J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters (Smith)1

secret
C.C.S. 223

Operations After Husky

The attached paper (Enclosure “A”) prepared by the Operations Division, Allied Force Headquarters, represents the views of General Eisenhower and Admiral Cunningham with respect to operations after Husky . It is not concurred in by Air Chief Marshal Tedder whose comments are attached (Enclosure “B”). It is requested that both papers be submitted for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as representative of the opinion of the Commander in Chief, Allied Force, from the local viewpoint only.

Enclosure “A”

secret

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Allied Force Headquarters (Rooks) to the Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters (Smith)

Subject: Operations after Husky

1. After Operation Husky there are two immediate possibilities:

a.
To continue operations against the Italian mainland by action against:
(1)
The Reggio–Sangiovanni area (Operation Buttress )
(2)
The Crotone area (Operation Goblet )
(3)
The Heel of Italy (Operation Musket )
These operations would be preparatory to an advance into Italy in the direction of Naples.
b.
To occupy Sardinia and Corsica as a preparatory measure to such further operations as may be decided upon.

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2. Object

To discuss the relative merits of the two courses of action referred to above.

3. Operations Buttress, Goblet and Musket

a.
The advantages of this course of action are:
(1)
Operations on the Italian mainland even though confined to one area might be sufficient to compel Italy to ask for terms.
(2)
Operation Buttress and possibly Goblet might be undertaken so as to coincide with the final stages of Operation Husky thus taking direct advantage of the disorganization and confusion which may occur as a result of a rapid success in Husky .
(3)
The fact that operations were carried into the mainland of Europe would have considerable political value.
(4)
Bases would be obtained from which operations in the Balkans could be supported if this strategy is decided upon.
b.
The disadvantages are:
(1)
The operations themselves will require considerable forces. Should Italy not ask for terms as a result, we may be committed to a major campaign on the Italian mainland possibly involving all the forces available in the Mediterranean.
(2)
Should Germany be in a position strongly to reinforce Italy and should she so decide, we might be involved in a campaign against superior German forces in country in which superiority in numbers would have full weight.
(3)
Both during and after the operations a considerable garrison commitment will be involved, since we shall be operating in enemy as opposed to occupied territory.
(4)
We shall be responsible for the administration and supply of such areas of the mainland as we occupy. This will constitute a heavy shipping and economic commitment.
(5)
Even if it is decided to limit the area of operations to the Toe and Heel of Italy, considerable forces will be required to defend these areas unless Italy has gone out of the war.
c.
It is estimated that some 4–5 divisions would be required for Operations Buttress and Goblet . For Operation Musket it is estimated that 4–5 divisions would be required initially. The force in this area would probably have to be built up to a total of approximately 10 divisions (including two Armored divisions) if further operations are to be undertaken on the mainland.
The above requirements would be to some extent counterbalanced by the reduction which it would be possible to make in the garrison of Husky . It is clear, however, that operations on the mainland are likely to involve all the resources which we can make available.
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4. Operations Brimstone and Firebrand

a.
The advantages of this course of action are:
(1)
It will place the whole of Italy within easy bombing range. This fact alone might be sufficient to induce Italy to ask for terms.
(2)
A threat of invasion will exist over the entire length of the west coast of Italy. This is likely to cause the Italians to withdraw troops from the Balkans and will cause the maximum dispersion of Axis troops on the mainland.
(3)
It will constitute a threat to southern France and thereby tend to retain German troops in that area.
(4)
It renders our sea communications in the western Mediterranean secure and reduces the air threat to North Africa thus freeing air and AA resources.
(5)
The operational commitment is limited and the subsequent garrison requirement will be small. Operation Firebrand can be undertaken by French forces.
b.
The disadvantages are:
(1)
If the occupation of Sardinia and Corsica does not induce Italy to ask for terms, we should still be faced with the necessity for conducting operations on the mainland in order to achieve that end.
(2)
We shall not be taking advantage of the disorganization which may be caused on the mainland by the success of Husky
(3)
We shall not reap the political advantages which will accrue from the opening of a campaign on the mainland of Europe.
c.
It is estimated that Operation Brimstone will require about 5 Inf Divs and one Armd Div; the garrison commitment is unlikely to be greater than 2 Inf Divs. On the other hand, it must be remembered that if this course is adopted it may be necessary to retain the maximum garrison in Husky .

