Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

J.C.S. Files

Final Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister ¹

secret
C.C.S. 170/2

[Casablanca,] January 23, 1943.

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 155/1)² the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented their proposals for the Conduct of the War in 1943. These proposals were in broad outline, and we have subsequently examined them and reached certain conclusions on points of detail. We have also studied a number of matters closely related to these proposals. The present memorandum contains a summary of what has been accomplished.

1. Security of Sea Communications:

A close examination of the minimum escort requirements to maintain the sea communications of the United Nations has been completed (C.C.S. 160³). In the course of this examination we have laid down certain scales of ocean-going escort vessels as the minimum acceptable. Our broad conclusion is that the minimum acceptable requirements of escort craft will not be met until about August or September 1943. We ought not to count on the destruction of U-boats at a rate in excess of the production rate before the end of the year. If it is desired to provide escorts for offensive operations, the acceptance of increased losses must be balanced against the importance of the operations in question. We have adopted certain resolutions on measures necessary to intensify the anti-U-boat war. C.C.S. 65th Meeting, Item 1.⁴

2. Assistance to Russia in Relation to Other Commitments:

We have examined the extent of the shipments to Russia required to fulfill United States and British obligations throughout 1943 with a view to estimating the effect of these shipments on other commitments. Our conclusion is that, provided a shipping loss rate of not more than 2.4 percent per month can be relied on, it will be possible to meet full commitments by the end of the calendar year 1943; and we have approved a program of shipments on this basis subject to the proviso that supplies to Russia shall not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations effort.

An essential point is that an agreed loss rate for 1943 shall be established so that all British and American calculations can be made on the same basis. We have accordingly directed the Combined Military Transportation Committee to make an agreed estimate.

We are agreed that in the preparation of the next Protocol with Russia (should this be necessary) to cover the period after July 1, 1943, a clause should be inserted to the effect that the commitments included in the Protocol may be reduced if the shipping losses or the necessities of other operations render their fulfilment prohibitive. (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 1,⁵ and C.C.S. 162.⁶)

3. Operations in the Mediterranean:

(a) Operations For The Capture of Sicily:

We have carefully examined possible operations in the Mediterranean theater and we have recorded the following conclusions: (C.C.S. 66th Meeting, Item 2,⁷ and C.C.S. 161/1⁸).

(1) To attack Sicily in 1943 with the favorable July⁹ moon as the target date.

(2) To instruct General Eisenhower to report not later than March 1st: firstly, whether any insurmountable difficulty as to resources and training will cause the date of the assault to be delayed beyond the favorable July moon; and, secondly, in that event to confirm that the date will not be later than the favorable August moon.

(3) That the following should be the Command set-up for the operation:

a. General Eisenhower to be in Supreme Command with General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, charged with the detailed planning and preparation and with the execution of the actual operation when launched.

b. Admiral Cunningham to be Naval Commander, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander.

c. Recommendations for the officers to be appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders to be submitted in due course by General Eisenhower.

(4) That General Eisenhower should be instructed to set up forthwith, after consultation with General Alexander, a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of Staff, for planning and preparing the operation.

The necessary directive to General Eisenhower conveying the above decisions has been drafted.

(b) Cover Plans:

We intend to instruct the appropriate agencies in Washington and London and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa, to draw up a comprehensive cover plan for the Mediterranean. The possibility of carrying out feints or minor operations in the Eastern Mediterranean will be examined.

(c) Command in the Mediterranean Theater:

We have agreed to the following Command arrangements in the Mediterranean: (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 4¹⁰ and C.C.S. 163¹¹).

(1) Sea:

For operation Husky the Naval Commander Force X will assume the title of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The present Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will be designated Commander-in-Chief, Levant. The boundary between the two Commands will be determined later.¹² The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will, however, be responsible for naval matters which affect the Mediterranean as a whole.

