Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

Hopkins Papers

Draft Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill ¹

secret
C.C.S. 242/3

[ Washington ,] 24 May 1943.

Trident: Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Final Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 242) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.

i. overall objective

In conjunction with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

ii. overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war

1. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

3. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

iii. basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

1. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

2. Support the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.

3. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U–boat menace.

4. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

5. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

6. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to keep Russia actively in the War.

7. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to keep China actively in the war as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

8. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section VI 1.)

9. To prepare the French Army in North Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers. (See also Section VI 2.)

iv. specific operations for 1943–44 in execution of overall strategic concept

The following operations in execution of the overall strategic concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible of accomplishment. (See Section V.) If a conflict of interest should arise, it will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. The U–Boat War

a. Operation To Seize the Azores Islands.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the Azores is essential to the efficient conduct of the anti-U–boat war for the reasons set out in the Annex.² The preparation of the plan for the capture of the Azores Islands is a responsibility of the British Chiefs of Staff, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the United Kingdom and that in the first place the islands of Fayal and Terceira should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor regarding the date of the operation and as far as can be seen at present the earliest date for the arrival of the force in the Azores will be about the end of August. It is agreed that the land, air, and sea facilities of the Azores will be available to all United Nations forces.

b. Other Anti-U–Boat Measures.

[This subsection is identical with the same subsection in C.C.S. 242/2, ante, p. 354.]

c. Flexibility of Forces.

[This subsection is identical with the same subsection in C.C.S. 242/2, ante, p. 354.]

2. Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe

a. Combined Bomber Offensive From the United Kingdom.

[This subsection is identical with the same subsection in C.C.S. 242/2, ante, p. 354.]

b. Cross-Channel Operations.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air forces then available.

Assault:	5	Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft).
	2	Infantry Divisions—Follow-up.
	2	Air borne Divisions.
Total	9	Divisions in the Assault.
Build-up:	20	Divisions available for movement into lodgement area.
Total	29	Divisions.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately, and the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the intial assault and build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

c. Operations in the Mediterranean To Eliminate Italy From the War.

[This entire subsection is identical with the same subsection in C.C.S. 242/2, ante, p. 355.]

d. Bombing of Ploeşti.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the U. S. Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Rumanian oil fields from bases in North Africa. Further, they have agreed that the Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, will be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These steps have been taken.

3. Operations for the Defeat of Japan.

We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation leading up to a plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required.

a. Operations in the Burma–China Theater.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:

[Subsection (1) of this section is identical with the same subsection in C.C.S. 242/2, ante, p. 356.]

(2) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations at the end of the 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma road.

[Subsections (3) and (4) of this section are identical with the same subsections in C.C.S. 242/2, ante, p. 356.]

(5) The continuance of administrative preparations in India for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of Anakim .

b. Operations in the Pacific.

[This entire section is identical with the same section in C.C.S. 242/2, ante, p. 356.]

v. availability of resources to meet the requirements of basic undertakings and specific operations in execution of overall strategic concept 1943–44

[With the exception of the last section, section 10 on Oil, this entire part is identical with the same part in C.C.S. 242/2, ante, p. 356.]

Oil

10. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters, but the whole question of stocks and of tankers must receive urgent examination in the light of the decisions taken at the Trident Conference.

vi. conclusions on miscellaneous subjects

1. Equipment for Turkey.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the Anfa Conference that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to the Munitions Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of such equipment as may be agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least practicable delay.

2. Rearming of the French in North Africa.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U. S. forces. The use of captured German equipment for this purpose will be explored

vii. other conferences

1. Decisions of the Casablanca conference in conflict with the provisions of this report are modified or cancelled accordingly.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet in July or early August in order to examine the decisions reached at this conference in the light of the situation existing at the time.

1. This draft report, which is a revision of the earlier draft, C.C.S. 242/2, May 23, 1943, supra, was reviewed and amended by Roosevelt and Churchill during their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 24, 1943; for the record of that meeting, see ante, p. 189. As revised during that meeting, the draft report was circulated as C.C.S. 242/4, May 24, 1943, not printed. For the final version of the Report, see C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, post, p. 364.
2. This annex is identieal to the annex to C.C.S. 242/6, post, p. 371.