J.C.S. Files
Memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners1
secret
Enclosure to C.C.S.
317
[Quebec,] 18 August 1943.
Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly
Neutrals
| References: |
a. C.C.S. 288;2
C.C.S. 288/1;3
C.C.S. 288/2.4
|
|
b. C.C.S. 104th Meeting, Item 3.5
|
the problem
1. To consider the requirements for matériel for equipping allies,
liberated forces, and friendly neutrals, and the determination of
basic policies which will govern the meeting of such
requirements.
discussion
2. During the Casablanca Conference, the United States Government
accepted the responsibility for equipping 11 French divisions (three
armored and eight infantry).6 By 1 September 1943, the equipment for two
armored and four infantry divisions, with supporting troops, will
have been shipped.
3. General Eisenhower has recommended (radio
Bosco–In
–21, 13 Aug 1943) (Appendix “A”) that equipment for
remaining French troops be accelerated in a manner that would
provide for a total of four armored and seven infantry divisions.
The Commanding General [Page 1030]
of the North African Theater of Operations advises that such a
program would satisfy the requirements of the Casablanca Conference.
The requisite equipment can be made available to meet such
requirements without prejudice to currently directed operations,
i.e.,
Bolero
/
Sickle
, and operations in the Pacific It should be noted, however,
that approximately 60% of the equipment required must be withheld
from advance shipments to the United Kingdom, to be made up prior to
departure of United Kingdom units concerned. This can be done.
4. During the first four to five months following an initial assault
on the continent, all available port and beach capacity will be
required for the buildup and maintenance of the United Nations
forces. It is considered that a minimum of six to eight months will
be required between the start of reorganization and reequipment of
French Army units on the continent and their initial employment.
Thus it would appear that no continental French Army units could be
employed for from ten to thirteen months after the initial
assault.
5. Balkan forces are capable of mounting approximately six modified
divisions and supporting troops (175,000) (Appendix “B”). They
should be supplied with captured German and Italian equipment, if
available, inasmuch as they are familiar therewith, and their
strategic position does not further substantiate commitments from
other sources.
6. It is assumed that Polish forces will continue to fight with the
British and they need not be considered as sacrificed by non-support
of the Polish “Secret Army” as an organized unit. Moreover, the
formation of Polish divisions and brigades can only be accomplished
after the fall of Germany, at which time existence of a formal
Polish Army for the defeat of Germany would not be necessary
(Appendix “C”).
7. In respect to equipping the Turkish forces, it is presumed that
this program will not extend beyond that envisaged at
Trident
.7 In
view of the apparent inability of the Turkish forces to properly
assimilate, maintain, and train with such equipment as has been
provided to them, it is questionable as to whether the political
benefits that would accrue from furnishing any further equipment
would outweigh the advisability of retaining such equipment for
other purposes.
8. The aggregate strengths of forces which might be available to the
United Nations and which are now located in Norway, Denmark, Belgium
and Holland totals about 150,000 men (Appendix “D”). Since potential
forces in none of these countries constitutes a force which of
itself could carry out extensive offensive operations, it is assumed
that such forces would be available only for garrison and interior
guard duty.
[Page 1031]
9. It is the opinion of the War Shipping Administration that cargo
shipping captured should be operated for rehabilitation and support
of the occupied country. This policy will reduce shipping load on
United Nations and will save the time and expense of repair and
rehabilitation of vessels in U.S. ports. Personnel vessels should be
operated to assist U.S. troop lift regardless of decisions as to
U.S. or British control.
recommendations
10. It is recommended that:
-
a.
- The supplies and equipment necessary to carry out the
program recommended by the Commanding General of the North
African Theater of Operations (cable W7177—
Cm–In
–Bosco 21, 13 Aug.
19438) be authorized for shipment during the
period 1 September–31 December 1943.
-
b.
- Rearmament of French Army units be limited to the
obligations of the Casablanca Conference, i.e., 11 divisions
as modified by General Eisenhower’s radio of 13 August
1943.
