811.20 Defense (M) Turkey/671: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)
Washington, July 30,
1943.
4573. USCCO 3005–A. Embassy’s 4480, July 9.
- 1.
- Department and OEW are in general agreement with the principles
and procedures as outlined in your cable of reference. We understand
that London Preemption Committee are now prepared to proceed as
follows:
- (a)
- Both UKCC and USCC are authorized to engage in unofficial as well as official purchases.
- (b)
- Each of the two governments will authorize funds and make them available to its Ambassador for the purchase of an agreed list of commodities under the joint purchasing program.
- (c)
- The Ambassadors will be authorized to purchase upon agreement any amount of these commodities by any means they see fit so long as they are both convinced at the start, even though the initial purchase appears insufficient, that in the long run they can effectively preclude the Axis.
- (d)
- Profits and losses on all such purchases will be shared equally.
- 2.
- Toward furtherance of complete understanding between Washington and London we wish to make specific comments on the following paragraphs in telegram of reference.
- 3.
- Your paragraph 2–a. We agree that no general request of the Turkish Government be made at this time for higher allocations on all commodities. However, we wish to point out that: (1) at some future date it may be advisable to make some such general demand; (2) this does not preclude asking for higher allocations of specific commodities such as copper, mohair and woolen rags as we have done in the past.
- 4.
- Your paragraphs 2–b and 6. We agree that open-end liabilities should be avoided and that full advantage should be taken of the special account. However, we do not consider it advisable to prevent the Ambassadors from making purchases that violate these principles if in their judgment effective preemption cannot be otherwise accomplished.
- 5.
- In our opinion, the effective execution of the revised Joint Program involves abandonment of the principles of predetermining in London and Washington primary purchasing responsibility. Purchases will be made by any agent and means deemed appropriate to the particular occasion by the Ambassadors’ Anglo-American Preemptive Committee in Turkey. The Committee will consider the availability of exchange, the nature of the allocations made by the Turkish Government, and other relevant factors.
- 6.
- Your paragraph 2–c. We agree. It is our understanding that the division into three categories places no restrictions upon the discretion of the Ambassadors in purchasing all commodities in the List. The categories are intended to indicate to the Ambassadors the relative strategic value of the commodities and are not intended to dictate a chronological sequence for purchasing.
- 7.
- Your paragraph 3. We agree that purchases should be made only when the opportunity of effectively damaging the enemy exists. However, we believe that the British caveat to the effect that they wish to retain and emphasize a limitation on the authority of their Ambassador should not be allowed to slow down the preemptive program. In commodities with large export surpluses, for instance, initial purchases may not in themselves deprive the Axis unless they are part of a long-term purchasing program. Effectiveness must therefore be judged on a long-term basis and not on single purchases.
- 8.
- Your paragraph 4. We agree fully and believe that this principle emphasizes the necessity for vigorous action now.
- 9.
- Your paragraph 5. We agree, and are not consulting the Ambassador as proposed in Department’s 3411.38
- 10.
- Your paragraph 6. We have already commented in section 2–b above. We await with interest the reports of British Treasury and Foreign Office on the question of payments. We are cabling to you separately regarding silk cocoons and valonia.
- 11.
- Your paragraph 7–a. Department and OEW view with apprehension the apparent tendency of the Turks to accept German gold in payment for Turkish commodities. In this connection we are repeating to you telegram no. 1175, July 339 from the American Embassy, Ankara, which reports on recent gold shipments from Germany to Turkey. We, therefore, await with interest developments concerning a démarche to the Turks which is now under discussion in Washington and London.
- 12.
- Your paragraph 7–b. Department and OEW agree that the problem deserves reconsideration. We understand from British Embassy, Ankara’s telegram 295, July 15 to MEW that the Clodius Agreement may fix quantities. If this is true it is doubtful that price-raising will be effective. Price manipulations appear to be successful in preventing the enemy from purchasing so long as prices are maintained above his reach. There is some doubt, however, as to the ultimate effectiveness of price raising as an independent preemptive operation. We are asking the views of the Ambassador on this subject and would appreciate any information the Preemption Committee can supply.
Hull