J. C. S. Files
Note by the Combined Staff Planners 1
C.C.S. 169
Proposed Organization of Command, Control, Planning and Training for Operations for a Reentry to the Continent Across the Channel, Beginning in 1943
1. Strategic Basis: The Combined Chiefs of Staff agree that there is no chance of our being able to stage a large scale invasion of the Continent against unbroken opposition during 1943. Their policy is, however, that we should:
- (a)
- Undertake such limited operations as may be practicable with the forces available and
- (b)
- Assemble the strongest possible force (subject to certain prior commitments in other theaters) in constant readiness to reenter the Continent as soon as German resistance is weakened to the required extent.
2. The organization should therefore provide for:
- (a)
- Small scale amphibious operations, such as the progressive re-occupation of the Channel Islands.
- (Note: Raids are already adequately taken care of by the existing organization.)
- (b)
- The need to reenter the Continent with all available forces at the shortest possible notice in the event of a sudden and unexpected collapse of German resistance, The aim would be to seize critical political and military centers in Germany in the shortest possible time.
- (c)
- Operations to seize a bridgehead late in 1943, leading up to a rapid exploitation or
- (d)
- An invasion in force in 1944.
3. Need for a Directive: The first thing that is essential, whatever organization is set up, is a clear directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff setting out the objects of the plans and the resources likely to be available. In this latter connection some inevitable difficulty arises from the fact that—except for the operation in paragraph 2 (a)—preparations for the other possible operations must be based, not on any given strength of forces available nor on any fixed estimate of enemy opposition to be encountered, but on the maximum forces that are likely to be available in the U. K. at any given time. Moreover, it is virtually impossible to fix a date, because that must depend entirely on the state of enemy resistance on the Continent.
All plans and preparations must therefore be extremely flexible.
4. Training: In order that training and preparation of the forces may not be unduly hampered by the maintenance of an unnecessarily high state of readiness, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should issue instructions on this point. In the first instance, the degree of notice might be fixed at three months. But planning for the operation described in paragraph 2 (b) above must be on the basis of immediate reentry into the Continent at the shortest possible notice with whatever resources are available at the time.
5. Principles of Command and Planning: It is suggested that 2 (a), small scale operations, such as the Channel Islands, should they be considered desirable either separately or as part of a larger operation, could adequately be dealt with by C.C.O.’s organization on the same lines as was the Dieppe raid.2
6. As regards the larger operations in 2 (b), (c), and (d), the governing principle should be that the responsibility for planning and training should rest with, or under the direction of, the Commanders who will have to carry out the plans, who will be the same Commanders for all three operations. These should be designated at once.
7. Supreme Command: This raises the question of a Supreme Commander. It is considered that when the operations in 2 (b) to (d) become reasonably imminent, a Supreme Commander must be appointed. He should have a small combined staff of British and American officers of all three services, and under him will be subordinate commanders, air, land and sea, corresponding to the organization just approved for the operations in the Mediterranean.
It is considered desirable that the Supreme Commander should be appointed at once. If this is not feasible, his Chief of Staff or Deputy [Page 791] and a nucleus of the combined staff should be appointed immediately to give the necessary impetus and cohesion to planning.
8. The present “Round-Up” Planning Staff: For some months a special inter-Allied staff drawn from all three services has been in existence working together in one building in London, studying the problem and planning for a return to the Continent. In this way much specialized experience has been gained and planning has progressed far beyond the staff study stage. In particular, a great deal of administrative work has been done and measures—such as the acquisition and preparation of airfields—actually put in hand.
9. This special planning staff should be adapted to the new conditions and strengthened by the addition of American personnel. They should work, under the direction of the Supreme Commander (or his deputy until he is appointed), in conjunction with the nucleus of his combined staff in London.
Administrative planning will have to be done very largely by the normal administrative staffs in the Service Departments and in H.Q. E.T.O. U.S.A. These Headquarters should, however, appoint representatives to form, together with the Administrative Staff in Norfolk House, a joint administrative planning staff for the reentry to the Continent.
One of the first tasks of the Supreme Commander (or his deputy) should be to simplify the existing system of interdepartmental administrative planning which, at present, is unduly cumbersome.