J.C.S. Files
Memorandum by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Deane)
Minutes of Meeting Held at the White House Between the President and the Chiefs of Staff on 10 August 1943 at 14151
| Present | |
| The President | Admiral E. J. King |
| The Secretary of War | General H. H. Arnold |
| Admiral W. D. Leahy | Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane |
| General G. C. Marshall |
1. Eur–African Operations
The President stated that he had just been talking with the Secretary of War who indicated that he gathered from conversation in England that the Prime Minister was opposed to an operation against Sardinia but favored operations against the Balkans.
Mr. Stimson said that in his final discussions with Mr. Churchill the latter had disclaimed any desire to land any troops in the Balkans. Rather, he wished to give them supplies. He indicated that the total supplies furnished the Balkans now amounted to 10 to 12 tons per month. The Prime Minister feels that considering what is being done with this small amount, much could be expected in the Balkan area if the Allies could give them additional supplies. On the other hand, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, wants the United Nations to invade the Balkans.
The Secretary of War said that the Prime Minister was rather apathetic and somewhat apprehensive with regard to Bolero . His attitude is reflected by the British Chiefs of Staff.
[Page 499]The President said that the British Foreign Office does not want the Balkans to come under the Russian influence. Britain wants to get to the Balkans first. He said that personally he could not see the logic of this reasoning. He did not believe that Russians would desire to take over the Balkan states. Their wish is to establish kinship with the other Slavic people. In any event, he thought it unwise to plan military strategy based on a gamble as to political results.
Secretary Stimson said he had talked to General Spaatz about the relative effectiveness of bombing Germany from northern or southern Italy. General Spaatz had said that it was not necessary to have bases north of the Po. The bombing would be just as effective from fields north of Rome as it would be further north.
General Arnold said that he agreed, but that it was absolutely essential that Rome not be declared an open city. If fields north of Rome were to be used, the railway facilities of Rome would be an essential in supplying them.
Admiral Leahy said that with the forces that General Eisenhower would have available, it would be possible to conquer southern Italy and obtain air bases north of Rome. It would not be necessary to leave the seven trained divisions in Italy that are now scheduled for Bolero .
The President suggested, as an alternative, that the 7 trained divisions might be taken from the Mediterranean but be replaced with an equivalent number from the United States.
Admiral King said that this procedure would cut into the troop lift in the Pacific.
General Marshall concurred, stating that there is a backlog of 87,000 troops needed in the Pacific. He had had a study made in the War Department which stated that if nothing was lost by submarine action, all convoys were to sail on schedule, and if the Monticello and West Point, two ships now scheduled for the Pacific troop lift, were allowed to remain in the Atlantic, there could be 7 divisions transported from the United States to North Africa by the end of June, 1944. This would still permit the planned troop lift to Overlord .
General Marshall, indicated that in addition to garrison troops, General Eisenhower will have 24 divisions and 4500 aircraft available for operations in the Mediterranean. If 7 divisions were to be added, this would make a total of 31. In messages received, General Eisenhower himself has said that without the 7 divisions he will have sufficient force to take care of planned operations in Italy which will carry him well north of Rome, capture Sardinia and Corsica, and still have 14 divisions available for an invasion of southern France and coordination with Overlord .
[Page 500]General Marshall added that the study which he had referred to did not take into consideration whether or not the landing craft or combat loaders would be available to utilize all the divisions that will be in North Africa. The views of General Eisenhower had been confirmed by his chief planner, Major General Rooks, who is now in the United States. However, General Rooks had said that one additional division would be desirable but not essential.2
He said that in the Mediterranean after Husky there will be 11 French divisions, 28 British divisions, and 9 U.S. divisions, or a total of 48. Four of the French divisions will be available for combat by 1 November and the remainder will be ready for combat in the spring of 1944. The 28 British divisions include 2 Polish divisions and 1 Greek division.
General Marshall said that if the contemplated operations in the Mediterranean can be carried on without sending 7 additional divisions, to do so would simply invite having these extra divisions used for an invasion in the Balkans. This would meet the Prime Minister’s and Mr. Eden’s desires, but would make the Mediterranean operation so extensive as to have a disastrous effect on the main effort from England. He said that there will be but little difficulty in moving the 7 trained divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom. A British convoy leaving the United States will proceed to England and thence to the Mediterranean, picking up 3 divisions and returning them to England. The remaining 4 divisions will be brought from the Mediterranean by troop ships returning from India and the Middle East.
The President asked Admiral King if he considered the Mediterranean was now open to traffic.
Admiral King replied that it is at the present time, and that the situation will steadily improve. Cargo convoys are moving through the Mediterranean now. However, there is some hesitancy about troop convoys moving through the Mediterranean because of a possible threat from Crete.
Admiral King said that the principal factor which must be met is the troop lift that will be available to General Eisenhower to conduct his operations in Italy, Sardinia, and possibly southern France.
General Marshall agreed, saying the principal factor is the troop lift and secondly the provision of adequate service troops. He said he was going to get General Eisenhower’s recommendations as to whether it would be necessary to send an additional division to the Mediterranean as had been suggested by General Rooks.
