862.20290H/10: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
London, June 11,
1943—8 p.m.
[Received 9:38 p.m.]
3953. Department’s attitude, as outlined in telegram 3539, June 5, 11
p.m.,52 concerning the discovery of
a plot to create disturbances in northern Afghanistan, was made known to
the Foreign Office. In an aide-mémoire which has
just been received the Foreign Office makes the following observations:
- “1. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the
Soviet Government have for some time been seriously
concerned about the subversive activities of a number of
Axis agents in Afghanistan. As the two Governments have
proof positive that the activities of these agents are
organized and financed by the Axis Legations in Kabul, and
are directly prejudicial to their respective interests, they
recently decided to request the Afghan Government to control
these agents and also to suggest at the same time that they
should reduce the staffs of the Axis Legations.
- 2. Sir F. Wylie handed to the Prime Minister on 27th May a
list of 36 Afghan subjects known beyond doubt to be engaged
in a subversive plot to damage British interests together
with a list of Axis agents in both Kabul and in the North
who are engaged in a similar plot to damage Soviet
interests. It was realized that a demand for the prompt
arrest of all the persons on the British list would be
extremely embarrassing to the Afghan Government. His
Majesty’s Government therefore demanded the immediate arrest
and imprisonment of only three and they left it to the
Afghan Prime Minister to decide how best the remainder could
be brought under sufficient control [Page 41] to make it impossible for them to act
as intermediaries between the Axis Legations and hostile
elements on the frontier, including the Faqir of Ipi. If the
Afghan Prime Minister expressed reluctance to agree, but
only in that event, Sir F. Wylie was instructed to say that
refusal to comply with our wishes would force us to consider
our course of action with the Soviet Government. Further,
our strong advice was that the Prime Minister in his own
interests and working in his own time and in his own way,
should take steps at once to reduce the staffs of all three
Axis Legations which in any case had no genuine diplomatic
work to do. The Prime Minister was also requested to ensure
that the Axis Legations should be prevented from obtaining
large quantities of extra Afghan exchange to finance
subversive elements.
- 3. The Soviet Government have made parallel
representations as regards the plot to disturb security on
the Soviet Afghan frontier.
- 4. These representations which were carefully concerted
with the Soviet Government were based on the imperative
necessity of safeguarding security on the frontiers both of
India and of the Soviet Union. As the threat to the security
of these frontiers did not appear to affect the interests of
the United States of America, His Majesty’s Government did
not seek the support of the United States Government for
their representations to the Afghan Government, though as
between allies His Majesty’s Minister at Kabul was
authorized to inform his United States colleague of the
substance of his instructions.
- 5. In these circumstances. His Majesty’s Government were
surprised to learn that the United States Minister at Kabul
had been instructed that if further representations were
made he should make to the Afghan Government a communication
which could not fail to encourage them to refuse the
entirely reasonable requests which His Majesty’s Government
and the Soviet Government have made. In view of their
special responsibilities in Afghanistan as a neighbor of
India, His Majesty’s Government would naturally have
expected to be consulted before any such démarche was decided upon. Notwithstanding the
instructions given to Mr. Engert, His Majesty’s Government
are happy to note that the United States Government appear
to regard the activities of Axis agents on the Indian and
Russian borders as prejudicial to United States as well as
to British and Soviet interests, and would it is officially
stated be glad to see the Axis Legations in Kabul
drastically reduced as to staffs or, still better,
closed.
- 6. It seems possible that the instructions which have been
sent to the United States Minister at Kabul were based on a
misapprehension. The advice offered to the Afghan Government
for the reduction of the staffs of the Axis Legations has
not been tendered in the form of a demand and it should be
clearly understood that though His Majesty’s Government and
the Soviet Government would naturally have to discuss their
future course of action if the Afghan Government should
refuse the requests which have been made to them, His
Majesty’s Government have no present intention of asking
them to expel the Axis Legations from Kabul. His Majesty’s
Government are fully aware of the internal difficulties with
which the Afghan Government has to contend and it is solely
for this reason that they have made such very moderate
requests and as regards the Axis Legations have confined
their action to advising the Afghan Government in their own
interests to reduce their staffs.
- 7. Moreover, the State Department may not be aware that
since his interview with the Prime Minister on the 27th May,
Sir F. Wylie has also discussed this question with the
Minister for Foreign Affairs (at the latter’s request) on
the 30th May. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was most
friendly, informed Sir F. Wylie that the three arrests which
we had demanded would be made; that immediate steps were
being taken to control the other persons engaged in
intrigues with our tribesmen; that the sale of Afghan
exchange to the Axis Legations would be effectively
controlled and that our advice regarding the Legation’s
staffs was under consideration.
- 8. His Majesty’s Government therefore have good reason to
hope that this matter will be settled satisfactorily as the
result of the negotiations now in progress. On the other
hand, if the United States Minister in Kabul acts on the
instructions which have been sent to him, the only effect
will be to convince the Afghan Government that, far from
agreeing in principle with the Anglo Soviet requests, the
United States Government entirely disapproves of them and
the Afghan Government may very well draw the conclusion that
the United States Government is prepared to support them if
they should decide to refuse. This can hardly fail to
precipitate the situation which the United States
Government, His Majesty’s Government and the Soviet
Government alike desire to avoid, namely a refusal by the
Afghan Government to take measures which are essential if
security on the frontiers of Afghanistan with both India and
the Soviet Union is not to be disturbed.
- 9. As the United States Government is not directly
concerned with this question of security it may be doubted
whether the Afghan Government would expect the United States
Government to express its views on this matter; or again
whether the latter would incur Afghan hostility unless they
dissociate themselves from the Anglo-Soviet approach
especially as the negotiations are proceeding quite
satisfactorily. In the circumstances His Majesty’s
Government entertain the very strong hope that the United
States Government will refrain from a démarche which could not fail to prejudice
representations essential for the British and Soviet war
effort and that fresh instructions may be issued as a matter
of urgency to the United States Minister at Kabul.”
The British position as developed in this aide-mémoire appears to me to be reasonable.
