711.90/70

Memorandum by Mr. George V. Allen of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

Turkey

Ever since the beginning of American lend-lease aid to Turkey more than a year ago, such aid has been accorded to Turkey in an indirect manner, through the British. The Turks have been required to present their needs for American equipment to the British, and the latter have passed on to us such Turkish requests as they thought proper. We have then given the supplies to the British, who have in turned delivered them to the Turks.

From time to time during the past year, Turkish officials have indicated their preference for dealing directly with us in lend-lease matters. The Turks have felt that they would know where they stood much better if they dealt directly with us, would know precisely to whom they were indebted, and would have more control over American material destined for them. An additional reason for the Turkish attitude was undoubtedly a feeling that they were being treated more or less as a British colony or protectorate.

As long ago as November 1941, the American Government expressed a willingness to deal directly with the Turks, but the British objected strenuously, on the grounds that Turkey was in a sphere of primary British military responsibility and that consequently all lend-lease supplies sent to the area should go through British hands. The American Government yielded to British wishes, and lend-lease to Turkey has continued to be accorded to Great Britain.

Last summer, however, the British agreed that some concession to Turkish wishes should be made, and arrangements for direct lend-lease of a modified form were drawn up. The arrangements were about to be placed into effect when the matter was taken up again forcefully by the British at the Casablanca meeting. As a result, we conceded once more to British insistence, and we have canceled the arrangements for dealing direct with the Turks as far as military supplies are concerned.

Certain phases of the matter, however, remain to be determined, notably the definition of military supplies. If the British insist on a broad definition and maintain that everything we furnish Turkey under lend-lease should go through British hands, the Turks will gain the impression that America has lost interest in them. While the Casablanca decision is not questioned, our view is that it relates purely to the prosecution of the war, and does not imply any agreement [Page 1100] that Turkey is to be considered as within a predominately British political or economic sphere nor a forerunner to a broader “handing over of Turkey to the British”.

The foregoing is deemed particularly advisable in view of reports which have been received from our officers in Turkey that while America is drastically restricting commercial exports to Turkey, in order to conserve shipping space for war purposes, British commercial goods are arriving in Turkey in large amounts. Furthermore, following our recent refusal of Turkish pleas to be allowed to buy or charter one or two merchant vessels in the United States, because our shipyards were too busy on British orders, Great Britain immediately promised Turkey six large British cargo vessels. The British claim that the ships they will give the Turks are old and slow, but the impression is strengthened in Turkey that we are not interested in the country and have handed it over to British domination.

In the political sphere, perhaps the most difficult problem to be overcome in bringing Turkey wholeheartedly on the Allied side results from Turkish fears of Soviet Russia. Turkish enthusiasm for our cause is dampened by apprehension lest an Allied victory would mean Russian domination of the Balkans, spread of communism in the area, and perhaps a Soviet demand for control of the Dardanelles. The Turks believe that Great Britain has made commitments to Russia which will prevent Britain from exercising a restraining influence on Russia after the war. The Turks would be much encouraged if they were convinced that the United States retains a strong interest in Turkey’s welfare. It is difficult to create such a conviction while we continue to agree to British demands in Turkey’s regard.80

  1. See correspondence regarding the visit of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in Washington, March 12–30, 1943, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.; see also correspondence concerning subsequent exchanges between the Department and the British Embassy relating to the interpretation of the Casablanca minutes regarding Turkey, ante, pp. 1064 ff.