Defense Files
Minutes by Major Sexton1
Subject: Tonnage.
At the President’s suggestion, Field Marshal Dill briefly reviewed the proposition of sending troops to North Africa, stating that the matter was in the hypothetical stage and depended on an invitation; that studies were being made of the forces required;2 and that the biggest problem is the matter of tonnage.
The President asked, if the above operation is undertaken, considering the shortage of tonnage, would the present convoys going to Great Britain be impaired.
General Marshall replied that it was his understanding that they would not; that both the British and Americans were in substantial agreement on the general plan; that details were being worked out by a Joint Planning Committee; but that the tonnage situation was such that we could not proceed with the North African Expedition and at the same time effect the relief of British units in Iceland and Ireland. One question was how large a force was necessary to appeal to the French in such a way that the occupation would be expedited; and that was a political matter for the President and the Prime Minister to decide. At any rate, the shipping should be collected and made ready for contingent use.
[Page 101]The President stated that the time for the movement was not ripe at present, but that it might become so at any moment, or it might possibly be three months away. That consideration should be given to the collecting of transports for the movement of troops to Northern Ireland, and then, if necessary, this tonnage could be diverted for the North African movement. General Marshall stated that that would be feasible.
Mr. Churchill stated that he placed tremendous importance on the Ireland and Iceland reliefs, the French African Expedition, and also the situation in the Far East. He approved all of them, but the question was, how could they be fitted in. The relief of Northern Ireland could be fitted in at any time. He recalled that in the World War two million men were shipped to France in a comparatively short time—and he asked what has become of the ships used. He stated that he was reluctant to take No for an answer because of shipping, and asked why there was a bottleneck in shipping; he suggested that if we try harder, the shipping can be obtained; he said that he would be frightfully unhappy if he had to adjust between expeditions; that he thought there was no possibility of an invasion of Great Britain before April.
The President pointed out that with regard to additional shipping, we also become involved with State Department matters; for instance, we now have three large ships plying back and forth between North and South America. These ships are the only access from South America to the United States, and their use for troop transportation has not been contemplated because of the “Good Will” feature. However, if it came to the point, we could probably utilize those ships plus three other Grace Line boats.
Admiral Turner pointed out that large ships could not go into certain Irish ports or Casablanca. Mr. Churchill stated that as far as Ireland is concerned, they could go into Clyde, and the troops could then be moved across.
The President then stated that if it would mean delaying the movement of troops to Ireland, Admiral Turner should take up with the State Department the matter of turning over the South American ships. Mr. Churchill stated that during the World War two million troops were moved in five months, and this present plan called only for the movement of a quarter of a million men in three months, and he did not feel that it was too great a problem to be solved.
The Secretary of War stated that he understood the movement of troops to Ireland was merely a passage, and that they would not require complete combat equipment, etc.
Lord Beaverbrook stated that the British are turning out ten ships of the cargo class each month, and that five armed merchant ships [Page 102] are now being converted to cruisers; that this might be stopped. There was also the possibility, he said, of utilizing some of the large ships, such as the Queen Mary or even the Queen Elizabeth.
Mr. Churchill stated that one solution might be to use a large battleship to carry troops. Ten thousand men could be transported in a vessel moving at a speed of 25 knots. The only danger was that there would be a large number of eggs in one basket, and it would be difficult to provide adequate protection for the battleship during part of its trip.
The President stated that he thought we might be able to dig up more ships some way, and directed that Admiral Land and Captain Vickery of the Maritime Commission be consulted.
Mr. Churchill stated that if the North African Expedition were undertaken, it would have to be carried through; the Ireland Expedition could be interrupted at any time without difficulty.
The President stated that the matter should be explored of sending small groups of men, possibly 50 to a boat, on the convoys which are continuously going back and forth between the United States and Britain, carrying food and raw materials. He stated that on a 40–ship convoy, 2,000 men could be carried; that with two convoys a week, 4,000 men could be moved each week.
