890D.01/704
The British Embassy to the Department of State 56
Aide-Mémoire
Among the problems which can hardly be postponed until the end of the war is that of the position of Syria and the Lebanon as independent states.
As the State Department are aware, independence was promised to the Levant States by General Catroux on behalf of the former French National Committee, and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom associated themselves with this promise. Elections are now being or are about to be held in these two States and when elected assemblies and popular governments supported by them are in being, there is little doubt that the question of defining the relationship of the French authorities to the new States by the conclusion of some more or less formal agreement will come to the fore. His Majesty’s Government have reason to think that prominent Syrian nationalists and possibly also Lebanese are anxious to negotiate treaties with the French authorities when the new governments are set up. So far as His Majesty’s Government are concerned, they have admitted that, when independence is granted to the Levant States, and without prejudice to it, France should have the predominant position in Syria and the Lebanon over any other European Power. They have [Page 990] hitherto not pressed for the conclusion of treaties partly because no popularly elected governments were in existence in the Levant States, partly because the former French National Committee could not conclude such treaties, and for other reasons. But the question seems to require re-examination if only because we may be faced, once the elections in the Lebanon have been held, by a joint move towards treaty negotiations on the part both of the States Governments and of the French Committee of National Liberation.
The obvious precedent is that of Iraq where the mandatory regime of the Anglo-Iraqi treaties of 192257 and 192658 was terminated by the conclusion of the Treaty of Alliance of 193059 and the entry of Iraq into full membership of the League of Nations. Treaties of Friendship and Alliance on somewhat similar lines were negotiated by the French Government with both the Levant States in 1936, but they were not ratified nor approved by the French Parliament and never came into force.
There would be several difficulties about such a development in the Levant States at the present time. First and foremost there is the question whether the French Committee of National Liberation could be regarded as entitled to conclude a treaty of this sort. To this the French reply is likely to be that we have ourselves pressed and encouraged them to promise independence to the Levant States and that it would hardly be logical now to object to their taking steps to implement that promise. Indeed the conclusion of treaties for this purpose was specifically mentioned in General Catroux’s proclamation on entry into Syria and the Lebanon in 1941, and in the declaration made by His Majesty’s Ambassador at Cairo on behalf of His Majesty’s Government. Possibly the difficulty could be surmounted in some way, for instance by initialling treaties in draft form, subject to formal ratification at a later date, and it might be agreed in a concurrent exchange of notes that pending a clarification of the constitutional position as regards the formal conclusion of the treaties, they would be put into force and executed. Such a solution would also overcome the difficulty of securing formal termination of the League of Nations mandate in present circumstances.
His Majesty’s Government are the more unwilling to oppose such a solution, if it were really desired by both parties, since it would be in accordance with the policy they have themselves pursued for many years past of promoting the freedom and independence of the Arab countries. The local population would, besides, inevitably misconstrue [Page 991] opposition to the more definite formulation of their rights of independence as contrary to the promises they had been given, and much local tension might well result in an area which is still essential for the prosecution of the war in the Mediterranean.
It might at one time have been feared that the elections would not be fairly conducted and that the negotiation of treaties with chambers and governments elected and chosen under pressure would in reality be a denial of popular rights. The elections in the Lebanon have not yet taken place, but there seems to be no question that the elections in Syria have given rise to very few complaints. At present there seems to be relatively little to fear on this score, at any rate so far as Syria is concerned.
In the circumstances His Majesty’s Government are inclined not to insist on the objections they have previously held to the negotiation of treaties of this kind before the end of the war, or to the negotiation of a treaty by the present French authorities provided that the formal position is covered in some way such as that described above. They would not, however, wish to exercise any pressure on the Syrian and Lebanese Governments for or against the negotiation of such a settlement, but propose to inform His Majesty’s Minister at Beirut that he should reply to any enquiries he may receive regarding the attitude of His Majesty’s Government that there is no objection to such negotiations.
In several directions, however, it may well be necessary to restrain the French from seeking to impose unduly onerous conditions on the Governments of the two States. It would be necessary firstly to make it plain that nothing in the new regime to be set up under the projected treaties could be allowed to prevent the two States from joining any Arab federation which may materialise. As a corollary a close watch would have to be kept on the educational arrangements contemplated by the French as part of the 1936 settlement; the teaching and the use of the English language will have to be secured on an equal basis with French. Indeed, should an Arab federation ever come into being it is highly probable that the teaching and use of English will, in order to secure conformity, tend largely to supersede that of French. Again the French claim to appoint Advisers to the new States will have to be kept within reasonable limits if the administrations are not to be swamped, and their financial stability impaired, by an excessive number of appointments.
The situation envisaged here, is one where both parties desire to conclude a treaty. In such a case His Majesty’s Government will hesitate to oppose their desire. If, however, the Syrians or the Lebanese do not wish to enter into negotiation, His Majesty’s Government have no intention whatever of pressing them to do so.
- Handed to Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs by the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Hayter) on September 18. For the Department’s reply, dated October 25, 1943, see p. 1000.↩
- Signed at Baghdad, October 10, 1922, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxxv, p. 13.↩
- Signed at Baghdad, January 13, 1926, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xlvii, p. 419.↩
- Signed at Baghdad, June 30, 1930, British Cmd. 3797, Treaty Series No. 15 (1931).↩