(2) Land:

At a moment to be determined after the British 8th Army has crossed the Tunisian border, General Alexander will become Deputy Commander-in-Chief to General Eisenhower, the 8th Army at the same time being transferred to General Eisenhower’s command. Subject to the concurrence of General Eisenhower, General Alexander’s primary task will be to command the Allied forces on the Tunisian front with a small Headquarters of his own provided from the Middle East and after the conclusion of these operations to take charge of Operation Husky . The boundary between the North African and Middle East Commands will be the Tunisian-Tripolitania frontier.

(3) Air:

We have agreed that Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder shall be appointed Air Commander-in-Chief of the whole Mediterranean theater with his Headquarters at Algiers. Under him will be the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Northwest Africa (General Spaatz), and the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Middle East (Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas). We have defined the relationship and mutual responsibilities of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Forces in Northwest Africa, and we have laid down certain principles for the organization of the Mediterranean Air Command subject to any minor changes which the Air Commander-in-Chief may find necessary after his appointment.

(d) The Bomber Offensive from North Africa:

We have laid down the following as the objects of the bomber offensive from North Africa in order of time (C.C.S. 159/1¹³):

(1) The furtherance of operations for the eviction of all Axis Forces from Africa.

(2) When (1) has been achieved, infliction of the heaviest possible losses on the Axis Air and Naval forces in preparation for Husky, including bombing required by cover plans.

(3) The direct furtherance of Operation Husky.

(4) The destruction of the oil refineries at Ploesti.

So far as is possible without prejudice to the achievement of objects (1), (2), and (3) above, bombing objectives will be chosen with a view to weakening the Italian will to continue the war.

4. Operations in and from the United Kingdom:

(a) The Operation of Air Forces from the United Kingdom:

We have agreed that the United States Heavy Bombardment Units in the United Kingdom shall operate under the strategical direction of the British Chief of the Air Staff. Under this general direction the United States Commanding General will decide upon the technique and method to be employed. (C.C.S. 65th Meeting, Item 2.¹⁴)

We have agreed upon a directive (C.C.S. 166/1/D)¹⁵ to be issued to the British Commander-in-Chief Bomber Command and to the Commanding General United States Air Forces in the United Kingdom.

(b) Bolero:

(C.C.S. 172¹⁶ and C.C.S. 68th Meeting, Item 1¹⁷)

A study has been made of the shipping capabilities for Bolero build-up in 1943.

With the data available at the conference and making a number of assumptions which are set out in full in C.C.S. 172, Enclosure “C”, we calculate that the U.S. Forces as shown in the following table will be available for Continental operations in the U. K. on the dates shown. The figures given in the last column include the build-up of the air contingent to 172,000. They may be regarded as the minimum, and every effort will be made to increase the number of trained and equipped divisions in the United Kingdom by August 15th.¹⁸

	Division	Total Numbers Equipped
By August 15	4	384,000
By September 15	7	509,000
By October 15	9	634,000
By November 15	12	759,000
By December 31	15	938,000

This is based on (1) the figures of 50,000 troops per division with supporting troops; (2) 45 days allowance between sailing date and availability date.

As the movement proceeds the over-all number of men per division will decrease and by the end of the year it may be down to 40,000 in which case the number of divisions available on December 31st may be 19 instead of 15. The number of divisions earlier in the year is unlikely to be increased.

(c) Amphibious Operations in 1943 from the United Kingdom:

(C.C.S. 167¹⁹ and 169²⁰ and C.C.S. 68th Meeting, Item 2.²¹)

We have examined the problem of amphibious operations from the United Kingdom in 1943. There are three types of operation for which plans and preparations must now be made:

(1) Raids with the primary object of provoking air battles and causing enemy losses.

(2) Operations with the object of seizing and holding a bridgehead and, if the state of German morale and resources permit, of vigorously exploiting successes.

(3) A return to the Continent to take advantage of German disintegration.

Plans and preparations for (1) above will proceed as at present. An attack on the Channel Islands is an example of the type of opera-don which we have in mind.

We propose to prepare for an operation against the Cotentin Peninsula with resources which will be available, the target date being set at August 1, 1943. This operation comes under type (2) above.

