Defense Files

Notes by Brigadier General Gerow 1
secret

British and American representatives were present. The results of the recent meetings of the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff were stated to the President and Mr. Churchill by Generals Marshall and Dill.

In substance, Chiefs of Staff had agreed on allotment of areas of operation to British and to the U.S. There was considerable discussion of the relative importance of immediate action with regard to Iceland, North Ireland and North Africa.

The President stated that the time was not yet ripe for the North Africa venture. He suggested that we go ahead and collect all available vessels, proceed with the Iceland or the north Ireland movement and interrupt it, if necessary, in order to carry out the North African operation. Mr. Churchill stated that he was very desirous of getting our troops into north Ireland at the earliest possible date. He would also like to see the relief of Iceland completed. He appreciated the fact that all these operations would have to be coordinated.

He discussed at length with regard to shipping. He stated he could not understand why, when the U.S. was able to move 2,000,000 men to Europe in World War I, that we couldn’t move approximately the same number now. He stated that we should count on using the shipping that is now enroute with British troops to the Middle East [Page 105] and Far East. An invasion of England as not expected before the middle of April.

The President discussed the political aspects of our shipping to South America, He would like to keep it going if possible. However, he stated that these ships could be diverted for troop movements in an emergency. The President seemed to be willing to give us carteblanche to collect the necessary shipping for any of the three operations.

Admiral Pound said that he had just received a report from London stating what reinforcements were required for the Far East. He stated that a decision must be made as between the North African venture and sending reinforcements to the Far East.

Lord Beaverbrook discussed at length the shipping situation, with particular, reference to the diversion of merchant cruisers to troop carriers or vice versa.

The President asked the possibilities of transporting a small number of troops (about 50) on freighters now moving between U.S. and the United Kingdom. He desired that this possibility be explored.

Mr. Churchill asked if any decisions had been made as to whether or not the U.S. troops that go to north Ireland would use British armament and food. General Marshall explained some of the difficulties involved but thought they all could be solved, with perhaps the single exception of food.

Mr. Churchill was particularly anxious that we send a detachment into north Ireland as soon as possible.

The President wanted to know if the Far East was being taken care of. General Marshall told him it was, to the limit of our resources and shipping.

The President was asked if “unity of command” in the Far East Theater had been settled. “Unity of command” was discussed at length by the President, Mr. Churchill, Admiral King and Secretary Knox. Mr. Churchill was opposed to “unity of command”. He said the situation in the Far East was not similar to the one on the Western Front during World War I. The Far East operating areas were widely separated and difficult of access. It would be very difficult for one single commander to control the whole theater. In his opinion, the control of the theater should be vested in Washington. Mr. Churchill and the President are to discuss this question.

The President seemed to be much concerned over the limited amount of information he was receiving with regard to all powers in the Far East.

Mr. Knox strongly supported “unity of command”. So did the President. Admiral King was lukewarm.

The President directed that the Chiefs of Staff go ahead and study the whole question.

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There will be another meeting tomorrow (Dec. 27, 1941) at 4:30 p.m. The Secretary of War and Chief of Staff are to see the Pres dent at 10 a.m.

L. T. G
  1. The notes by Gerow give the starting time of the meeting as 3:30 p.m. but the President’s appointment calendar agrees with the Sexton minutes in indicating 4:30. For citations to pertinent documents, see the minutes by Major Sexton, supra.