-
c.
- Equipment for any French local forces to be organized on
the Continent subsequent to invasion be limited to that
required for garrison or guard duties and no attempt be made
to organize assault forces. Equipment to be furnished
through CG, ETO, for Northern France and
through CG, NATO, for Southern France. All
equipment to be furnished as far as practicable from
captured German and Italian items.9
-
d.
- In accordance with C.C.S.
303/3,10 Strategic Concept for the Defeat
of the Axis in Europe (par. 6d and
par. 8) equipment to be supplied to the Balkans will be
limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea
transport and for11
planning purposes the forces to be so equipped will be
limited to 175,000 men (six divisions and supporting
troops).
-
e.
- No equipment be supplied the Polish forces in Poland,
other than that which can be flown in to guerrilla and
underground forces extant within the limits of Poland. (The
limitations imposed by the requirement that all material
must be flown in will limit the forces that can be equipped
to an optimum figure of 50 modified infantry battalions).
This is to be a British commitment.
-
f.
- The program of aid to Turkey be reviewed in the light of
experience to date and with a view to possibly curtailing
the furnishing of additional equipment.
-
g.12
- Equipment for potential forces in Norway and the Low
Countries be limited to basic individual equipment for a
total force aggregating 150,000 men, together with certain
categories of light infantry weapons and light motor
vehicles. That measures be initiated to determine the exact
forces to be equipped as soon as operations by the United
Nations in Western Europe make such action practicable.
Theater commanders concerned to equip liberated forces of
Norway, Holland, and Belgium through CG, ETO. The
Balkans to be equipped through CG, NATO.13
-
h.
- That in implementing the recommendations appearing in
subparagraphs c to g, inclusive, maximum use be made of captured war
matériel.
-
i.
- That implementation (after maximum utilization of captured
war matériel) of equipping the forces carried in
subparagraphs a, b and d above, be considered to be a
responsibility of the United States, and for subparagraphs
c, e, f, and g to be considered as a responsibility of the
United Kingdom.
-
j.
- Captured cargo shipping be used, insofar as practicable,
to carry relief and rehabilitation supplies to the country
from which captured. Captured personnel vessels be operated
to assist U.S. troop lift regardless of decisions as to U.S.
or British control.
Appendix “A”
secret
Rearmament of the French
1. During the Casablanca Conference, the United States Government
accepted the responsibility for the equipping of 11 French
divisions (three armored and eight infantry).
2. By 1 September 1943 the equipment for two armored and four
infantry divisions, with supporting troops, will have been
shipped.
3. a. By radiogram W7177 (
Bosco–In
–21, 13 August 1943), the Commanding General, North
African Theater of Operations, recommends [Page 1033] that equipment for the remaining
French troops be provided as follows:
| September, 1943 |
—One infantry and one armored division (less
certain units) |
| October, 1943 |
—One infantry division |
| November, 1943 |
—One infantry division |
| December, 1943 |
—One armored division |
Equipment for supporting and service units to be
provided on a proportionate basis for each month.
b. The proposal outlined in a above will provide for a total of four
armored (on a slightly reduced scale) and seven infantry
divisions. The Commanding General, North African Theater of
Operations, advises that this, considering also the Koenig
Division, which was equipped by the British, will satisfy the
requirements of the Casablanca Conference.
4. Equipment, allowing minor substitutions, can be made available
to meet the requirements outlined in paragraph 3 above, provided
that priority above that for pre-shipments to the United Kingdom
is granted. About 60% of the equipment for French units would
necessarily be withheld from pre-shipment to the United Kingdom.
These shortages can be made up in time to equip U.K. units prior
to departure. Provision of this equipment will not prejudice
currently directed operations in the Pacific,
Bolero
, or
Sickle
. Any equipment left behind by U.S. divisions
transferred from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom will be
credited against this requirement. Shipping can be made
available as requested by General Eisenhower (180,000 ship tons
in September and 150,000 ship tons per month, October, November,
and December).
