Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt ¹

secret

London, April 5, 1943.

No. 279. Personal and secret, Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

1. I had a long talk with Anthony last night and I thank you for all your kind reassuring messages.

2. I am delighted to hear that there is a prospect of Harry coming here almost immediately. If you could let General Marshall come with him there would be enormous advantages and we could then settle about going on to Torch area to discuss possibilities with all our people on the spot there. The battles impending in Tunisia this week should clarify the position a good deal.

3. From what Anthony told me about your ideas for Husky and its exploitation if successful, it seems that we are thinking along the same lines. I therefore send you a copy of the minute which I sent on the second instant to the Chief of Staffs Committee and on which they are now at work. Please keep this to yourself, Harry and General Marshall as I have not yet heard what our Chiefs of Staff have to say about it. It is only intended as a channel for thought and planning. Minute referred to in Paragraph 3 follows:

1. Assuming, first, that Vulcan is finished by the end of April, or, at worst, by May 15th and no large formed body of German or Italian troops escapes: secondly, that Husky takes place on July 10: thirdly, that there are not more than five Italian divisions, aggregating not more than 50,000 combatants, and not more than two German divisions, aggregating 20,000 combatants, total 70,000 combatants, in Husky -land, and furthermore that we place seven or eight British and American Divisions ashore, at a combatant strength of 15,000 each, total 105,000, and reinforce by another 30,000 British, grand total 135,000: and fourthly, that we win the intense battles which the landing involves:—how long is the subjugation of the armed forces of the enemy in Husky -land estimated to take?

2. In an operation of this kind, everything depends upon the initial battle lasting, say, a week, after which one might reasonably expect that the bulk of the enemy’s forces would be destroyed, captured or driven into the mountains. The distances are not great and the resources of the country are small and once we have the ports and the airfields we should be effectively the masters of Husky -land, and be able to disperse by air power, and sea power covered by air power, all attempts by the enemy to reconquer it.

3. Hitherto the capture of Husky -land has been regarded as an end in itself: but no one could rest content with such a modest and even petty objective for our armies in the campaign of 1943. Husky -land is only a stepping stone, and we must now begin to study how to exploit this local success. What has been done about this? Every reasonable alternative should be explored. Now that Anakim has receded owing to the shipping shortage, Mediterranean operations gain more prominence. If we take the end of July as the date by which we are established in Husky -land, what other operations are open? Of course our choice must depend upon what the enemy do. If large German forces are brought down into Italy and Italian morale and will to fight is thereby enhanced, the scale required for the taking of Rome and Naples might be beyond our power. In that case we must be ready with our plans in the Eastern Mediterranean, and put it hard across Turkey to come in with us. We must be ready for an atack on the Dodecanese and for supporting Turkey if she gets into trouble.

4. If however the Germans do not come, and the Italians crumple, there is no limit to the amount of Italian territory we may overrun. Italy may be forced out of the war. We may become possessed of Sardinia without fighting. Corsica may be liberated. All our available forces, including divisions in Africa not involved in Husky , will have to be moved northward into Italy till they come into contact with the Germans on the Brenner or along the French Riviera. How far have these possibilities been studied?

5. Even if Italy remains in the war with a certain amount of German help we ought, the moment we are masters of Husky -land, to try to get a footing both on the toe and heel of Italy. The possession of Taranto as well as the Isthmus governing the toe would confer great advantages upon us. The Italian fleet would have to decide on which side of Italy it would take refuge. We cannot tell what its position or condition will be as a result of the Husky operation. If it has not retreated up the Adriatic before we are masters of Husky -land with our air force established there, it will not be able to do so and will have to content itself with Spezia and Genoa. In any case, it must be considered a most important objective to get a footing on the Dalmatian coast so that we can foment the insurgents of Albania and Yugoslavia by weapons, supplies and possibly Commandos. I believe that, in spite of his present naturally foxy attitude, Mihailovic will throw his whole weight against the Italians the moment we are able to give him any effective help. Evidently great possibilities are open in this theatre.

6. The object of this paper is to request with the utmost urgency the close study of these problems, and to obtain from the Chiefs of Staff their view of what can be done and what it is best to do. I hope this work may be pressed forward with the greatest speed because the mere capture of Husky -land will be an altogether inadequate result for the Campaign of 1943.

1. Transmitted via military channels.