Roosevelt Papers1

The Secretary of State to the President 2

My Dear Mr. President: After giving careful consideration to all of the circumstances in connection with the St. Pierre-Miquelon situation and with a view to arriving at an acceptable solution I have drafted the enclosed suggested telegram to Admiral Leahy setting forth a formula for the settlement of the matter. My suggestion would be that before sending this telegram in the event you approve it the telegram be submitted to the British and Canadian Governments for their concurrence.

Without specifically stating so this would amount to a trusteeship. It seems to me advisable to steer away from any specific statement implying a trusteeship, or an administration by the three Governments for the reason that we are likely to run counter to provisions in the Habana Convention which as you know provides for the administration of regions of this hemisphere under certain circumstances by the American Republics. I do not think that we should give the other Republics occasion to feel that we are circumventing the Convention through the establishment by the United States, Great Britain and Canada of an administration of the Islands.

On the question of bringing about the removal of de Gaulle’s forces from the Islands I am sure that you have in mind our commitments to Vichy and Admiral Robert on which they have been and are now counting and to which they have referred. In your message of December 13 to Marshal Pétain which Admiral Leahy transmitted textually to Marshal Pétain you stated that

“You may rest assured that the Government of the United States under present circumstances and in view of the instructions which you have issued to Admiral Robert will continue to give full recognition to the agreement reached by our two governments involving the maintenance of the status quo of the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere.”3

Moreover in the letter which you handed to Mr. Matthews for transmission to Marshal Pétain you stated

“I again repeat that as long as French sovereign control remains in reality purely French, subject solely to the limitations of the Armistice [Page 394] Agreement, the Government of the United States has no desire to see existing French sovereignty over French North Africa or over any of French colonies pass to the control of any other nation.”4

Admiral Robert has already referred in connection with the St. Pierre Miquelon incident to your communication of December 13 and has stated that he regards this Government “as obligated to obtain the reestablishment of French sovereignty over St. Pierre Miquelon”.5

We have already discussed the application of the Habana Convention to this situation and I do not need to go into that here. I am confident, however, that the American Republics are watching the matter and will not be loathe to view our action with circumspection.

If the proposed telegram meets with your approval I shall at once take it up with the British and Canadian Governments.6

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull
[Enclosure]

Draft Telegram to the American Ambassador at Vichy

Your 15, January 5, 7 p.m.7 In consultation with the British and Canadian Governments we have given very careful study and consideration to the situation created by the occupation of St. Pierre-Miquelon, which was accomplished without the consent or knowledge of any of these three Governments. With a view to reaching a solution satisfactory to the governments concerned, and with the concurrence of the British and Canadian Governments, we have worked out the following formula:

“Suggested arrangement with regard to St. Pierre-Miquelon:

1.
The islands are French and will remain French.
2.
To avoid any potential threat to the shipping of the Governments concerned, the use of the wireless stations on the islands will be subject to supervision and control by observers appointed by the American and Canadian Governments and attached to their respective consulates.
3.
The islands shall be neutralized and demilitarized and shall be considered out of the war.
4.
The present Administrator shall be withdrawn for the period of the war; the appointment of an Administrator shall be withheld for the same period, and the administration of the islands shall be left in the hands of the Consultative Council.
5.
All armed forces will be withdrawn.
6.
The Canadian and American Governments agree and undertake to continue economic assistance to the inhabitants of the islands and the respective consuls of those countries will confer with the local authorities as to the nature of the assistance to be given.”

This formula is in conformity with the commitments given by this Government.

We fully realize the concern and anxiety of the French Government in maintaining the integrity of its colonial possessions. We feel that the formula submitted, with its guarantee that the islands shall remain French, and with the undertaking to continue economic assistance to St. Pierre and Miquelon, will fully safeguard the French Government’s concern about these islands during the war.

You should see Marshal Pétain at the earliest possible moment and impress upon him the importance of reaching a solution along these lines which maintains the purely French tradition of these islands for the future. You may, in your discretion, point out that time is of the essence, since the longer the matter remains in its present status the more likely it is to become crystallized and the more difficult it will be to bring about a satisfactory solution.

We have shown this telegram to the Canadian and British Governments and it has their full concurrence.

Until we receive an expression of opinion from the French Government regarding this formula, the matter will not be discussed with Admiral Robert or the French Ambassador.

C. H.
  1. The copy of this memorandum in the Department’s files (851A.01/87A) does not have the enclosure mentioned in the memorandum.
  2. Hull (vol. ii, p. 1135) states that the President was at his home at Hyde Park, New York, when this letter was sent to him. The President’s appointment calendar (Roosevelt Papers) indicates that Roosevelt was away from the White House from January 7 through January 10.
  3. Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. ii, p. 499.
  4. Ibid., p. 206.
  5. See Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, p. 661.
  6. The President apparently insisted that the telegram not be sent to Vichy, at least until he had had an opportunity to discuss the matter with Churchill, who was away from Washington, January 6–11, on a trip to Florida. See the document infra, and Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 691–698. There is no indication that the telegram actually was sent.
  7. Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, p. 660.