5. The provision of equipment and supplies referred to in
paragraph 5 [3?] above, will satisfy the
United States obligation of the Casablanca Conference. There is
no further known requirement for equipment for French units from
United States sources. During the first four to five months
following the initial assault on the Continent, all available
port and beach capacity will be required for build-up of the
combat forces. It is considered that a minimum of six to eight
months would be required between the start of reorganization and
re-equipment of French Army units on the Continent, and their
initial employment. Thus it would appear that no Continental
French Army units could be employed for from ten to thirteen
months after the assault.
6. Certain resistance groups in France are being equipped by air
delivery with small arms. This is a British commitment. Any
demands [Page 1034] on the
United States for weapons or equipment for this purpose will be
negligible.
7. It may be necessary to clothe and equip local defense units
organized in France after the invasion is well under way. Arms
for such units would undoubtedly be limited to small arms and
light weapons. It is believed that any such equipment should be
provided from and limited to that available from captured enemy
(Italian) supplies, and should not be set up as an obligation of
the United States Government.
Appendix “B”
secret
Balkans
- 1.
- The Balkan guerrilla forces are estimated to number around
175,000; however, some estimates have placed this figure as
high as 300,000. The former figure is based on recent
intelligence reports and is considered to be reliable. These
forces are divided into several political groups, operating
independently, the strongest of which is General
Mihailovitch’s Chetniks. However, it is doubtful that even
he can command the loyalty of more than 175,000 to 200,000
men.
- 2.
- In addition to these forces, recent radio report from the
Mediterranean Theater quotes a Yugoslavian representative as
being desirous of establishing a training corps, on the fall
of Italy, in some Italian territory, preferably Sicily, to
consist of 30,000 to 40,000 Yugoslavian prisoners of war now
in Italy. The State Department is very emphatic in the
opinion that a maximum of 6,500 Yugoslavian and 1,800 Greek
prisoners of war will be liberated on the fall of Italy, and
that any claims of the Yugoslav Government in Exile in
excess of this figure would constitute an attempt to create
a Free Yugoslav Army to lend national prestige in peace
conference negotiations. The liberated prisoners of war
available therefore appear to be relatively insignificant in
comparison to the tangible guerrilla forces, and, moreover,
the time that would be consumed in training such a force
would render them valueless in the conquest of
Germany.
- 3.
- In the past, supply of these forces has been effected by
the British Middle East Command, in some 100 scattered
sorties, dropping only the bare essentials of medical
supplies, etc. Their principal needs are machine guns, light
(horse) artillery and medical supplies.
- 4.
- The supply of equipment to the Balkans therefore devolves
to a consideration of furnishing an equivalent of the
requirements for a force commensurate with the 175,000
guerrillas.
- 5.
- Equipment to be supplied to the Balkans should be limited
to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport. The
latter method [Page 1035]
must supplement the former before any substantial amount of
equipment can be made available to a force aggregating
175,000 men.
Appendix “C”
secret
Polish Forces
- 1.
- Polish forces in the U.K. consist of approximately 40,000
men, including one armored division, one parachute brigade,
13 air squadrons and some light naval vessels. In the Middle
East, Polish forces contain about 73,000 men, including two
infantry divisions, one tank brigade, and corps troops. In
both of the above elements, the supply of matériel and
equipment has been from British sources, including some
lend-lease transactions, and the supply status of each is
approximately 75% complete.
- 2.
- There is an additional Polish force of approximately
65,000 men, in the occupied territory, known as the “Secret
Army.” Various estimates of this force have run as high as
300,000 men, however the former figure is based on U.S. Army
Intelligence information and is considered to be reliable.
In addition to supplying the Polish forces in the U.K. and
Middle East, the British have occasionally dropped small
quantities of explosives, and communications equipment, to
this “Secret Army,” from the air.
- 3.
