891.00/2035
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Ailing)
Mr. Hayter89 called at his request to inform the Department of certain developments in connection with the situation in Iran. He stated that General Pownall, commanding British troops in Iran, had become greatly disturbed by recent attacks upon Iranian forces by tribesmen. Mr. Hayter pointed out that, as we knew, tribesmen had recently annihilated an Iranian garrison. General Pownall proceeded to Tehran a few days ago to discuss with the British Minister recommendations which might be made to the Foreign Office regarding steps to be taken to improve the situation. The British Minister and General Pownall both agreed that it would be unwise to use British troops against the tribesmen. After lengthy discussion they submitted the following proposals to the Foreign Office: (1) 550 trucks carrying Lend-Lease supplies to Russia would be sent north convoyed by British troops; (2) it would be suggested to the Shah that, in view of the weakness of Prime Minister Soheily, it would seem desirable to replace him by appointing Ali Mansur; (3) it would be desirable to appoint Qavam-ol-Molk as Governor General of Fars. The Foreign Office replied that it had no objection to using British troops to convoy the trucks as far as Isfahan but it desired that the Russian authorities be informed; (2) the Foreign Office would be glad to see Mr. Soheily replaced by Ali Mansur if that could be done without too much difficulty; (3) the Foreign Office approved of the proposal regarding the appointment of Qavam-ol-Molk as Governor General of Fars but pointed out that the Shah might disapprove.
The Foreign Office had instructed the British Embassy in Washington to bring the foregoing to the attention of the Department of State and to point out that the Foreign Office regarded interference in the internal affairs of Iran “with reluctance and repugnance”. However, the British Government had responsibilities regarding the transport of supplies to Russia and could not allow the disturbed situation in Iran to interfere in the supply program.
I said that I was sure that all of the interested officials in the Department would be glad to learn that the Foreign Office regarded interference in the internal affairs of Iran “with reluctance and repugnance”, and that we certainly all hoped that a solution could be found without such interference.
Mr. Hayter said that he had one further communication to make. German parachutists had recently landed in Iraq near the borders of [Page 373] Iran and the British authorities had some reason to believe that German agents were operating in Iran with the connivance of Iranian officials or nationals. It was possible therefore that it would be necessary to arrest some of the Persian officials who were alleged to be in contact with Axis agents. I told Mr. Hayter that as he doubtless knew it had been the general feeling in the Department that it was better, when Iranian officials came under suspicion, to request their arrest by the Iranian authorities rather than having them arrested by British or Russians. Mr. Hayter indicated that he would recall this point of view to the attention of the authorities.
- W. G. Hayter, First Secretary of the British Embassy.↩