Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Ambassador in the United States (Halifax)¹

most secret

London, August 6, 1943.

My comments on Tangier telegram² are as follows.

2. Berio is an Italian professional diplomat. Sir P. Loraine just remembers meeting him as Counsellor of Italian Embassy at Ankara. Member of my Department recalls him as an unassuming pleasant little man.

3. Berio’s approach is substantially the same as d’Ajeta’s, though more definite. We are entitled to regard it as an offer by Badoglio Government to negotiate on terms.

4. There can of course be no question of any negotiation. On the other hand we believe that this is an official approach from Badoglio Government and I think it might be difficult to justify ignoring it altogether.

5. Should we not then reply that as is well known we insist on unconditional surrender and Badoglio Government must as a first step notify us that Italy surrenders unconditionally?

6. Subsequently at a later stage if Badoglio Government were to do this we should then inform them of terms on which we should be prepared to cease hostilities against Italy.

7. The following are my comments on Barcelona telegrams.³

8. Busseti is unknown to us. Though we had not heard that political parties mentioned had formed themselves into a Committee of Action Ave think this quite credible. Further enquiries are being made. But we doubt whether Committee of Action hastily formed out of liberal groups which have been suppressed for the past 20 years and excluding Communist and apparently other groups such as Partita d’Azione can represent a serious political force. Committee makes no claim to speak for Italian Army who so far as we know are still loyal to Badoglio and are perhaps the most powerful factor in the country.

9. We conclude that Committee’s claim to be able to turn out Badoglio Government and instigate the Army to turn against the Germans should be discounted. I therefore consider it would not be in our interest to recognize this group as a provisional government. Moreover, if we are to try out Badoglio on the lines of paragraph 5 above we do not at present at least wish to support any opposition against him.

10. At the same time Committee of Action may be useful to us hereafter since they apparently represent, we presume, moderate opinion which might eventually come into its own. They should therefore not be discouraged. Busseti might be told that Committee’s communication has been considered, that without further assurance that they are in a position to replace existing Government we cannot enter into any undertakings with them, but that in any case the first step must be for Italy to surrender. Meanwhile best advice we can give is that all patriots should turn their efforts towards bringing about that surrender and frustrating German designs on Italy.

11. Please inform President of the foregoing.

1. The text of this message was made available to the Department of State by the British Embassy at Washington, was delivered to the White House Map Room by the Department during the evening of August 6, 1943, and was forwarded by the Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island, by telegram during the night of August 6–7.
2. Supra.
3. Ante, pp. 563, 564.