Mr. Churchill asked General Marshall if he had looked into the matter of artillery, and General Marshall said it was intended to send several key men who would be introduced to the British matériel. These cadres would be followed by personnel who would take over the matériel in place.
Mr. Churchill asked if the matter of rationing had been looked into. General Marshall stated that this matter was under study but as yet he had had no report. He stated that it is feasible to standardize in some things, but not in all, since the Americans were strongly antagonistic to “plum and apple” and not enthusiastic over British tea. Our World War experience in these respects was both amusing and disturbing.
Mr. Churchill stated that he was very anxious to get the American troops into North Ireland.
Subject: The Far East.
The President asked General Marshall if everything was being done to get troops and planes to the Far East. General Marshall replied that everything possible is being done; there has been some delay in the movement of the Kitty Hawk, but that planes and personnel are available to be moved as fast as ships can take them.
The President then asked if the matter of unity of command had been solved. He stated that this would seem to be most desirable, since there are four forces involved in the Far East.
[Page 103]General Marshall stated that he had brought up the matter yesterday, but that it had not been discussed today.
The President stated that this matter should be considered; that he did not think we were getting the most out of the forces in the Far East.
Mr. Churchill pointed out that in some cases the troops are separated by a thousand miles, and that it is necessary for the person on the spot to play his own hand; that the matter of disposition of forces should be taken care of in Washington—that this is the place for the clearing and disposing house; that a commanding officer could not be a true commander if part of his command were a thousand miles away.3
The President observed that the reports we are getting from the Far East are very sketchy. He stated that his idea was for the commander to have his headquarters in a plane and go from place to place.
Mr. Churchill stated that he would like to take this matter up with the President, and said that the British were very happy at the United States attitude that the Number 1 enemy is Germany.
The President then asked if the Dutch had a good man in command of their forces. Marshal Dill stated that there had been a change recently, but that he understood the new man was good.
Mr. Churchill observed that unity of command is all right where there is a continuous line of battle, such as existed in France in the World War, but that the situation in the Far East is not the same; he felt that command could be best exercised from Washington.
The President stated that we are not getting good information from the Far East, and asked if the Naval Commanders were working together. Admiral King stated that each was working in a certain sphere of action arranged previously by agreement, the Dutch and British generally in the Singapore area and the United States forces farther to the East.
Mr. Churchill stated that he thought Admiral Phillips had worked out an agreement prior to his death.4
Admiral Pound observed that Admiral Leighton [Layton?] had stated that since the outbreak of war, cooperation between Naval forces had weakened and that he thought it could be improved.
The Secretary of the Navy observed that, in his opinion, Mr. Churchill’s argument that a scattered condition of command is an argument against unity of command, is wrong; that, in fact, this scattered condition is an argument for it.
[Page 104]The President pointed out that in case the Japanese should invade Borneo, for instance, Dutch and United States elements working together might be able to attain success, where individually it would be impossible.
The Secretary of the Navy observed that he believed there should be one commander there, working under a directive from Washington.
The President then stated that the matter was one well worth study, and he directed that a study of it be made.5
At 5:30 p.m. the conference adjourned, with the President stating that he would like to have it meet again tomorrow at the same time.6
- Stimson, in his diary for December 26, characterized the meeting as follows: “This was a sort of interim conference to see how the Chiefs of Staff had been getting on in their conferences and everything seems to be going pretty well.” In addition to the minutes and notes on this meeting presented herein, brief notes made by Arnold may be found in the Arnold Papers in the Library of Congress.↩
- See ABC–4/2, post, p. 240.↩
- For a note passed by Beaverbrook to Hopkins at this point in the discussion, see post, p. 273.↩
- For the arrangements worked out by Vice Admiral Phillips, Admiral Hart, and General MacArthur just prior to the outbreak of war in the Pacific, see Matloff and Snell, pp. 76–78.↩
- See the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff, December 27, 1941, post, p. 273.↩
- The Chiefs of Staff met at 3 p.m. on December 27, but it does not appear that they met with the President and the Prime Minister that afternoon.↩