Admiral King suggested to the President that if the British insist upon abandoning Overlord or postponing the operation indefinitely, [Page 501] we should abandon the project as in carrying it on we would simply waste our substance.
The President said we can, if necessary, carry out the project ourselves. He was certain that the British would be glad to make the necessary bases in England available to us.
General Marshall said that the trouble with that plan would be that it would greatly overlook the availability of 15 British divisions available now in the United Kingdom. There is no other spot in the world where 15 divisions can be placed into an operation without large transportation and supply problems.
The President said he was anxious to have American preponderance in the Overlord operation, starting from the first day of the assault.
General Marshall said that the Overlord plans called for 29 divisions being available for combat immediately. As he recalled it, there were to be 14 American divisions and 15 British divisions in England at the time. In addition, there were to be about 6 American divisions just arriving in England which could not be considered as available for combat during the first two months after the Overlord assault took place. During this period these divisions would be assembling equipment, completing their training, and preparing themselves for combat.
The President stated that, frankly, his reason for desiring American preponderance in force was to have the basis for insisting upon an American commander. He wished that preponderance of force to be sufficient to make it impossible for the British to disagree with the suggestion. He said that the British had once offered that the commander be American. He said he was anxious to get 14 or 15 divisions into France in the first action if possible, with several divisions left in England which could be shipped over later.
General Marshall said that in the coming conferences one of the most important points to be insisted upon by the American delegation would be that there should be no cuts made in the Overlord buildup.
The President stated definitely that he was going to advocate leaving General Eisenhower with his present buildup, less the 7 divisions scheduled to go to England.
General Marshall pointed out the destructive effects of any divergence from the main plan. He said the 2d Division and one other American division would be in England now had it not been necessary to divert an entire convoy from England to the Mediterranean in order to deliver 66,000 troops needed by General Eisenhower. He said we must avoid being committed to some operation that would have to be done “on a shoestring.” The question of infantry divisions was not serious. He pointed out that we have a reserve of infantry divisions, [Page 502] but as far as shipping and all other munitions of war are concerned, we have been living from hand to mouth, utilizing them as fast as they become available, and as yet no reserve has been built up.
The President then asked if the French would occupy Corsica.
General Marshall said that that was the present plan and it was also anticipated that they should have a part in any operation against Sardinia. He hoped, however, that Sardinia would eventually fall of its own weight, and that the operations necessary to occupy it would be relatively insignificant.
The President then summed up the discussion by stating that our available means seem to fit in pretty well with our plans. He outlined these as insistence upon continuation of the present Overlord buildup and carrying out that operation as our main effort. He desired that every effort be made to have additional American divisions available at the time Overlord is mounted in order to justify an American commander. He said he proposed leaving in the Mediterranean those forces now available to General Eisenhower and that he was opposed to operations into the Balkans.3
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3. Other Operations
The President asked the Secretary of War if the British were still interested in an operation against Norway.
Mr. Stimson replied that the British staff gave the Prime Minister more opposition on this subject than on any other. The staff is definitely opposed to it, although the Prime Minister still believes such an operation is feasible.
The President asked the Secretary how many troops he thought it was necessary for the United States to have in Iceland.
Mr. Stimson said certainly far less than two years ago.
General Marshall said that at present there are 31,000 troops in Iceland and that the 5th division was on its way to England. In his opinion, the garrison should be cut to about 16,000.
The President then suggested that in order to obtain more shipping, a survey should be made of the necessities for large British stock piles of raw materials and munitions. He felt that with the improved submarine situation, the British could cut their stock piles from a six months’ supply to a three months’ supply.
General Marshall said that he imagined that such a proposal would meet with opposition from the British, since the situation has now arisen in which there is ample cargo shipping and more than enough to keep up with our available troop lift.
[Page 503]General Arnold pointed out, however, that there were certain items in which it would be well to cut the size of the British stock piles. He said that Britain now has a six months’ supply of gasoline. If this were to be cut to a three months’ supply, there would be sufficient gasoline available in the United States to carry out training programs on schedule and thus increase the flow of trained personnel.
The President suggested that there might be a possibility of converting cargo ships that are about three quarters completed into troop ships.
Admiral King said that as new escort vessels become available, he has undertaken to convert the old four-stacker destroyers to A.P.D.’s. These give a troop lift of about 250 people and are well suited for moving reinforced companies in the Pacific. He said that nearly all of the fast ships of the C type being constructed by the Maritime Commission are now being converted from cargo ships to some other use. These uses include conversion into small aircraft carriers and transports. He said, however, he would cause an investigation to be made as to whether or not more cargo ships could not be converted.
General Marshall said that again he wished to emphasize to the President that no future changes should be made in basic decisions. He said that the main plan should be carried through and only small diversions from this plan made when necessary. It is impossible to calculate the wastage that has accrued to the United Nations war effort from changes made in basic decisions. The first instance was carrying out Torch which involved moving troops set up from the United States to England and thence to Africa. Every such change has effects which reach as far back as the Middle West in the United States, caused by the necessity for altering production schedules, special loadings of convoys, etc.