We have agreed to establish forthwith a Combined Staff under a British Chief of Staff until such time as a British Supreme Commander, with an American Deputy Commander, is appointed. A directive to govern the planning is in course of preparation. We intend to include in this directive provision for a return to the Continent under (3) above with the forces which will be available for the purpose in the United Kingdom month by month.²²

9. [5?] Pacific and Far East Theater:

(a) Operations in the Pacific Theater:

(C.C.S. 168 and C.C.S. 67th Meeting, Item 1.²³)

The following is an outline of the operations which it is intended to carry out in the Pacific in conformity with the provisions of our previous report (C.C.S. 155/1²⁴):

(1) Operations to make the Aleutians as secure as may be.

(2) An advance from Midway towards Truk-Guam as practicable and particularly in conjunction with the operations now in hand for the capture of Rabaul.

(3) An advance along the line Samoa-Jaluit.

(4) An advance on the Malay Barrier (as Timor) on a limited scale to counter enemy capabilities and divert his forces.

(5) It is not intended to advance from the Rabaul area towards the Truk-Guam line unless and until forces are in hand to enable the advance to be carried through and followed up.

(b) Support of China:²⁵

(1) Immediate Operations:

Subsequent to the operations now in progress which are aimed at the capture of Akyab, a limited advance from Assam will be carried out to gain bridgeheads for further operations; to improve the air transport route to China by enabling aircraft to fly at lower altitudes; and, if Chinese cooperation is available, to gain ground for additional airfields and to extend the air warning system.

(2) Operations In China:

In order to support the Chinese war effort, to provide means for intensifying attacks on Japanese shipping, and to strike at Japan herself when opportunity offers, it is intended to improve air transportation into China by supplying additional transport aircraft, and to build up the U.S. Air Forces now operating in China to the maximum extent that logistical limitations and other important claims will permit. We hope that more sustained operations with increased Air Forces may begin in the spring, and we regard this development as of great importance in the general scheme.

(3) Reconquest of Burma and Reopening of the Burma Road:

We have approved November 15, 1943, as the provisional date for the Anakim assault. It will be necessary to decide in July 1943 whether to undertake or to postpone the operation (C.C.S. 65th Meeting, Item 4²⁶).

We have prepared a provisional schedule of the forces required for the operation and have investigated the possibility of their provision. The land and air forces can be provided. The provision of naval forces, assault shipping, landing craft and shipping cannot be guaranteed so far in advance and must depend upon the situation existing in the late summer of 1943 (C.C.S. 164²⁷).

6. The Axis Oil Position:

We have had laid before us certain information from British sources on the Axis oil position (C.C.S. 158²⁸). It is believed that additional information available in Washington may modify the conclusions which have been drawn by the British. We have accordingly directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to submit as early as possible an agreed assessment of the Axis oil situation based on the latest information available from both British and United States sources. In the meanwhile, we have taken note that the Axis oil situation is so restricted that it is decidedly advantageous that bombing attacks on the sources of Axis oil, namely, the Rumanian oil fields and oil traffic via the Danube, and the synthetic and producer gas plants in Germany, be undertaken as soon as other commitments allow (C.C.S. 62nd Meeting, Item 1²⁹).

7. Naval and Air Command in West Africa:

We have agreed upon the following naval and air arrangements to cover the French West African Coast (C.C.S. 61st Meeting, Item 3³⁰):

(a) That the West African Coast (offshore) from Cape Bojador (Rio de Oro) southward shall be an area under command of a British Naval Officer for naval operations and of a British Air Officer for air operations in cooperation with naval forces.

(b) That subject to (a) a sub-area extending from Cape Bojador to the western boundary of Sierra Leone and all forces operating therein shall be under French Command.

(c) That in the French sub-area the intention will be to enable French air units to take over air duties as rapidly as equipment and training permit.

8. Turkey:

We have agreed upon the administrative measures necessary to give effect to the decision that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 2³¹).

