for
close contact between his command and the American Legation at
Tehran. I said I was sure the Legation was in agreement with his
views in this regard. I further remarked that I thought he might
hear from the War Department in the not too distant future regarding
American policy in Iran, since shortly before my departure from
Washington a statement of the State Department’s general attitude
had been sent to the President with the request that he transmit it,
if he approved, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration
and guidance and for the issuance of appropriate instructions to the
field.
