Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Draft Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill ¹

secret
C.C.S. 242/2

[Washington,] 23 May 1943.

Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Final Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 242)² the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.

i. overall objective

In conjunction with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

ii. overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war

a. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

Proposed by C.P.S.	Amendment Proposed by British Chiefs of Staff
b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced.	Alter to read: “To maintain, and so far as is consistent with a above, to extend …”

c. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

iii. basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

a. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

Proposed by C.P.S.	Amendment Proposed by British. Chiefs of Staff
b. Support and maintain the war making capacity of our forces in all areas (to which committed).	Omit

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U–boat menace.

Proposed by C.P.S.	Amendments Proposed by British Chiefs of Staff
d. Intensify the air offensive from the United Kingdom and concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.	Reletter as c and amend to read: “Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.”
	Add new paragraph: “d. Take all necessary and practicable measures to draw land and air forces from the Russian Front.”

Note: The basic undertakings noted under d (proposed by C.P.S.) and c and d (proposed by British Chiefs of Staff) are now included under “Specific Operations,” and should be omitted here.

e. Sustain the Soviet Forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to Russia without militating against the attainment of the overall objectives.

Proposed by C.P.S.	Amendment Proposed by British Chiefs of Staff
f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary to provide China with a volume of supplies sufficient to keep China actively in the war against Japan.	Amend to read: f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to keep China actively in the war against Japan.”

g. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section VI a.)

h. To prepare the French Army in North Africa to fulfiill an active role in the war against the Axis powers. (See also Section VI b.)

iv. specific operations for 1943–44 in execution of overall strategic concept

The following operations in execution of the overall strategic concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible of accomplishment. (See Section V.) If a conflict of interests should arise, it will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision.

1. The U–Boat War

a. Operation To Seize the Azores Islands.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the Azores is essential to the success of the anti-U–boat war for the reasons set out in the Annex,³ and that the preparation of the plan for the capture of the Azores Islands is a responsibility of the British Chiefs of Staff, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the United Kingdom and that in the first place the islands of Fayal and Terceira should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor regarding the date of the operation and as far as can be seen at present the earliest date for the arrival of the force in the Azores will be about the middle of August.

b. Other Anti-U–Boat Measures.

All possible measures for strengthening the air forces engaged in the Bay Offensive and for increasing the number of VLR, aircraft engaged in convoy protection have been examined and such steps as are possible are being taken.

c. Flexibility of Forces.

The necessity for flexibility in the utilization of both air and sea forces has been agreed, and steps to improve matters in this respect are being constantly studied and implemented.

2. Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe

a. Combined Bomber Offensive From the United Kingdom.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U. S.–British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

b. Cross-Channel Operations.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944:

Assault:	5	Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft).
	2	Infantry Divisions—Follow-up.
	2	Air borne Divisions.
Total	9	Divisions in the Assault.
Build-up:	20	Divisions available for movement into lodgement area
Total	29	Divisions

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom and the seizure and development of Continental ports will be undertaken in order that the initial assault and build-up forces may be augmented subsequent to 1 May 1944 by shipment from the United States of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

c. Operations in the Mediterranean To Eliminate Italy From the War.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That the Allied Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of Husky as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from, the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Each specific operation will be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander-in-Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for Husky will not be considered available. It is estimated that 19 British and allied, 4 United States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean Area subsequent to Husky . These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions to be transferred to the United Kingdom and the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to Turkey.⁴ It is further estimated that there will be available after Husky a total of 3,622 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 1,986 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives.

d. Bombing of Ploeşti.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the U. S. Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Rumanian oil fields from bases in North Africa and Syria. Further, they have agreed that the Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, should be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These steps have been taken.

3. Operations for the Defeat of Japan

We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation leading up to a plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required for its implementation.

a. Operations in the Burma–China Theater.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:

(1) The concentration of available resources, as first priority within the Assam–Burma Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to:

(a) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;

(b) Maintaining increased American air forces in China; and

(c) Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China.

(2) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma road.

(3) The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations, with possible exploitation.

(4) The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

(5) The continuance of administrative preparations in India for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of Anakim . (This has not yet been agreed.)

b. Operations in the Pacific.

Various courses of action have been examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the operations they have agreed to undertake have the following objects:

(1) Conduct of air operations in and from China.

(2) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.

(3) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.

(4) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.

(5) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

v. availability of resources to meet the requirements of basic undertakings and specific operations in execution of overall strategic concept—1943–44

We have examined our resources with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the above operations and our conclusions are as follows:

Ground Forces.

1. All the ground forces required can be made available.

Naval Forces.

2. If a covering force is required for the operations to capture Akyab and Ramree, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated some diversion of U.S. naval forces may be required. Subject to this, all the naval forces required can be made available.

Air Forces.

3. Broadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements in all theaters.

4. For Cross-Channel operations there will be sufficient air forces in the U.K. with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision of which needs further investigation. In the absence of any detailed plan for Cross-Channel operations, it has not been possible to estimate the requirements of gliders. This will have to be the subject of urgent study, which we are initiating.

5. For operations in Burma there are only small deficiencies which can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater.

6. Subject to the development of air fields and necessary communications in Assam, the air transport and defense requirements of the air route into China, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met.

Assault Shipping and Landing Craft.

7. Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we have allowed for, and provided that the U.S. and British planned productions are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft required can be made available. We have agreed upon the necessary allocations.

Supply of Critical Items.

8. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of critical items. With the exception of steel for landing craft construction, deficiencies do not appear serious. We recommend that the possibilities of providing the necessary items, and particularly steel, should be further examined.

Shipping.

9. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate, personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of United Nations forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping.

The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected operations for 1943/1944 reveals small deficiencies in the third and fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect will not be unmanageable.

Oil.

10. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters but we feel that the whole question of stocks and of tankers will require urgent examination in the light of decisions taken at the Trident Conference.

vi. conclusions on miscellaneous subjects

1. Equipment for Turkey.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the Anfa Conference that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to the Munitions Assignment[s] Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey.⁵ The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of the equipment as proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least possible delay.

2. Rearming of the French in North Africa.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U. S. forces in the various theaters. The use of captured German equipment for this purpose will be explored.

vii. other conferences

a. Decisions of the Casablanca conference in conflict with the provisions of this report are modified or cancelled accordingly.

b. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet in July or early August in order to examine the situation in the light of the results of Husky and the situation in Italy and Russia.

1. This draft report was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined. Chiefs of Staff: “The attached draft is a revision of C.C.S. 242/1. It has been, prepared by the Combined Secretariat in the light of the most recent decisions taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” For the earlier version of this report, see C.C.S. 242, May 21, 1943, supra. This draft report was considered and revised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 24, 1943 (ante, p. 184). For the text as revised, see C.C.S. 242/3, May 24, 1943, infra.
2. Supra.
3. Not printed as such, but its text can be reconstructed from the annex to C.C.S. 242/6, post, p. 372, and from footnotes 5 and 7 thereto.
4. The British commitment of two armoured divisions was part of the planned military support which the British were to provide in the event of Turkey entering the war. The whole plan, which was known by the name Hardihood and which the British and Turks discussed in detail in mid-April 1943 in Ankara, is described in John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. v: August 1943–September 1944 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956), p. 90, in the series History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series.
5. Regarding the agreement referred to here, see item 2 of the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, January 20, 1943, 10 a.m., Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 659.