- Supply of the forces in the U.K. and Middle East having
been undertaken by the British (these elements are now a
part of British forces in the respective area), the
equipping of Polish forces evolves to the requirements of
the “Secret Army.” This requirement amounts to equipment for
an equivalent of fifty infantry battalions which must be
flown in, and would require an estimated 500 sorties
initially. The Polish Genera] Staff estimates this force
could fight in isolation for about 20 days and its continued
existence would depend on a break through contact by other
Allied Forces within that time.
- 4.
- The Polish plan further envisages the transporting of the
U.K. and Middle East Forces into Poland by air after the
break through contact with the “Secret Army” has been
established. These, with other liberated Polish Forces,
would be organized into 16 infantry divisions and six
dismounted cavalry brigades. This latter phase is not
considered as advantageous inasmuch as the effect of it can
not be realized until such time as it is no longer
needed.
- 5.
- It is clear that sabotage and intelligence operations are
desirable and the operation of 50 rifle battalions will
considerably aid in this activity, as well as occupy the
attention of considerable German forces. However, current
intelligence digests indicate Russia will violently [Page 1036] oppose any
arming of the Poles in Poland due to the well-known
Polish-Russian enmity.
- 6.
- To support this operation, including supply of initial
equipment, would require some 2,000 sorties by heavy
transport planes and this air lift can not be spared without
seriously affecting other operations.
Appendix “D”
secret
Norway, Low Countries
1. In giving consideration to the possible need for supplying
equipment and matériel to the forces of free neutrals of nations
at present occupied by Axis forces and which might come within
the scope of possibly having to be rearmed by the United
Nations, estimates have been confined to Norway, Denmark,
Belgium and Holland. The table which follows indicates (on the
basis of informal estimates furnished by a representative of the
Joint Intelligence Committee) the strengths of the armed forces
of each nation at or about the time each became involved in the
war, as well as the indicated potential strengths of that
portion of the manpower of each nation which might be available
for reequipment, rearming, training and service in the event of
a United Nations reoccupation:
|
Country
|
Estimated Strength at Outbreak of
War
|
Possible Strength To Be
Equipped
|
| Norway |
17,000 |
40,000*
|
| Denmark |
11,000 |
10,000†
|
| Belgium |
650,000 |
50,000*
|
| Holland |
400,000 |
50,000*
|
|
|
150,000 |
2. From the above table it is apparent that the aggregate
strength of the forces which might be available for rearming in
all of these countries totals 150,000 troops. Since potential
forces in none of these countries constitute a force which of
itself could carry out extended offensive operations, it is
presumed that such forces would be supplied only to the extent
of basic individual equipment, together with certain categories
of small arms and light motor vehicles. Considering the
reequipment of all of these nations as a complete total
requirement, and assuming that such reequipment would not take
place until, at the earliest, some time after 1 January 1944
(the estimated date on which [Page 1037] the rearming of the French forces as
presently contemplated would be completed), it is not considered
that any great problem of supply would be involved and that
quantities of the requisite matériel could be made available
without unduly affecting the equipment status of American
forces.
3. Assuming (for conservative purposes) that the reequipment of
all of these countries would be coincidental, which of course
would not be the case, a total maximum shipping requirement of
some six to eight ships might be required but this could be made
available without any effect on the
Bolero
/
Sickle
operation or operations as presently contemplated and
planned for the South and Southwest Pacific areas.
4. It is, of course, obvious that a determination must be made at
the earliest practicable moment in the event any or all of these
countries, or any contiguous countries, are to be reequipped and
rearmed. Such plans must indicate the approximate date on which
rearming and reequipping would be required and, in general, the
type force that it would be considered advisable to rearm and
reequip for each country with the forces available to it and the
nature of operations in which it is contemplated such forces
might become engaged, i.e., garrison and police duty, or actual
components of an offensive fighting force. It is also essential
that a determination be made at the earliest practicable date as
to how much equipment would be supplied and the source of the
equipment.