5. Summary

The position may therefore be summarized as follows:

a.
Operations Buttress, Goblet and Musket require considerable forces and once we have embarked upon this course we are committed. Unless Italian morale is already weakening, we may be involved in a major campaign the duration and requirements of which it is not possible to foresee.
b.
Operations Brimstone and Firebrand can be carried out with comparatively limited forces and after these operations we shall still retain full liberty of action to strike in whatever direction may seem advisable. If Italian morale is weakening after Husky , the threat of heavy bombing which these operations will produce may be sufficient to induce Italy to ask for terms.
c.
The decision between these two courses of action must depend to a great extent upon the state of Italian morale after Husky . It will not be easy to assess this accurately and it is therefore considered that the course of action which does not definitely commit us to the mainland is preferable.

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6. Conclusion

It is concluded that the next operations after Husky should be Brimstone and Firebrand in preference to Buttress, Goblet and Musket .

Lowell W. Rooks

Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3

Enclosure “B”

most secret

The Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Air Command (Tedder) to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)

Ref: ACMT/S. 515.

Mediterranean Strategy

I have just seen a paper prepared by G.3. section for the Chief of Staff. This paper has not been considered by the J.P.S. Previous editions of the paper (P/68) have been considered by the J.P.S. and I have instructed my representative to emphasize certain factors. This final paper does not, in my opinion, give these factors due weight. I cannot, therefore, agree with it or with its conclusions. The main points on which I am in disagreement are the following:

1.
Firstly, the difficulties of the capture of Sardinia are completely glossed over. In my opinion, owing to the distance from air bases the capture of Sardinia would be a more difficult problem than Husky .
2.
The alleged advantage that “It placed the whole of the Italian mainland within easy bombing range” is true, but misleading. The whole Italian mainland is already within easy bombing range from Tunisia and Sicily. The value of additional bases in Sardinia is more than balanced by the additional maintenance and supply involved.
3.
The value of Sardinia is, in my opinion, almost entirely a defensive one, in that it would reduce the commitment for the protection of shipping passing along the North African coast.
4.
I do not agree that the capture of Sardinia would free considerable A.A. resources in North Africa, since North African bases are within reasonable operation range of enemy bases in Italy.
5.
As regards Italy itself, the paper does point out that the establishment of air bases in central Italy would bring within range of our heavy bombers the main Axis industrial centers in southern Germany, etc., also the Roumanian oil fields. This is true, but the main advantage of using Italy as a base is omitted. The main value of such an air base is that heavy bomber attacks on the majority of the most [Page 257] vital centers in Germany, and other Axis countries pass through routes which completely evade the great belt of fighter and A.A. defenses which Germany has set up along the whole North and North Western approaches. These defenses are exacting an increasing toll on our bomber offensive. It would be quite impossible from every point of view for the enemy to create a similar organization covering the Southern approach, and bomber offensive directed, from the South, especially when coordinated with that of U.K. would have enormously increased material and moral effects.
6.
I must emphasize, therefore, that in my opinion the conclusions to paper No. P/69 are unsound insofar as they fail to pay due weight to the air aspect which I am sure you will agree has already proved itself to be one of the vital factors.

A. W. Tedder

Air Chief Marshal
Air Commander in Chief
  1. This memorandum was circulated on May 14, 1943 for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The views of Eisenhower and Tedder regarding operations to be undertaken after Husky , which are set forth in the enclosures to this memorandum, were considered in the course of the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 24, 1943, ante, p. 194.