1. The original draft of this paper prepared by the Combined Secretariat, designated C.C.S. 170, January 22, 1943, was reviewed and revised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and redesignated C.C.S. 170/1, January 23, 1943. C.C.S. 170/1, as reviewed and revised in conformity to the wishes of the President and the Prime Minister on January 23, 1943 (ante, p. 708), became the final document here printed as C.C.S. 170/2. Variations between C.C.S. 170/1 and C.C.S. 170/2 are indicated in footnotes.
2. Ante, p. 774.
3. C.C.S. 160, January 19, 1943, Report by the Combined Staff Planners entitled “Minimum Escort Requirements to Maintain the Sea Communications of the United Nations”, not printed. Some salient points of this paper are briefly summarized in Leighton and Coakley, pp. 588 and 675.
4. Ante, p. 667.
5. Ante, p. 656.
6. C.C.S. 162, January 19, 1943, a joint memorandum by Somervell and Leathers entitled “U.S. Aid to Russia”, not printed. With the exception of the revisions of paragraphs 14 and 15, which were discussed and agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the morning of January 20, C.C.S. 162 is identical with C.C.S. 162/1, January 20, 1943, ante, p. 778.
7. Ante, p. 681.
8. C.C.S. 161/1, January 21, 1943, Report by the British Joint Planning Staff entitled “Operation Husky ”, not printed, set forth those proposals and recommendations requested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the conclusion of item 1 of their meeting on the morning of January 20, ante, p. 665.
9. A footnote in the source text at this point reads as follows: “We have agreed that without prejudicing the July date for the operation, an intense effort will be made during the next three weeks to achieve by contrivance and ingenuity the favorable June moon period as the date for the operation. If at the end of the three weeks our efforts have proved successful, the instructions to General Eisenhower will be modified accordingly.” This annotation was not included in the earlier version of the Report (C.C.S. 170/1), but it was included in this final version by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the evening of January 23 in conformity with the wishes of Roosevelt and Churchill expressed at their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff earlier on the same day.
10. Ante, p. 660.
11. C.C.S. 163, January 20, 1943, Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff entitled “System of Air Command in the Mediterranean”, not printed.
12. In the earlier version of the Report (C.C.S. 170/1), this sentence read as follows: “The boundary between the two Commands will be drawn from Zanti [Zante] to Bardia.”
13. Ante, p. 777.
14. Ante, p. 669.
15. Ante, p. 781.
16. C.C.S. 172, January 22, 1943, Note by Lieutenant General Somervell entitled “Shipping Capabilities for Bolero Build-up”, not printed; for a discussion and summary of the salient points of this paper, see Leighton and Coakley, pp. 676–677.
17. Ante, p. 697.
18. The final sentence of this paragraph had not been included in the earlier version of the Report (C.C.S. 170/1).
19. Ante, p. 785.
20. Ante, p. 789. In the earlier version of the Report (C.C.S. 170/1) there was no reference at this point to C.C.S. 169.
21. Ante, p. 698.

22. This last paragraph under (c) (3) was revised at the final meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the evening of January 23. In the earlier version of the Report (C.C.S. 170/1) this paragraph read as follows:

    “We have agreed to establish forthwith a Combined Staff under a British Chief of Staff until such time as a Supreme Commander is appointed. A directive to govern the planning is in course of preparation. We intend to include in this directive provision for a return to the Continent under (3) above with the forces which will be available for the purpose in the United Kingdom month by month. The directive win also make provision for the planning of an invasion of the Continent in force in 1944.” (J.C.S. Files)

23. For the text of C.C.S. 168, January 22, 1943, memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff entitled “Conduct of the War in the Pacific Theater in 1943”, see Morton, Appendix H, p. 627. At their meeting on the afternoon of January 22, 1943, ante, p. 687, the Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of the proposals set forth by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 168.
24. Ante, p. 774.
25. This section “(b) Support of China” did not appear in the earlier version of the Report (C.C.S. 170/1). C.C.S. 170/1 did contain a section “(b) Reconquest of Burma” which was identical in content with the present paragraph (b) (3) below entitled “Reconquest of Burma and Reopening of the Burma Road”.
26. Ante, p. 673.
27. Not printed; Combined Chiefs of Staff consideration of this paper is recorded in Item 4 of the minutes of the meeting of January 21, 1943, ante, p. 673.
28. Not printed.
29. Ante, p. 648.
30. Ante, p. 638.
31. Ante, p. 659.