Office of the Historian

868.00/1340

Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[Washington,] December 10, 1943.

Fighting Between Guerilla Groups in Occupied Greece

There have been many fragmentary and often conflicting accounts in the press and from our own offices regarding internecine strife in Greece.

Lieutenant Colonel James G. Basbas, Acting Military Attaché at Cairo has now attempted to assemble the available information into a general picture. His reports may be summarized as follows:

1.
Up to March 1943, the British had been furnishing equipment and supplies to the fighting arm of the leftist and strongly anti-monarchist EAM (National Liberation Front).
2.
Thereafter, fearing the powerful growth of an organization violently opposed to the King’s return, and hence to British policy of support for the King, the British began first to divide their support with, and then deliberately to favor, EDES (National Democratic Greek Army) another organization similar in purpose which was gaining in local popularity because of its anti-communist stand. EDES, too, was anti-King, but being more conservative in character the British felt that EDES would be more tractable on this point.
3.
In July 1943, the British liaison mission in Greece succeeded in securing a cooperative pact between EAM and EDES, acceptable to the former though essentially favorable to the latter.
4.
This pact was, however, not destined to last long, as a direct clash was precipitated by the Italian surrender. Allegedly at the instigation of British liaison officers, the Italians in Thessaly surrendered to EDES. Since Thessaly was EAM territory, EAM began disarming both the Italians and the EDES members who had taken Italian arms. EDES thereupon asked British aid against EAM. When this was refused because of the relative strengths of EAM and EDES (said to be 35–40 thousand compared to 10–12 thousand), EDES also became anti-British.
5.
The EDES–EAM struggle for position, which has been marked by relatively little violence, was intensified after the return of the guerilla emissaries from Cairo, reporting lack of success in securing acceptance of their demand that the King stay outside Greece until a plebiscite had been held. EAM presumably decided thereupon that it could ensure acceptance of its demand only by being in complete and firm control of the country.
6.
High-ranking British officials admit the failure of British policy, and realize that attempts to build up EDES at the expense of EAM can only lead to further strife.

Colonel Basbas himself believes that no reconciliation between EDES and EAM is possible until a clear statement is made that the King will not return to Greece before a plebiscite, which statement can be made only when the British change their policy. Even so, he suggests that only an American officer or a real Allied Mission consisting of a group of American (Senior Officer of Mission), British and Greek officers can effect reconciliation.