868.01/421: Telegram
The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 23—7:10 p.m.]
Greek [Series] 140. I believe that the developments reported in my telegrams number 128 and 13062 referred to in the Department’s 63, December 18, midnight should be taken not as indicating any reversal or even alteration of British policy toward the Greek King but rather as representing a change in tactical procedure for the fulfillment of established policy, prompted by changes in the military and political situation.
From conversations with the British Ambassador and from confidential documents which he has made available to me, it seems clear that British policy continues to be based on the hope that the King will be restored to his throne as a constitutional monarch by the will of his people. However when Allied strategical plans were so changed recently as to make it seem unlikely that any large military force would occupy Greece upon evacuation by the enemy, it occurred to the British Embassy here, which was advised of the growth of anarchy within the country, that the King’s early return with only the [Page 159] small forces envisaged would be inadvisable. In the circumstances, as I saw them, which appeared to necessitate a certain lapse of time before conditions of tranquillity could be obtained, requisite to the determination of the people’s will regarding the regime, it felt that the most hopeful procedure would be to secure some suitable person who had resisted the Axis in Greece and who might be expected to command general respect such as the Archbishop of all Greece63 to be appointed by the King to head a Regency committee to exercise constitutional authority during the immediate post-liberation era, the King remaining abroad. This idea was I am convinced conceived purely with a view to giving the Royal regime the best possible chance of survival though it is true that many employees and agents of the British Government now working on Greek affairs both within and without the country are personally anti-royalist in sentiment.
Furthermore, in view of the fact that the question of the King’s return has become within Greece as well as outside increasingly controversial, the British Embassy felt that a public announcement that the King did not intend to return until called for by his people would tend to counteract the activities of political agitators now capitalizing on the absence of such a statement and might likewise influence the guerrillas particularly Zervas but also members of ELAS to seek closer affiliation with the Middle East Command. This suggestion seems also to have been made with the interests of the King’s regime in mind.
The Foreign Office appears to have agreed with the British Embassy from the outset as to the probable inadvisability of an immediate return under the new military conditions but to have resisted for some time the plan proposed including the King’s declaration feeling that it would constitute too definite a move in the existing circumstances. Mr. Eden is even reported to have rejected the plan at one time and only during his latest visit to Cairo does it seem that the British Embassy was able to persuade him possibly because of the fact that in the interval it had become more likely that Britain’s guerrilla protégé Zervas would find it difficult to gain the upper hand over ELAS. The principal argument used with Mr. Eden at this time seems indeed to have been that a declaration by the King would alienate moderate political elements from EAM and ELAS and deprive these last of one of their chief propaganda weapons. In all this the established policy of supporting the King would appear to have been in the mind of the Foreign Office as well as that of the Embassy.
The task then fell to Mr. Eden to persuade Mr. Churchill who saw the King with Mr. Eden in attendance. How deeply Mr. Churchill himself felt the importance of the plan I am not informed but he appears to have counselled the King to accept it. However, in doing [Page 160] so he is said to have told the King “I am a Royalist” which if the report be true would seem to clinch the matter of the fundamental policy involved.
Finally I would add that I have secured from the British Ambassador a copy of the brief which he prepared and gave to Mr. Eden entitled “Main Talking Points with the King of the Hellenes” and am forwarding it to the Department by airgram.64 This brief ties in the proposed tactical plan very closely with British interest in the regime and explicitly mentions “the King’s return in the role which we desire for him—that of a constitutional monarch”.