J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff1

secret
C.C.S. 224

Operations in the European Theater Between “Husky” and “Roundup

1.
The object of this paper is to indicate the action we recommend in the period which will elapse between the completion of Husky , which we assume will be about the middle of August, and the invasion of France.
2.
In the Mediterranean Theater, Germany will be occupying a long and vulnerable front with poor north and south and even worse lateral communications. In this area large hostile populations are being, with difficulty, held down mainly by Italian troops. On the other hand, we shall be firmly established on the whole North African shore and will have developed a superior combination and structure of sea and air power. We shall have mastered an important stepping-stone to Europe, and we shall have large and experienced forces standing ready for fresh enterprises. We cannot afford to keep those forces out of action for a period of nine or ten months before we can launch an [Page 258] offensive from the United Kingdom into northern France. During this time, the battles on the Russian Front will be raging, and Germany will require all the forces that she can muster against the Russians. The first essential, therefore, will be to make certain that there will be no diminution of the threat to Germany’s Southern Front, the vulnerability of which is proved by the tenacity with which she has clung regardless of cost to Tunisia. So long as she is faced by our formidable Mediterranean forces, she cannot be certain where the next blow will fall, and must lock up resources she can ill afford to spare in unsuitable localities for the prosecution of the war.
3.
It will not be sufficient to exercise a threat across the Mediterranean. The attack on Italy must be carried out relentlessly to insure her elimination from the war. We believe that this, more than any other single event, would hasten the early defeat of Germany. Through the fall of Italy, Germany must be forced to divert large forces from the Russian Front to Yugoslavia, Greece and France, thus relieving the pressure on Russia. The way would thus be paved for the defeat of Germany on the Russian Front, and thus for a successful return to the Continent from the United Kingdom in 1944. We think these events, coupled with a great increase in the air bombardment of Germany possibly from Northern Italy as well as from the United Kingdom, may well bring about her collapse.
4.
We have examined very carefully the various operations which we might carry out after Husky in the Mediterranean, with the object of eliminating Italy. The alternatives are:
a.
Operations against the Mainland of Italy
These would take the form of the capture during or immediately after Husky of a bridgehead on the toe of Italy, to be followed by the seizing of Cotrone and further assault on the heel as a prelude to an advance on Bari and Naples. These operations present many difficulties and their practicability must depend on the situation prevailing in Russia and its repercussions on German assistance to Italy. Success must contribute materially to the disintegration of Italy and provide useful bases for further action against the Balkans.
b.
The Capture of Sardinia
Much will depend on the extent to which this island is reinforced after Husky , particularly by the Germans. If strongly defended, the operation would be comparable to Husky . On the other hand we should enjoy the benefit of the experience gained in a successful Husky and be able to apply this to good effect against Sardinia. After Sardinia we should capture Corsica, which should not present undue difficulties.
The capture of the island would assist us to increase the intensity of our air attack against Italy, would threaten the south of France and increase the security of our sea communications in the Mediterranean.
5.
Further alternatives, not so directly connected with the elimination of Italy, have also been examined. Of these the most promising are:
a.
An Assault on Greece from the West
The capture of the Athens Area and the establishment of a front in Greece would enable us to increase the pressure on Germany, interrupt sea communications to Crete and the islands in the Aegean and would give us air fields from which the Roumanian oil fields could be attacked. In view, however, of the strength of the German garrison, the difficulty of providing fighter cover, and the lack of ports in the Gulf of Corinth this operation does not appear a practicable one at the present time.
b.
Operations against the Dodecanese
These operations have been fully examined in the Middle East. In our view, they cannot be carried out simultaneously with amphibious operations in the Central Mediterranean. The use of air fields in Turkey would greatly simplify the air problem. We consider that the right time to carry out these operations is simultaneously with the entry of Turkey into the war. This contingency is considered later in this paper.
6.
Our conclusion, after prolonged study of these alternatives, is that we ought to undertake those which not only contribute most directly to the elimination of Italy, but which also relate themselves naturally to operations from the United Kingdom in 1944. Our proposal, therefore, is as follows:
a.
That preparations should be made forthwith for the establishment of a bridgehead on the toe of Italy, during or immediately after Husky .
b.
That alternative plans should be made by General Eisenhower for operations against the heel of Italy, and for the capture of Sardinia. A decision on which of these two operations should actually be undertaken should be made when we see how matters stand at the conclusion of Husky . If as a result of Russian successes and the consequent lack of German reinforcements for Italy and. the weakening or withdrawal of German air forces, Italy is on the point of collapse, then we should enter the heel so as to administer the coup de grâce, and prepare for exploitation across the Adriatic. If, on the other hand, Germany diverts large force to Italy—an event which in itself would relieve the pressure on the Russian Front—we could go for Sardinia and Corsica. The seizure of these islands would not only increase the pressure on northern Italy early next year, but would provide stepping-stones from which to threaten and perhaps invade the south of France, and thus ease the cross-Channel operation. At the same time it would add to the security of our communications through the Mediterranean.
7.
It is quite possible, of course, that Italy may collapse before any of the operations discussed above have been carried out. The moral [Page 260] and material effects of her crushing defeats in Africa, the fall of Husky land, and the effects of our air attack on Italy herself, may prove decisive. If this proves to be so, then we shall have reached at an early stage the favorable position in the Mediterranean at which we are aiming, and which, if properly exploited, should insure the earliest possible defeat of Germany. We must act quickly in the confusion before the Germans have time to regroup their forces. This would be the moment to bring pressure to bear on Turkey, either to permit the use of Turkish bases by our forces, or to enter the war on our side. Provided the Russians are doing well, there is no other time when a Turkish entry would be so opportune or so likely.
8.
If, therefore, Italy collapses after Husky , our immediate action should be:
a.
To occupy southern Italy, taking over air bases and at least one port in the heel, an air field at Reggio or Cotrone, and the air fields in the Rome–Naples Area.
b.
To establish a bridgehead in the Durazzo area, and introduce supplies and long-range penetration groups to rally and support the guerillas.
c.
To seize the Dodecanese, and if possible move into Turkey and attack Ploeşti.
d.
To occupy Corsica and the key points in Sardinia, and to complete the occupation of Sicily.
e.
To land forces in central Italy to prevent German infiltration from the north.
9.
The further exploitation of the situation must depend upon the progress of events and the German reaction. More than one possible theater of operations would be available. We do not believe that Germany can hold both northern Italy and the Balkans without risking a collapse on the Russian Front. Even if she decides to abandon Italy, and hold the Balkans, her task will be by no means easy, especially if Turkey comes into the war. We would carry out our plans for going to the support of Turkey in the first place with air and specialized units, and we should be prepared to exploit any weakening of the German positon in the Balkans.
10.
A further promising line of action would be to direct forces towards southern France from Corsica and northern Italy. Such a movement would fit in well with a simultaneous operation into northern France from the United Kingdom.
11.
These projects should, we think, be further examined and we should like to hear the views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff.
12.
Our final conclusion is that the Mediterranean offers us opportunities for action in the coming autumn and winter, which may be decisive, and at the least will do far more to prepare the way for a [Page 261] successful cross-Channel operation in 1944 than we should achieve by attempting to transfer back to the United Kingdom, any of the forces now in the Mediterranean Theater. If we take these opportunities, we shall have every chance of breaking the Axis and of bringing the war with Germany to a successful conclusion in 1944.
  1. This memorandum, which was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 14, 1943, apparently was prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff during their trans-Atlantic voyage aboard the Queen Mary en route to the Conference.